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ABSTRACT 
The concepts of safety culture and safety climate have received a great deal of attention from 
safety professionals and academic researchers as efficient non-technological means of reducing 
injuries and accidents within various industries. However, there is conceptual confusion 
regarding these constructs as there is a lack of single, unified theoretical and operational 
definitions for both of these constructs, which has led to a vast number of assessment tools with 
questionable validity and applicability. In this thesis, the author addressed some of these 
conceptual issues.  The thesis reports two studies. In Study one, the author conducted a 
conceptual analysis of the two constructs, which included analysis of theoretical definitions of 
safety culture and safety climate, analysis of their operational definitions, and assessment of 
congruency between these types of definitions.  Finally, a theoretical definition and an 
operational definition was developed and presented for each of these constructs.  This conceptual 
analysis was complemented by the analysis of corresponding literature. In Study two, the 
researcher focused on developing and verifying a self-report measure for assessing safety climate 
in the College of Engineering.  The developed theoretical and operational definitions for safety 
climate were used to develop the Saskatchewan Safety Climate Questionnaire. This 
questionnaire was administered to 267 students in the College of Engineering at a Canadian 
University. The developed Safety Climate Questionnaire demonstrated adequate psychometric 
properties and highlighted the link between safety climate and students’ experience with injuries 
and near misses on campus. The safety climate scores were found to be related to students’ 
discipline, previous work experience in industry, students’ experience with injuries and near 
misses, and witnessing injuries and near misses.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW 
Just outside the small town of Pripyat, Ukraine on April 26th 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant experienced one of the most devastating accidents in the nuclear power industry’s 
history. An unexpected power surge within one of the nuclear reactors resulted in a fire that sent 
highly radioactive fallout into the atmosphere (Schmid, 2011). The effects of this nuclear 
explosion are still felt decades later, with approximately 31 deaths directly attributed to the 
Chernobyl accident; as well, an additional 4,000 deaths from cancer and other diseases are 
related to the effects of the radiation (Jaworowski, 2010). Due to the severe nature of the 
accident, a thorough analysis of the causes surrounding the Chernobyl accident was conducted 
by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG). Upon reviewing the dynamics 
that lead up to the accident, an interesting phenomenon regarding the non-technological, human 
aspect of safety was uncovered.  
1.1 Current Problems within the Concept of Safety Culture and Climate 
1.1.1 Culture of Safety: A New Safety-Related Phenomenon Discovered 
After reviewing the statements and reports of the employees and managers at the time of 
the Chernobyl accident, the INSAG inspectors found that the employees and managers were 
overlooking the non-technological aspect of safety, which involves the organizational and 
individual aspects of safety that are controlled by humans, such as their attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviors. The attitudes and behaviors at the time of the accident among all workers reflected a 
disregard for safety through negligence towards safety regulations, a lack of communication 
between managers and employees, and prioritizing secrecy over safety (Schmid, 2011).  
Firstly, it was found that on the day of the Chernobyl explosion several operators 
disconnected the technical protection systems that were in place to keep an accident such as this 
from occurring. This was done in order to test one of the generators; however, safety regulations 
were not properly followed (Schmid, 2011). While not found to be the direct cause of the 
accident, such a breach in safety protocol suggests a disregard for the regulations put in place to 
protect both employees and citizens. Furthermore, it also suggests a lack of knowledge among 
employees about the purpose and necessity of these protection systems, possibly due to 
insufficient training.  
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Secondly, it was discovered that there were oversights present in the communication and 
circulation of information within the nuclear power plant. When managers discovered there was 
a design flaw with one of the parts of the reactors, they were quick to modify the operating 
instructions to account for this defect. However, it was deemed unnecessary to inform the 
employees responsible for using this piece of equipment about the issue (Schmid, 2011). As 
such, this lack of communication lead to the operating staff remaining unaware of the defect in 
the equipment. Therefore, they did not fully comprehend why it was necessary to meticulously 
adhere to the modified instructions when handling the equipment.  
Finally, a review of the accident demonstrated that there was greater priority placed on 
maintaining secrecy surrounding nuclear affairs compared to the safety of the employees and 
citizens. After the initial explosion and radiation leak, the plant managers attempted to cover up 
the severity of the situation, resulting in the explosion going unreported for days. The Chernobyl 
accident was only officially reported once the radioactive cloud set off Swedish radiation 
detectors, and by this time many employees and civilians were in danger of experiencing high 
radiation exposure (Schmid, 2011). If a greater priority had been placed on safety rather than 
keeping information classified, citizens could have been evacuated sooner, thereby reducing the 
explosion’s harmful effects.    
The non-technological aspects of safety that were discovered at Chernobyl are 
characterized by the safety-related attitudes and behaviors of both employees and managers. The 
behaviors at the time of the incident demonstrate that safety was not a priority at either the 
individual or organizational level. At the individual level, the employees’ poor attitudes towards 
safety were evident through the act of disregarding essential safety measures and disconnecting 
vital protection systems. Moreover, the decision made by management to cover up the nuclear 
explosion and neglect to provide proper training to their employees demonstrates that safety was 
not viewed as a priority at the organizational level. The International Nuclear Safety Advisory 
Group (INSAG) classified this phenomenon as a defect within the “culture of safety” in the 
nuclear power plant and it was this defect which ultimately lead to the Chernobyl accident.  
1.1.1.1 Initial definition of the concept. The INSAG defined safety culture as “that 
assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, 
as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 
significance” (IAEA, 1991; as cited by Cooper, 2000, p. 113). This definition is in line with the 
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flaws in the non-technological aspects of safety which were discovered at Chernobyl, as both 
individuals and management were neglecting the importance of safety. The definition developed 
by the INSAG focuses on the collective characteristics, such as values, beliefs, and attitudes that 
determine how safety is prioritized.  
1.1.2 Safety Culture and Organizational Performance 
Safety culture has been studied extensively since the concept was conceived in 1986, 
attracting the attention of safety practitioners and researchers alike. After this concept entered the 
occupational health and safety research, researchers focused their investigations into how safety 
culture impacts injury rates, production quality, employee turnover, job satisfaction, and 
organizational cohesion.  
1.1.2.1 Injury rates. Reducing injury1 and fatality rates is the primary safety goal of any 
organization. Vredenburgh (2002) studied the relationship between safety culture and hospital 
employee injury rates, in which injury rate data included needle punctures, sprains, fractures, 
infectious diseases, or crushed fingers and hands that occurred in the past three months. In this 
study, safety culture was assessed with a perception survey which included the following factors: 
rewards, training, hiring, communication, participation, and management support. The safety 
culture survey score was negatively related to injury rates, as higher safety culture scores were 
related to fewer injuries. O'Toole (2002) found a relationship among employees of a concrete 
production company between safety perception survey scores and injury rates. The safety 
perception survey was used as a measure to assess the respondent’s perception of the safety 
culture at the company. In this study, employees with a higher score on the perception survey 
were less likely to report experiencing injuries at work compared to employees with a low score 
on the perception survey. Additionally, O'Toole (2002) was able to reduce the organization’s 
injury rates by improving the safety culture within the organization. The relationship between a 
strong safety culture and reduced injury rates has also been found in the lumber industry 
(Varonen & Mattila, 2000), the offshore oil and gas industry (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003), 
as well as the manufacturing, construction, and transportation industries (Huang, Ho, Smith, & 
Chen, 2006).   
                                                          
1 Injuries are defined as “physical harm or damage to a person resulting in the marring of appearance, personal 
discomfort, infection, and/or bodily hurt or impairment” (Lack, 2001). 
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1.1.2.2 Quality of production. It is a common belief that an organization focused on 
safety must sacrifice their productivity, but this need not be the case. Few studies were available 
that directly link production quality and safety culture; however, there are several studies that 
have found relations among injury rates and production quality. Following the logic of the 
previous discussion, production quality is indirectly linked to safety culture; that is, safety 
culture is related to low injury rates which in turn promotes higher quality performance. To 
illustrate this, Wanberg, Harper, Hallowell, and Rajendran (2013) determined the relationship 
between production quality and safety performance among 32 construction sites. Safety 
performance was assessed as any recordable injury that required receiving first aid or a hospital 
visit, while quality performance was assessed using the total number of defects found or units 
needing to be reworked on the construction site. The researchers found that the recordable injury 
rate was positively correlated with need to rework, in that a project with a higher rate of injuries 
was more likely to demonstrate poor quality of work (Wanberg et al., 2013).  
Similarly, Hinze and Parker (1978) demonstrated that supervisors who were safety 
conscious and ensured their employees were not injured on the job, were also more likely to 
meet their proposed job costs and time schedules. The relationship between lower injury rates 
and increased productivity has also been found in the manufacturing industry (O'Toole, 2002) 
and the nuclear power industry (Lee & Harrison, 2000). It is also important to consider that a 
high number of injuries within a company results in increased insurance costs and decreased 
productivity due to the time lost because of these injuries and the necessary shut-down of 
equipment (Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007b). So, not only are fewer injuries related to 
improved productivity, but it is also avoids related negative outcomes. 
1.1.2.3 Job satisfaction. Safety culture has also been shown to relate to increased job 
satisfaction. Modak, Sexton, Lux, Helmreich, and Thomas (2007) had hospital staff complete a 
safety attitudes questionnaire in order to assess the safety culture of their hospital. It was found 
that nurses with the highest scores on the safety attitudes questionnaire also had the highest job 
satisfaction and positive attitudes towards working conditions. Additionally, employees who 
work in organizations with low incident rates experience higher job satisfaction and higher 
satisfaction with the tasks they are assigned (Lee, 1998). This link between low injury rates and 
high job satisfaction has also been found in road and bridge construction in Finland (Niskanen, 
1994) and building construction in Hong Kong (Siu, Phillips, & Leung, 2004). These 
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associations may also mean that, because safer employees experience fewer injuries, employees 
require less work-related injury leave. Consequently, this saves the company the costs associated 
with recruiting and training new employees. 
 1.1.2.4 Employee turnover. Employee turnover has also been found to relate to safety 
culture. For example, using education and training techniques, Pronovost and colleagues (2005) 
implemented a comprehensive safety program designed to improve safety culture among nurses. 
Safety culture was assessed with a standardized medical safety survey. The researchers found 
that turnover decreased from 9% to 2% after the intervention, which was a practically significant 
change for this organization (Pronovost et al., 2005). This link between low injury rates and 
decreased employee turnover has also been found in other hospital studies (Colla, Bracken, 
Kinney, & Weeks, 2005), as well as in the aviation (Dı́az & Cabrera, 1997) and chemical 
industries (Barling & Hutchinson, 2000). 
1.1.2.5 Communication and interpersonal cohesion. A strong safety culture is also 
related to improved communication and teamwork. Blegen and colleagues (2010) analyzed the 
safety culture of a hospital before and after a communication intervention program was 
implemented. The intervention on communication and teamwork significantly improved the 
safety culture among the three included hospitals. Similarly, Hsu, Lee, Wu, and Takano (2010) 
analyzed Taiwanese companies that were improving their safety practises. They found that 
increased emphasis on safe practice was linked to more harmonious relationships, increased trust 
among employees, and improved team collaboration.  
1.1.2.6 Concluding remarks. As illustrated, safety culture has been found to have 
crucial implications for workplaces among a variety of industries. There are many outcomes of a 
strong safety culture that would benefit an organization, ranging from low injury rates, to 
improved quality of production and improved employee relationships. Therefore, safety culture 
is a valuable concept that can be used to improve employees’ well-being and an organization’s 
productivity. However, the relationships between safety culture and climate and these beneficial 
outcomes are not always direct. Safety culture is a complex phenomenon that is not necessarily 
directly related to these beneficial outcomes. According to Cooper (2000), safety culture is a sub-
feature of organizational culture. Many other sub-features are also included within organizational 
culture, including employee creativity, motivation, autonomy, risk-taking, teamwork, resources, 
decision making, learning from incidents, employee participant, and a multitude of other 
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constructs (Naranjo-Valencia, Jimenez-Jimenez, & Sanz-Valle, 2016). These constructs are all 
interconnected, in that high productivity, good management, low stress, and a strong safety 
culture may all work together to result in employees with high job satisfaction and a desirable 
workplace. This interconnectedness makes it difficult to determine a single, simple direct 
relationship between these constructs, which is further compounded by the differences present in 
each organization.   
It is important to note that the current research on safety culture also demonstrates that 
there is a very broad range of theoretical and operational definitions of this construct among 
researchers, making comparisons between and applications of safety culture studies highly 
problematic. Even among the above studies, researchers utilized a variety of operational 
definitions to represent safety culture, ranging from the number of injuries within an organization 
(Wanberg et al., 2013), the effectiveness of an intervention program (Blegen et al., 2010), the 
scores on employee attitude questionnaires (Modak et al., 2007) and perception surveys 
(O'Toole, 2002). To make this concept more useful, researchers have to have a clear and 
relatively standard understanding of the nature of this safety phenomenon, as well as well-
defined concepts and assessment instruments to investigate it. Without such clarity the concept 
of safety culture may lose its potential as an important non-technological factor within 
organizational functioning. The following section provides an overview of the competing 
definitions of safety culture, highlighting the need for greater clarity and specificity in this area.  
1.1.3 Safety Culture Theoretical Definitions 
A theoretical definition “attempts to describe the essence of a phenomenon in a way that 
represents a basic truth” (Corsini, 2002, p. 257). In other words, a theoretical definition involves 
the nature or mechanism of the phenomena under study. It articulates in theoretical terms an idea 
of what researchers plan to study. Theoretical definitions are important as they allow researchers 
to differentiate between related phenomenon by providing a boundary line of what a specific 
construct is and what it is not. Theoretical definitions also allow researchers to understand what 
it is they are studying as, without this understanding, researchers cannot adequately assess the 
construct. Continued attempts to assess a construct, without a solid theoretical definition of what 
it is, constitutes an inappropriate and poor research practice.  
According to Edwards and Armstrong (2013) “safety culture can be viewed as the 
assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared by members of an 
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organisation, which interact with an organisation’s structures and systems and the broader 
contextual setting to result in those external, readily-visible, practices that influence safety” (p. 
77). This definition highlights safety culture as a collective phenomenon that influences the 
organizational structure, as well as management and safety practices. Conversely, according to 
Olive, O’Connor, and Mannan (2006), “safety culture can be viewed as the overarching policies 
and goals set by an organization relating to the overall safety of their facility or environment” (p. 
133). In this definition, researchers exclusively highlight the organizational role of structuring 
safety management. Individual workers and their communities are excluded from the creation of 
such policies and goals. Cabrera, Isla, and Vilela (1997) suggest another definition involving 
“shared perceptions [about safety] of organizational members and their work environment and, 
more precisely, about their organizational safety policies” (p. 257). This definition is focused not 
on behaviors or attitudes, but on the perceptions of employees; this is more closely related to the 
concept of safety climate which will be discussed later.  
Furthermore, the above three definitions contain different components compared to the 
definition suggested by the INSAG above (p. 3). While the definition from the INSAG states that 
safety culture includes the attitudes of members of the organization and is determined by whether 
safety is a priority, none of the above proposed definitions mention that safety culture involves 
safety being viewed as a priority (Edwards & Armstrong, 2013; Olive et al., 2006; Cabrera et al., 
1997). Conversely, Olive and colleagues (2006) and Cabrera and colleagues (1997) agree that 
organizational policies are integral to safety culture; however, policies are not mentioned in the 
INSAG’s definition. These contradictions illustrate that among the three different teams of 
researchers purporting to study the same topic, there are significant differences in their 
theoretical definitions of safety culture.  
Overall, this varied understanding of the phenomenon, results each from research team 
developing their own definition of safety culture, as evidenced by the 37 definitions provided in 
Appendix A. Lack of a unified theoretical definition demonstrates a lack of understanding about 
the nature of and mechanism underlying safety culture. Consequently, any attempts to 
operationalize this concept in order to develop assessment instruments is hindered by the 
uncertainty of what the safety culture concept entails. Subsequently, the absence of congruent 
theoretical and operational definitions have led to the design of an abundance of safety culture 
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instruments which makes comparative analysis between studies on safety culture nearly 
impossible.  
1.1.3.1 Concluding remarks. In my thesis, I decided to elaborate on the nature of the 
phenomenon of safety culture by conceptually analyzing the existing definitions, with the aim of 
providing a more encompassing and unified definition of safety culture. A more unified 
definition will provide a basis for a developed theoretically meaningful instrument for assessing 
the construct, as well as developing the functional strategies required for establishing a strong 
safety culture. If we do not understand the nature of safety culture, then we cannot treat it when it 
becomes defective.  
Before moving to an analysis of the various safety culture operational definitions, there is 
another concept that must be discussed. The widely used concept of safety climate emerged 
before the introduction of the concept of safety culture and is often used interchangeably (Zohar, 
1980). In order to fully address safety culture we cannot avoid discussing the phenomenon and 
concept of safety climate.  
1.1.4 History and Theoretical Definition of Safety Climate 
Before the safety culture concept was coined, the concept of safety climate was used to 
assess the collective non-technological aspect of safety performance (Zohar, 1980). It was not 
until the latter half of the 20th century that researchers began to investigate the differences 
between organizations where employees exhibited high-risk versus low-risk safety behavior. 
Zohar (1980) reviewed the literature and demonstrated that, in companies where safety was 
given high priority, there was a lower number of incidents and injuries; to explain these 
differences he introduced the concept of safety climate. Zohar (1980) sought to use this concept 
to explain which organizations were at a higher risk of experiencing safety-related incidents. 
When the concept of safety culture emerged in 1986, a conceptual confusion emerged among 
safety researchers, as both concepts targeted the non-technological aspect of safety performance. 
The presence of both concepts - safety climate and safety culture - within the literature adds to 
the contemporary confusion when defining and conceptualizing the collective and non-
technological aspects of organizational safety. Therefore, in addition to clarifying the 
understanding of the safety culture phenomenon, it becomes necessary to differentiate it from the 
concept of climate in order to make the concepts usable.   
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In comparison to the concept of safety culture, the notion of climate reflects the opinions 
and perceptions of employees about their organization’s policies and management actions about 
safety. Zohar (1980) illustrates this with the following definition of safety climate: “a summary 
of molar perceptions that employees share about their work environments” (p. 96). These 
perceptions are then used as a frame of reference to determine which behaviors are acceptable 
and which will lead to an increased risk of injury. Zohar’s definition of safety climate is fairly 
broad and does not provide a detailed understanding of what safety climate entails. Many other 
researchers have created their own definition of safety climate; Appendix B provides 24 
definitions of safety climate, illustrating the extent of the existing conceptual diversity. For 
example, Denison (1996) defines safety climate as “perceptions of ‘observable’ practices and 
procedures that are closer to the ‘surface’ of organization life” (p. 622). In this definition, safety 
climate is described as perceptions of what is observed and practiced in organizations; thus, it 
addresses the manifest aspects of safety regarding organizational functioning. According to 
Allen, Baran, and Scott (2010), safety climate “refers to a type of organizational climate in which 
employees perceive that management, rewards, supports, and expects safe practices” (p. 750). 
All three of these definitions agree that safety climate focuses on the employees’ perceptions of 
safety norms and practices within their organization. However, Zohar (1980) believes these 
perceptions are shared and directed towards the work environment. Conversely, Denison (1996) 
suggests that the perceptions are directed towards observable behavior, as they deal with surface 
features. Lastly, Allen and colleagues (2010) proposes that safety climate is primarily concerned 
with employees perceptions about management.  
As demonstrated, the concept of safety climate has an abundance of varied definitions 
that require analysis. However, there is another area of conceptual confusion surrounding the 
concept of safety climate. In addition to the disagreement surrounding the definition of safety 
climate, there is also uncertainty surrounding the relationship between notions of safety culture 
and safety climate.  
1.1.4.1 Relationship between safety culture and climate. Safety researchers are 
currently divided on whether concepts of safety climate and safety culture are assessing the same 
or separate phenomena. Some researchers believe that safety climate and safety culture are two 
distinct constructs (Mearns, Flin, Fleming, & Gordon, 1997; Reichers & Schneider, 1990), 
whereas others use them interchangeably (Denison, 1996; Glick, 1985). Furthermore, Choudhry, 
10 
  
Fang, and Mohamed (2007a) suggest that safety climate is actually a subcomponent of safety 
culture. Colla and colleagues (2005) support this point as they consider safety climate the 
“measureable components of safety culture” (p. 364), as safety climate assessing more concrete, 
easily observable aspects of safety compared to safety culture. Nevertheless, safety climate is 
more often associated with perceptions of safety, while safety culture is associated with shared 
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of employees (Guldenmund, 2000). 
This suggests that the notions of safety climate and safety culture are related to similar, 
but distinct phenomena; however, confirming evidence of this is lacking. That is why another 
objective of my project is to provide comparative analysis of the two concepts to inform their 
relations with each other.  
1.1.4.2 Concluding remarks. As with safety culture, the proposed theoretical definitions 
for safety climate are varied and broad, making conceptualization exceedingly difficult. 
Therefore, in this thesis I clarify the concept of safety climate by analyzing existing definitions in 
order to formulate a single, inclusive definition. Additionally, I analyze the relationship between 
safety culture and safety climate to investigate whether they are separate or distinct concepts, or 
whether safety climate is best understood as a subcomponent of safety culture. 
1.1.5 Problems with Operational Definitions of Safety Culture and Safety Climate  
In conjunction with a concept’s theoretical definition, it is also necessary to have its 
operational definition. An operational definition refers to “the precise operations (methods) by 
which any phenomenon or construct is . . . determined or measured” (Corsini, 2002, p. 668). In 
other words an operational definition involves describing the methods or procedures that can be 
used to assess and measure the concept or phenomenon. It is important to have consistent 
operational definitions for a construct, as it allows researchers to consistently measure a 
construct across samples and contexts. Furthermore, if the operational definition is based on the 
theoretical definition of the construct, then this results in more theoretically sound research, as 
the theoretical definition explains the phenomena, the operational definition states how the 
phenomena should be measured, and the assessment tool assesses the construct (Smith, 2015). 
Operational definitions are particularly important when studying safety, as a correctly formulated 
operational definition allows all employees within an organization to understand “safety” or 
“injury” in the exact same way, across contexts and time (Smith, 2015).  
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To further complicate the relationship between safety culture and safety climate, there is 
also an abundance of operational definitions that are used to build assessment tools for these 
concepts. For example, safety culture is operationally defined in the Safety Culture Scale (Wu, 
Lin, & Shiau, 2010) through items such as, “Colleagues often fall or slip at work” (p. 428). This 
operationalization focuses on the participant’s objective observations about the behavior and 
practices of their colleagues.  
Conversely, the Safety Climate Questionnaire (SCQ) (Currie & Watterson, 2010) 
operationally defines the current workplace’s safety climate as, “This is a safer place to work 
than other [places] I have worked for” (p. 37). This operationalization consists of the employee’s 
opinion or attitude regarding their previous workplace. Thirdly, the Safety Culture Questionnaire 
(Carroll, 1998) operationally defines safety culture through “Management makes workers feel 
uncomfortable about raising concerns” (p. 276). This operationalization emphasizes 
management’s behavior and attitude towards safety. As such, the operational definitions for 
safety culture and safety climate are very diverse and it is uncertain which operationalizations are 
the most valid and reliable. A consistency in operationalizing these constructs is crucially 
important for creating standard and comparable assessment tools by which safety culture and 
safety climate in different organization can be meaningfully compared and analyzed. 
1.1.5.1 Congruency between theoretical and operational definitions. In order for a 
concept to be useful and applicable there needs to be congruence between the concept’s 
theoretical and operational definitions. Without this congruence, any assessment instruments that 
are developed based on this incongruity will be flawed, due to issues with construct validity, 
creating further confusion among researchers. Appendix H illustrates the disagreement between 
how researchers have defined safety culture and safety climate and how they have 
operationalized these concepts. As can be seen from Appendix H, the majority of theoretical 
definitions do not have corresponding operational definitions, which makes assessing the 
congruency between them difficult. Even when the researchers include both theoretical and 
operational definitions in their study, these definitions do not always correspond, such that the 
theoretical definition will refer to safety culture while the corresponding operationalization is 
addressing safety climate. For example, the instrument used by the researchers is called the 
Safety Climate assessment toolkit (Cox & Cheyne, 2000); however the corresponding theoretical 
definition is directed towards safety culture, which results in an incongruity. Additionally, Cox 
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and Cheyne (2000) define safety culture as “an enduring aspect of the organisation with trait-like 
properties and not easily changed” (p. 114). However, the corresponding operationalizations 
include “Personally, I feel that safety issues are not the most important aspect of my job” and “I 
believe that safety issues are not assigned a high priority.” The operational definitions do not 
include anything on the enduring aspect of safety culture or that it demonstrates trait-like 
properties. In this case, incongruences with the definitions and operationalizations of safety 
culture and safety climate result in later inconsistencies when assessing these concepts, as safety 
climate scales are commonly used when assessing safety culture. This is a major drawback in the 
literature as it promotes further conceptual confusion.  
1.1.5.2 Concluding remarks. In my thesis, I analyzed the previously presented 
operational definitions for safety culture and safety climate and assessed their congruency to 
their theoretical definitions. This illustrates the need for more rigour when developing safety 
culture and safety climate assessment tools, as congruence between these theoretical and 
operational definitions provides a solid foundation for the development of a valid assessment 
tool.   
1.1.6 Assessments and Measures for Safety Culture and Safety Climate  
As a result of the previously discussed conceptual incongruence regarding the definitions 
of safety culture and safety climate the literature has a multitude of assessment tools that may not 
be measuring their intended concepts.  
1.1.6.1 Lagging and leading indicators. The primary focus of industry managers and 
occupational health and safety professionals is to assess safety culture and safety climate in order 
to use this information to determine the probability of an incident and the overall safety of the 
organization. In the decades since the concepts were coined, means of assessing these concepts 
using self-report and objective measures have evolved. Until recently, lagging indicators were 
the primary method of assessing safety within organizations (Currie & Watterson, 2010). A 
lagging indicator is “a collection of retrospective data or information” (p. 36) regarding safety. 
Lagging indicators are reactive in that the organization’s fatalities, incident rates, and near 
misses are assessed and corrective actions are taken after an incident has occurred. However, the 
major drawback of lagging indicators is that they only use reactive measures, such as injuries, 
fatalities, and near misses as a measure of safety culture. Consequently, employees within an 
organization may disregard the safety regulations and not use proper personal protective 
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equipment, resulting in an organization with a poor safety culture. However, lagging indicators 
that assess fatalities and injuries may not be able to capture the full extent of the poor safety 
culture if the employees are lucky enough to avoid serious injury or under-report the injuries 
they do receive.  
Due to these limitations, more recently there has been an increased focus on leading 
indicators, such as structured questionnaires and safety audits. Leading indicators take a more 
proactive approach and assess the present state of safety behaviors and attitudes in an 
organization. The reduction of injury rates themselves, which would be a lagging indicator, are 
not sufficient to indicate the presence and quality of a strong safety culture. Whereas, focusing 
on leading indicators, such as safety training, hazard awareness, employees’ motivation to adhere 
to safety protocols, and knowledge of safety is something that can always be improved and 
assessed (Cooper, 2000). As such, it is suggested that leading indicators may be a more useful 
approach to measuring safety culture and safety climate (Currie & Watterson, 2010), but there is 
currently little research on whether leading or lagging indicators provide a more valid 
representation of this construct within an organization.  
1.1.6.2 Self-report measures and survey questionnaires. Due to the increased focus on 
leading indicators, over the past several decades many self-report measures for safety culture and 
safety climate have been developed. For example, Sexton, Helmreich, Pronovost, and Thomas 
(2003) created the Safety Climate Survey, which is a 19-item, 7-point Likert scale directed at 
medical personnel. The Safety Climate Survey includes many items assessing the opinion of the 
respondent (e.g. “Leadership is driving us to be a safety-centered institution”). Additionally, the 
Safety Climate Survey is used as a measure of safety culture (e.g. “The culture of this clinical 
area makes it easy to learn from the mistakes of others”), that again demonstrates the conceptual 
confusion or overlap between culture and climate. Another self-report questionnaire is the 2010 
revision of the Safety Culture Survey (Frazier, Ludwig, Whitaker, & Roberts, 2013). The revised 
Safety Culture Survey consists of 28 items broken down into the following subgroups: 
management support for safety, peer support for safety, personal responsibility for safety, safety 
management systems, and miscellaneous. This survey contains some abstract, opinion questions 
(e.g. “Safety is considered when changes are made to rules and procedures”), as well as some 
concrete questions (e.g. “My supervisor often gives me positive feedback when he sees me 
working safely”). Additionally, Wu et al. (2010) also provide a Safety Culture Scale consisting 
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of 12 items regarding the attitudes and behaviors of the respondent’s colleagues, as opposed to 
asking about the respondent’s own behavior. Clearly, there is an abundance of self-report 
measures used to assess safety culture and safety climate, with each survey and scale formulated 
in a unique way (Kho, Carbone, Lucas, & Cook, 2005; Nielsen, Eid, Hystad, Saetrevik, & Saus, 
2013; Singer, Gaba, Geppert Sinaiko, Howard, & Park, 2003). Given the diversity of these 
measures, it is difficult to compare results across studies as each survey evaluates different 
aspects of safety culture. Therefore, a unified assessment tool is necessary to standardize the 
results obtained about this collective non-technological aspect of safety.  
1.1.6.3 Concluding remarks. Many culture and climate assessment tools are used 
interchangeably, due in part to the concept confusion surrounding the definitions and 
relationships between these concepts. The relationship between safety culture and safety climate 
is not clear, as many assessment tools use the terms interchangeably, while others see them as 
distinct. Additionally, there are discrepancies between the theoretical and operational definitions, 
which results in a vast number of assessment instruments that are of questionable validity and 
applicability. These problems require further study due to these discrepancies, which will be 
addressed in this thesis (See Table 1-1). 
Table 1-1. Summary of Introduction 
Current Gap in The Literature Purpose of Current Study 
Broad array of theoretical definitions for 
safety culture and safety climate 
Study One Part One: Conduct a conceptual 
analysis of existing safety culture and safety 
climate definitions and propose a single 
unified definition for each construct 
Overlap in the literature between the construct 
of safety culture and safety climate 
Study One Part One: Use conceptual 
analysis results to determine the relationship 
between safety culture and safety climate 
Appears to be a lack of congruency between 
the theoretical and operational definitions 
used for safety culture and for safety climate 
Study One Part Two: Examine existing 
theoretical and corresponding operational 
definitions to determine congruency, as well 
develop operational definitions that 
correspond to theoretical definitions 
developed in Part One 
Existing assessment tools are not based on 
their theoretical or operational definitions 
Study Two Part One and Two: Develop a 
questionnaire for safety climate based on the 
developed theoretical and operational 
definitions and evaluate the results of this 
questionnaire.  
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As Table 1-1 illustrates, there is a need for a consensus regarding the theoretical 
definitions for safety culture and for safety climate, the relationship between safety culture and 
safety climate should be clarified, there is a need for congruency between the theoretical and 
operational definitions for these constructs, and existing safety assessment tools should be based 
on their theoretical or operational definitions. Each of these current gaps in the literature will be 
addressed in the current study.  
CURRENT STUDY 
1.2 Purpose of the Project 
The purpose of the current project is to clarify relations between the concepts of safety 
culture and safety climate and demonstrate an applicability of the proposed conceptual 
clarification of at least one concept. As demonstrated above, several gaps exist in the literature 
regarding the concepts of safety culture and safety climate, resulting in two main issues that need 
to be addressed. In study one a conceptual analysis was conducted, in which the theoretical 
definitions for safety culture and safety climate were assessed and the congruency between the 
theoretical and operational definitions was examined.  
The definitions for safety culture and safety climate are far too varied and consensus 
needs to be reached on whether safety culture and safety climate are distinct or similar 
constructs. In part one of study one, a conceptual analysis of the literature was conducted to 
examine existing theoretical definitions for safety culture and safety climate to identify common 
aspects within these definitions. A single, unified theoretical definition for safety culture and for 
safety climate was developed in order to have a better understanding of what these constructs 
entail. Additionally, in part two of study one, the current gap between the safety culture and 
safety climate theoretical and operational definitions was examined, as this incongruency 
impacts the validity of the assessment tools.  
In study two an empirical analysis was conducted, in which a safety climate questionnaire 
was developed and tested on the students in the College of Engineering. In part one of study two, 
an assessment tool was developed that was congruent with the developed safety climate 
theoretical definition and included previously validated items. In part two of study two, the 
developed safety climate questionnaire was administered to students in the College of 
Engineering to determine the safety climate in the College and the psychometric properties of the 
scale. In order to achieve these purposes, the following research questions were articulated. 
16 
  
1.2.1 Research Questions  
1. What is an appropriate theoretical definition for safety culture that includes the most 
significant aspects of the phenomenon? What is an appropriate theoretical definition 
for safety climate that includes the most significant aspects of the phenomenon?  
2. Are the concepts of safety culture and safety climate assessing the same or distinct 
phenomena as identified in the conceptual analysis? Is safety climate a subcomponent 
of safety culture? 
3. In the current literature, what is the congruency between the theoretical and 
operational definitions for safety culture and safety climate? What operational 
definitions emerge for safety culture and for safety climate that are congruent with the 
theoretical definitions?  
4. Based on the developed theoretical and operational definitions, what items should 
compose an assessment tool that would adequately capture the underlying 
assumptions associated with safety culture and safety climate? 
As Figure 1-1 displays, Study One Part One involves comparing existing safety culture 
and safety climate theoretical definitions to aspects within these definitions and using these 
common aspects to develop a single, unified definition for safety culture and for safety climate. 
Study One Part Two involves comparing safety culture and safety climate theoretical definitions 
to their corresponding operational definitions to determine their congruency, as well as 
developing operational definitions for safety culture and for safety climate that are congruent 
with the theoretical definitions developed in Part One. Study Two Part One involves using the 
safety climate theoretical and operational definitions developed in Study One to form an 
assessment tool for safety climate. Study Two Part Two involves administering this 
questionnaire to students in the College of Engineering to determine the psychometric properties 
of the questionnaire, as well as to examine the safety climate within the College of Engineering.  
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Figure 1-1. Conceptual Model of Study One and Study Two 
CHAPTER 2 
STUDY ONE: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF “SAFETY CULTURE” AND “SAFETY 
CLIMATE” 
2.1 Purpose of Study One 
 There are several objectives for study one. The first is to provide a conceptual analysis 
and comparison of the notions of safety culture and safety climate conducted at the level of 
theoretical and operational definitions. The second purpose is to develop a comprehensive 
theoretical and operational definition for the concept of safety culture and the concept of safety 
climate. The third purpose is to outline the structure of existing safety assessment instruments 
and prepare a questionnaire for assessing safety climate in the College of Engineering, based on 
existing safety instruments and the developed safety climate theoretical definition.  
2.2.1 Part 1: Analysis of Theoretical Definitions  
2.2.1.1 Purpose. The purpose of part one of the conceptual analysis was to examine 
existing theoretical definitions of safety culture and safety climate and to identify common 
features within these definitions. From this analysis a single, unified definition for safety culture 
and a single, unified definition for safety climate was developed. Additionally, this conceptual 
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analysis provided evidence to conclude whether the concepts of safety culture and safety climate 
refer to the same or distinct phenomena.  
As the theoretical definition of a construct addresses the essence or mechanism of the 
underlying phenomena, it is necessary to develop a single, comprehensive theoretical definition 
of these constructs. When multiple definitions are used to describe a construct it can be difficult 
to fully understand and assess the construct under study, particularly as different definitions may 
actually be referring to different constructs (e.g., safety culture and safety climate).  
2.2.1.2 Method. In order to conduct the theoretical definition analysis, the following 
tasks have been done: (1) searched and selected articles of interest that contained definitions of 
the constructs; (2) identified dimensions that are present in the safety culture and safety climate 
constructs; (3) developed matrices; (4) the raters conducted an assessment of the definitions; (5) 
the raters’ assessment was examined; and, (6) summarized the results by developing a theoretical 
definition for safety culture and for safety climate.  
To expand on the above steps, the researcher searched and selected articles that examined 
the assessment, analysis, and application of the concepts safety culture and safety climate. From 
these articles, 72 sources were included that contained a theoretical definition for the safety 
concepts; 46 definitions were included for safety culture and 26 for safety climate. The 
researcher separated articles that developed or used theoretical definitions of the concepts from 
articles where a conceptual analysis of the concepts was provided. For the first part of the 
theoretical definition analysis, raters classified empirical research. Specifically, the definition 
analysis included articles that did not analyze the definitions, only provided their own definition 
to conduct their research. However, in order to further analyze the results of the definition 
analysis, additional literature was reviewed. These additional articles include review articles that 
compiled a list of current safety culture and climate definitions and extracted the common factors 
in order to determine the dimensions that make up safety culture or climate and, sometimes, to 
create their own definitions of the construct. 
Secondly, the researcher identified 42 potential aspects or “dimensions” that were 
commonly identified within the safety literature (See Appendix D). Safety studies that mentioned 
dimensions commonly thought to be included in either the safety culture or safety climate 
concept were analyzed and these aspects or dimensions were compiled and compared to the list 
of compiled theoretical definitions. For each aspect, a definition was created that described this 
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aspect in order to provide clarity to raters. Examples of the aspects or dimensions include: 
individual-centered, group-centered, perception about policies, beliefs, attitudes, norms, 
organizational, behavior, etc. (See Appendix D).   
Thirdly, the researcher developed matrices (See Appendix C). Definitions for both safety 
culture and safety climate were compiled into a matrix in Excel. The label “safety culture” or 
“safety climate” was removed so that raters would be unaware of which definitions they were 
classifying, in order to prevent any bias. The right column of each matrix contained the 72 
extracted theoretical definitions of the concepts. The top row displayed the dimensions or aspects 
of the phenomenon in question. Appendix C does not display the full dimension labels due to 
limited space; however, for the raters, the full dimension labels were provided.  
Fourth, the matrices were administered to four raters who then classified the 72 compiled 
theoretical definitions based on the aspects within them. Four rater were recruited to analyze the 
72 safety culture and safety climate definitions. Raters included three females and one male and 
all raters were current or past graduate students at the University of Saskatchewan from various 
Colleges. They were not familiar with safety research and had no previous experience with the 
concepts of safety culture or safety climate. We were open to using more raters, however as the 
raters demonstrated adequate agreement in evaluating the definitions, the researchers decided not 
to increase their number.  
Raters were emailed the instructions (Appendix E), definitions of aspects (Appendix D) 
and the blank excel sheet matrix into which they were to place “x” if the definition contained a 
specific aspect. The instructions were emailed to the rater and they had the opportunity to ask 
any questions. The rating process took approximately two hours, which raters completed over a 
series of days on their own time. Upon completion the rater emailed the completed definition 
analysis excel sheet to the researcher. Once all four raters had completed their ratings, the 
primary researcher compiled all the ratings and calculated rater agreement.  
Lastly, a summary of the raters’ assessment is provided below, which displays the 
developed theoretical definition for safety culture and for safety climate, as well as the developed 
structure of the concepts.  
2.2.1.3 Analysis of the raters’ assessments. In calculating agreement between raters, 
agreement between all four raters equaled a four, an agreement between three raters equaled a 
three, agreement between two raters equaled a two, and when one rater believed a specific aspect 
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was present in the definition it was assigned a one. If no raters felt an aspect was present it was 
assigned a zero. In this case, 4 indicates an agreement between raters of 100%, 3 indicates 75% 
agreement, and 2 indicates 50% agreement. Additionally, a score of 1 indicates 75% agreement 
and a score of zero indicates 100% agreement between raters that a particular aspect is not 
present in the definition. Appendix F displays the percentage of agreement for each aspect for 
safety culture, while Appendix G displays the percentage of agreement for each aspect for safety 
climate. 
Following this, the safety climate and safety culture definitions were separated and 
agreement among the raters regarding each concept was calculated. There were 46 definitions for 
safety culture and 26 definitions for safety climate. In order to calculate the overall agreement for 
the safety culture and climate definitions, all of the 4s, 3s, 2s, 1s, and 0s for all aspects (i.e., 
subset of organizational culture, individual-centered, attention, etc.) were added up and divided 
by the total number of answers provided by raters.  
For safety culture, there were 238 fours, which indicated 100% agreement that the aspect 
was present, and 1,631 zeros, which indicated 100% agreement that the aspect was absent. The 
fours and zeros equaled 1,869 for 100% agreement for safety culture, as these ratings did not 
need to be weighted. There were 30 threes (which indicated 75% agreement that the aspect was 
present) and 23 ones (which indicated 75% agreement that the aspect was absent). The threes and 
ones equaled 53 ratings weighted by 75% agreement, as such, 53 was multiplied by .75, which 
resulted in 40 weighted ratings. There were 10 twos (which indicated 50% agreement that the 
aspect was present or absent) which were weighted by 50%. As such, 10 was multiplied by .50, 
which resulted in 5 weighted ratings. Following this, the researcher summed up the weighted 
number of ratings by the total number of possible answers. Consequently, 1,869 was added to 40 
and 5, resulting in 1,914, which was divided by the total number of possible answers which was 
1,978. As such, the agreement for safety culture was 96.76%.  
For safety climate, there were 92 fours, which indicated 100% agreement that the aspect 
was present, and 967 zeros, which indicated 100% agreement that the aspect was absent. The 
fours and zeros equaled 1,059 for 100% agreement for safety climate. As these ratings did not 
need to be weighted. There were 12 threes (which indicated 75% agreement that the aspect was 
present) and 13 ones (which indicated 75% agreement that the aspect was absent). The threes and 
ones equaled 25 ratings weighted by 75% agreement. As such, 25 was multiplied by .75, which 
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resulted in 19 weighted ratings. There were 7 twos (which indicated 50% agreement that the 
aspect was present or absent) which were weighted by 50%. As such, 7 was multiplied by .50, 
which equaled 4 weighted ratings. Following this, the researcher summed up the weighted 
number of ratings by the total number of possible answers. Consequently, 1,059 was added to 19 
and 4, resulting in 1,082, which was divided by the total number of possible answers which was 
1,092. As such, the total agreement for safety climate was 99.08%. As such, raters demonstrated 
adequate consistency of ratings for both safety culture and safety climate.  
2.2.1.4 Calculation of frequency of aspects and consistency of definitions. In order to 
determine which aspects were present in the definitions in the highest frequency, the number of 
fours, threes, twos, and ones were compiled and placed into tables. All of the aspects that are 
present in the safety culture definitions are presented in Appendix F. All of the aspect that are 
present in the safety climate definitions are presented in Appendix G. 
As there was an unequal number of definitions for safety culture versus safety climate, 46 
and 26 respectively, these numbers could not be used to compare the frequency of aspect 
between safety culture and safety climate. Consequently, these numbers were transformed into 
percentages by dividing the aspect frequency by the total number of definitions. These 
percentages were weighted based on the consistency of agreement.  
To illustrate how this was calculated the aspect “improve safety performance” under 
safety culture will be used as an example. For “improve safety performance”, there were 12 
definitions in which all four raters stated that “improve safety performance” was an aspect within 
safety culture. This number was then divided by 46 (the total number of definitions for safety 
culture) which resulted in 26%. Next, there was one definition in which three raters stated that 
“improve safety performance” was an aspect within safety culture. This number was divided by 
46 which resulted in 2%. The 2% was then multiplied by .75 in order the weight the frequency 
by consistency of raters, as only three raters stated “improve safety performance” was an aspect 
within safety culture. The result was still 2% when rounded up. Next, there were two definitions 
where two of the raters stated that “improve safety performance” was an aspect within safety 
culture. Two was divided by 46 which resulted in 4% and was multiplied by .50 in order to 
weight the frequency by consistency, which resulted in 2%. Finally, there were four definitions 
in which only one rater stated that improve safety performance was an aspect within safety 
culture. Four was divided by 46 which resulted in 9%, this 9% was then multiplied by .25 (as 
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only one rater felt these definitions contained the aspect improve safety performance), which 
resulted in 2%. These weighted percentages were added up to determine the overall frequency of 
safety culture definitions that included the aspect “improve safety performance”. Twenty-six plus 
two plus two plus two equalled 32% of the safety culture definitions included the aspect 
“improve safety performance”.  
This frequency percentage was calculated for each aspect and the aspects were then 
ranked based on the highest frequency within the safety culture definitions. The same 
calculations were conducted for safety climate. Some of the original aspects were clustered 
together if they were similar to one another. Aspects that were clumped together include (1) all 
perception aspects, (2) organizational and management aspects, and (3) work environment and 
situational aspects.  
2.2.2 Theoretical Definition Results for Safety Culture 
The major results for the theoretical definition analysis for safety culture are presented in 
Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1. Most Frequent Safety Culture Aspects 
Safety Culture Aspects 100% 75% 50% 25% Total (%) 
Organizational/Management 63% 20% - - 83% 
Group-centered/shared 41% 18% 2% 1% 62% 
Behavioral 59% 2% - - 61% 
Individual-centered 28% 5% 3% 3% 39% 
Attitudes  37% 2% - - 39% 
Values 37% 2% - - 39% 
Improve safety performance 26% 2% 2% 2% 32% 
Beliefs 30% - - - 30% 
Norms 26% - - - 26% 
Subset of organizational culture 20% - - - 20% 
Commitment/Responsibility 15% - - 2% 17% 
Perception  13% - - 1% 14% 
Prioritize safety 11% - 1% 1% 13% 
Stable 13% - - - 13% 
Situational/Work Environment 13% - - - 13% 
Implicit 11% - - 1% 12% 
Policies 9% - - 2% 11% 
As Table 2-1 demonstrates, the organizational aspect, group-centred/shared aspect, and 
behavioral aspect were the most frequently found aspects within the analyzed definitions of 
safety culture. As can be seen from Table 2-1, 83% is the proportion of safety culture definitions 
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that have the organizational aspect (which is the highest common aspect in comparison to all 
others). The organizational aspect encompasses any definitions mentioning organizational 
members, organizational life, organizational safety practices, work organization, or the 
organization itself, as well as management, safety systems, or leadership. Following this, 62% is 
the proportion of definitions which contain the group-centered or shared aspect and 61% is the 
proportion of definitions that contain the behavior aspect. The group-centered or shared aspect 
includes any definitions that states that safety culture is held by the group, is shared among 
employees, or involves the staff, workers, or employees in the plural form. The behavioral aspect 
involves definitions that mention behaviors, practices, or procedures relating to safety.  
Following this, three aspects: individual-centered, attitudes, and values all tie for fourth 
place, as 39% of the definitions contain these aspects. The individual-centered aspect states that 
safety culture is held by an individual or involves employee’s perceptions, attitudes, behaviors, 
etc. in the singular form. The attitudes and values aspects include definitions that mention 
attitudes about safety or safety values and the value placed on safety respectively. Thirty-two 
percent is the proportion of definitions that contain improve safety performance within them, 
which includes any definitions that mention improving or enhancing safety in the workplace. 
Subsequently, 30% of the definitions contain the beliefs aspect, 26% of the definitions contain 
the norms aspect, and 20% contain the aspect: safety culture is a subset of organizational culture. 
The beliefs aspects includes any definition that mentions beliefs about the importance of safety, 
while the norms aspect includes definitions that state that safety culture includes norms or habits 
of thought. Safety culture is a subset of organizational culture includes definitions that state that 
safety culture refers to or is a part of the organizational culture of the workplace. Commitment to 
safety and safety responsibility is present in 17% of the safety culture definitions, as employees 
feel they have a personal responsibility to safety or a personal commitment to safety. Safety 
perception is present in 14% of the definitions and refers to perceptions or impressions about 
safety or employees’ general perceptions, as well as, employees’ perceptions about safety 
policies, management attitudes or values, management behavior, practises, rewards, or actions, 
co-worker practices or behavior, or their work environment, work setting, or work organization.  
Prioritize safety, stability, and situational/work environment were present in 13% of the 
definitions. Prioritize safety refers to any definitions in which safety is given priority. Stability 
refers to any definitions that state that safety culture is long-lasting or difficult to change. The 
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situational/work environment aspect refers to safety culture as being dependent on the situation, 
contextual setting, social context, or work environment. Twelve percent is the proportion of 
definitions that have the implicit aspect within their definitions and 11% is the proportion of 
definitions with policies as an aspect. The implicit aspects suggests that safety culture involves 
habits of thought and underlying assumptions, while policies refer to the safety policies within 
the workplace. The following aspects were present in less than 10% of the safety culture 
definitions: thoughts/cognitions, symbolic meaning, jobs, attention, rewards, learning about 
safety, feelings, public safety, goal-directed, communication, multiple/holistic, psychological, 
and abstract. There were also several aspects that were not present in any of the safety culture 
definitions, including: safety culture as a subset of organizational climate or safety culture, 
transient aspect, and surface features.   
2.2.3 Results of Theoretical Definition Analysis for Safety Climate 
The major results for the theoretical definition analysis for safety climate are presented in 
Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2. Most Frequent Safety Climate Aspects 
Safety Climate Aspects 100% 75% 50% 25% Total 
Perception  62% 9% 4% 1% 76% 
Group-centered/shared 65% - 2% - 67% 
Organizational/Management 30% 23% 4% 3% 60% 
Behavioral 27% - - 2% 29% 
Subset of safety culture 27% - - - 27% 
Transient 27% - - - 27% 
Work environment/Situational 15% - 4% 2% 21% 
Subset of organizational climate 15% - - - 15% 
Attitudes  15% - - - 15% 
Manifest 15% - - - 15% 
Policies 8% - - 2% 10% 
As Table 2-2 demonstrates, the perception aspect, group-centred/shared aspect, and 
organizational aspect were the most frequently found aspects within the current definitions for 
safety climate. As can be seen from Table 2-2, 76% is the proportion of safety climate definitions 
that have the safety perception aspect (which is the highest common aspect in comparison to all 
others). The perception aspect includes perceptions or impressions about safety or employees’ 
general perceptions, as well as, employees’ perceptions about safety policies, management 
attitudes or values, management behavior, practises, rewards, or actions, co-worker practices or 
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behavior, or their work environment, work setting, or work organization. Sixty-seven percent is 
the proportion of definitions that include the group-centered aspect and 60% is the proportion of 
definitions that include the organizational aspect. The organizational aspect encompasses any 
definitions mentioning organizational members, organizational life, organizational safety 
practices, work organization, or the organization itself, as well as management, safety systems, 
or leadership. The group-centered or shared aspect includes any definitions that states that safety 
climate is held by the group, is shared among employees, or involves the staff, workers, or 
employees in the plural form.  
Safety behavior is present in 29% of the safety climate definitions and involves 
definitions that mention behaviors, practices, or procedures relating to safety. Twenty-seven 
percent is the proportion of definitions that include the transient aspect and that safety climate as 
a subcomponent of safety culture. The transient aspect suggests that safety climate is temporary, 
subject to change, only observable at a particular moment in time, or involves current-state 
reflections. Work environment is present in 21% of the safety climate definitions and refers to 
safety climate as being dependent on the situation, contextual setting, social context, or work 
environment.  
Following this, three aspects: safety climate as a subcomponent of organizational climate, 
attitudes, and manifest are all present in 15% of the safety climate definitions. The manifest 
aspect suggests that safety climate addresses safety perceptions that are closer to the surface. Ten 
percent is the proportion of definitions with policies as an aspect. The following aspects were 
present in less than 10% of the safety climate definitions: beliefs, improve safety performance, 
prioritize safety, individual-centered, values, feelings, rewards, symbolic meaning, training, 
communication, and jobs. There were also several aspects that were not present in any of the 
safety climate definitions. According to these definitions, safety climate is not implicit, stable, 
abstract, multiple/holistic, goal-directed, psychological, or a subset of organizational culture. 
Additionally, safety climate does not include: norms, attention, commitment/responsibility, 
thoughts/cognitions, public safety, or learning about safety. 
2.2.4 A Comparison of the Conceptual Analysis with Analysis of Current Literature 
Six review articles that contained a conceptual analysis of the concepts were examined in 
order to determine which dimensions or aspects are common to safety culture and safety climate. 
These six review articles were chosen because they compiled existing definitions of safety 
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culture and safety climate in a similar approach with the current study, and used these compiled 
definitions to identify common factors. However, these articles did not systematically assess the 
existing definitions, only noted common factors and they used a much smaller sample of 
definitions.  
2.2.4.1 Common safety culture factors identified in literature. These articles identified 
several common factors associated with safety culture, including: “organization systems and sub-
systems” (Cooper, 2000), as well as “the management and supervisory systems” (Wiegmann et 
al., 2004). Safety culture is a concept defined at the “group level or higher that refers to the 
shared values among all the group or organization members” (Wiegmann et al., 2004). Safety 
culture also has been described in terms of “values, beliefs, attitudes, social mores, norms, rules, 
practices, competencies, and behavior” (Mearns & Flin, 1999). Additionally, safety culture is 
“reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and learns from error, incidents, and 
accidents (Wiegmann et al., 2004).  Safety culture is “relatively stable and not subject to change 
on an hourly, daily, or weekly basis (Cox & Flin, 1998). Safety culture includes “organizational 
commitment, management involvement, [and] employee empowerment” (Wiegmann et al., 
2004). Safety culture is about “assumptions, expectations, and outlooks that are taken for granted 
by organizational members and are therefore not immediately interpretable by outsiders” 
(Mearns & Flin, 1999). Safety culture is also “holistic and involves dimensionality 
(Guldenmund, 2000), in that safety culture is a complex construct that encompasses a multitude 
of aspects (i.e., organization, norms, beliefs, values, policies, improving safety, behavior, etc.) 
and assesses their underlying assumptions.  
Table 2-3 displays the common factors associated with safety culture, as identified in the 
review articles.  
Table 2-3. Common Safety Culture Factors Identified in Review Articles 
Common Factors associated with Safety Culture Authors 
1. Organizational level safety issues, 
organizational commitment, management 
involvement 
Wiegmann et al., 2004 
2. Group level and involves a shared, collective 
commitment to safety 
Cooper, 2000; Cox & Flin, 1998; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 
1999; Wiegmann et al., 2004 
3. Practices and behaviors of management and 
employees 
Cooper, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 1999; 
Wiegmann et al., 2004 
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4. Individual’s attitudes, values, beliefs, and 
norms regarding safety 
Cooper, 2000; Cox & Flin, 1998; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 1999 
5. Improvement of the organization’s safety 
performance and willingness to learn from 
incidents 
Wiegmann et al., 2004 
6. Employee empowerment and commitment to 
safety 
Mearns & Flin, 1999; Wiegmann et al., 
2004 
7. Relatively enduring, stable, and resistant to 
change 
Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; 
Wiegmann et al., 2004 
8. A holistic, implicit concept that is dependent 
on the constructed systems of meanings, as 
well as, the assumptions and expectations of 
organizational members 
Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; 
Mearns & Flin, 1999 
2.2.4.2 Safety Culture Theoretical Definition. The following definition was created for 
the safety culture concept, developed from both an investigation of the theoretical definition 
analysis conducted by four raters and from a review of the literature:  
“Safety culture is an organizational, collective phenomenon that is developed and 
maintained by sharing norms and attitudes regarding safety. Development of safety culture starts 
with management, which is responsible for safety leadership and safety policies, but a strong 
safety culture will not exist if it is not also supported and shared by individual employees. This 
sharing of safety norms results in safety behaviors that become implicitly followed and, at some 
point, automatic and taken for granted. The end goal of safety culture is to improve and enhance 
the safety of the organization and to learn from incidents, as well as, create an environment in 
which all employees feel empowered and personally responsible for their own and other’s safety. 
Safety culture is a subcomponent of organizational culture and includes the deeply-held, implicit 
assumptions and underlying expectations of organizational members, which consequently results 
in a phenomenon that is relatively stable and resistant to change.” 
2.2.4.3 Common safety climate factors identified in literature. Four review articles 
were synthesized in order to determine dimensions common to safety climate. Some common 
factors associated with safety climate include that it “describes a set of perceptions and beliefs 
held by an individual and/or group about a particular entity” (Mearns & Flin, 1999). Safety 
climate is “shared” and “involves the work environment” (Guldenmund, 2000). Safety climate 
“represents a more transient mood state, sensitive to external pressures” (Cox & Flin, 1998). 
Safety climate is a “temporal phenomenon, a ‘snapshot’ of safety culture” (Wiegmann et al., 
2004) that is “directly observable” (Mearns & Flin, 1999). Finally, safety climate also includes 
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employees’ perceptions of “a strong management commitment to safety. . . [and an] emphasis 
put on safety training” (Zohar, 1980, p. 97). Perception is defined as an awareness of external 
objects, qualities, or events, in which the individual can interpret a stimulus and form an opinion 
based on it (Corsini, 2002, p. 705). According to this definition, perception consists of two 
separate aspects: first, is what our senses can determine through sight and hearing, and second, is 
our opinion or interpretation of what the senses tell us. Perception is the act of recognizing what 
you see or hear and interpreting it using your own opinions.  For example, safety perceptions are 
formed by an individual noticing a safety hazard in their workplace, then forming an opinion of 
their organization’s safety conscientiousness based on the safety hazard they noticed and whether 
they view their organization adequately addressing the safety hazard.  
Table 2-4 displays the common factors associated with safety climate, as identified in the 
review articles.  
Table 2-4. Common Safety Climate Factors Identified in Review Articles 
Common Factors associated with Safety Climate Authors 
1. Perceptions or opinions of organizational 
members 
Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; 
Mearns & Flin, 1999; Wiegmann et 
al., 2004; Zohar 1980 
2. Both an individual and a shared phenomenon Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 
1999 
3. Dependent on the current situation or work 
environment and is sensitive to external 
pressures 
Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; 
Wiegmann et al., 2004 
4. Involves the manifest, surface perceptions of 
employees at a specific point in time, and these 
perceptions are easily changeable 
Cox & Flin, 1998; Mearns & Flin, 
1999; Wiegmann et al., 2004 
5. Safety climate is a subcomponent of safety 
culture 
Cox & Flin, 1998; Mearns & Flin, 
1999; Wiegmann et al., 2004 
Within the literature, there seem to be five main aspects that form safety climate: (1) 
Safety climate involves the perceptions or opinions of organizational members (Cox & Flin, 
1998; Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 1999; Wiegmann et al., 2004; Zohar 1980); (2) Safety 
climate is both an individual and a group phenomenon (Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 
1999); (3) Safety climate is dependent on the current situation or work environment and is 
sensitive to external pressures (Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; Wiegmann et al., 2004); 
(4) Safety climate involves the manifest, surface perceptions of employees at a specific point in 
time, and these perceptions are easily changeable (Cox & Flin, 1998; Mearns & Flin, 1999; 
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Wiegmann et al., 2004); and (5) Safety climate is a subcomponent of safety culture (Cox & Flin, 
1998; Mearns & Flin, 1999; Wiegmann et al., 2004).  
2.2.4.4 Safety Climate Theoretical Definition. The following definition was created for 
the safety climate concept, developed from both an examination of the theoretical definition 
analysis conducted by four raters and from a review of the literature:  
“Safety climate reflects what employees perceive regarding safety within their 
organization, where “perceive” refers to the employees’ awareness, interpretation, and opinion 
formation regarding specific safety events. These opinions are developed by individual 
employees, but when these opinions become shared, they are what form the safety climate of an 
organization. The major aspect of safety climate involves how employees perceive the safety 
attitudes and behaviors of both management and fellow co-workers, their organization’s safety 
policies, and the safety of their work environment. Safety climate is sensitive to external 
influence and involves the temporary, surface features of safety culture, which only captures the 
safety of the organization at a specific point in time.” 
2.2.4.5 Comparative Analysis of the Concepts Safety Culture and Safety Climate. As 
these definitions demonstrate, safety culture and safety climate appear to be two distinct 
constructs, in which safety climate is a subcomponent of safety culture. First, the overlap 
between the concepts will be discussed, then the distinction between safety culture and safety 
climate will be discussed.  
 2.2.4.5.1 Overlap. Safety culture and safety climate both deal with the non-technological 
aspect of safety. Both safety culture and safety climate involve individual employees’ views and 
the shared attitudes of the group regarding safety. Safety culture and safety climate both involve 
the perceptions (i.e., safety climate) or attitudes (i.e., safety culture) of their organization’s safety 
policies and the working environment. On the surface, safety culture and climate both involve 
organizational features, management, and behaviors 
 2.2.4.5.2 Discrepancy. There are also several aspects on which safety culture and safety 
climate differ.  
1. Firstly, safety culture is a subcomponent of organizational culture, while safety climate 
is a subcomponent of safety culture.  
2. Safety climate involves perceptions and opinions, meaning that these are reflections of 
the work environment regarding safety, while safety culture encompasses attitudes, beliefs, 
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values, norms, and behaviors or a shared socio-cultural reality within which employees work and 
function in organizations.  
3. Safety climate represents the easily observable, surface features of safety culture, while 
safety culture involves the deeply-held, implicit assumptions that are believed and followed by 
employees. These deeply-held assumptions and expectations are often adopted by employees and 
they become the “norm” and are often taken for granted. Consequently, safety culture can be 
difficult to assess as it involves measuring the underlying assumptions held by employees.  
4. Additionally, safety climate is a temporary phenomenon that represents safety at a 
specific point in time and is easy to change. Safety climate is temporary in the sense that it can 
change under pressure of deadlines, financial issues, productivity goals, and other external 
pressures. Conversely, safety culture is a stable phenomenon that is long-lasting and difficult to 
change. The goal of safety culture is to improve and enhance the safety of the organization. 
Safety culture is also an abstract, holistic, psychological phenomenon that includes learning 
about safety and researching goals. These dimension are not shared by safety climate.  
 While it was previously stated that safety culture assesses deeply held assumptions and 
beliefs about safety that have become norms to the extent that some of these beliefs are followed 
without conscious thought (Guldenmund, 2000), it seems apparent that such a complex concept 
could not be assessed through a simple survey questionnaire. Survey questionnaires are 
recognized as useful for assessing participant perceptions, not norms and unconsciously held 
beliefs. Assessing safety culture through a questionnaire may not adequately provide the 
necessary depth of information needed to grasp the concept (Cooper, 2000). To adequately 
assess the construct of safety culture, a multimethod approach is needed, involving ethnography, 
observation, focus group, and interviews. As such, the phenomenon is too complex to be 
adequately assessed with a survey questionnaire and is beyond the scope of this study. 
Conversely, safety climate mainly addresses the participants’ opinions and perceptions of safety 
(Flin et al., 2000). Consequently, safety climate may be a more suitable concept to be assessed 
through a questionnaire. 
 While both safety culture and climate do address some of the same safety features, 
namely organizational management, group-centered or shared, and safety behavior, these safety 
features are addressed in different ways and on different levels. For example, both safety culture 
and safety climate are group-centered constructs. However, safety climate assesses the group’s 
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perceptions of safety, while safety culture assesses the group’s underlying assumptions, values, 
and norms. Furthermore, while safety culture and safety climate include management and 
behavior, safety climate addresses employees’ perceptions of management and employees’ 
perceptions of their own and other’s behavior, through survey questionnaires. While safety 
culture will more directly assess management through documents review and behavior through 
participant observation. While safety climate assesses concrete, easily observable aspects of 
safety, safety culture addresses the underlying assumptions that guide the observable aspects of 
safety. 
It is also natural to expect safety culture and climate to share some of the same safety 
features, as safety climate is a subcomponent of safety culture and they both assess the non-
technological aspects of safety. However, there are a number of aspects that diverge between the 
concepts, and it is these nuances that truly highlight why safety climate should be considered a 
subcomponent of safety culture. Safety culture is qualitatively different from safety climate.  
2.3 Part 2: Theoretical and Operational Definition Congruency 
2.3.1 Purpose. The purpose of the operational definition analysis was to analyze the 
existing operational definitions for the safety culture and safety climate concepts and their 
corresponding theoretical definitions in order to evaluate the congruency between them. Once 
the conceptual classification in part one was completed and a single, unified theoretical 
definition for safety culture and safety climate was created, then the current operational 
definitions were analyzed in order to create an operational definition for safety culture and for 
safety climate that corresponded to the previously created theoretical definitions. This aids in 
developing a valid assessment tool for safety culture and safety climate.   
As operational definitions provide the methods or procedures through which a construct 
should be measured, it is particularly important to ensure that any operational definition for a 
construct are consistent with the theoretical definition of the same construct. If a theoretical 
definition for safety culture results in an operational definition for safety climate, then the 
researchers cannot be certain they are assessing the correct construct. It is also important to 
ensure that the operational definition logically follows from the theoretical definition to ensure 
consistent use to the constructs.  
2.3.2 Procedure. Numerous definitions of safety culture and safety climate were 
obtained and matched with their available corresponding operational definitions. It was then 
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determined whether each aspect of the theoretical definition was accounted for by the provided 
operational definition. The researcher rated the congruence between the theoretical and 
operational definitions, which are provided in Appendix H.  
Once the theoretical and operational definitions were given a percentage rating on 
congruency, then these percentages were placed into levels. The first congruency level includes a 
congruency rating of 75% to 100%, the second congruency level includes a rating of 50% to 
74%, and the third congruency level includes a rating below 50%. The frequency of definitions 
that fall within each congruency level identified clusters of theoretical and operational definitions 
that are congruent and incongruent.  
2.3.3 Results. As Appendix H illustrates, congruency between theoretical and operational 
definitions for the safety climate and safety culture constructs are lacking. Out of a total of 47 
theoretical and operational definition pairs, 26 were missing either the theoretical definition or 
the operational definition. This indicated that 55% of the studies did not have both a theoretical 
definition and a corresponding operational definition when they analyzed the safety culture or 
climate constructs. Of the remaining 45% of the definitions, 6 had a congruency rating below 
50%, 12 had a congruency rating between 50% and 74%, and 3 had a congruency rating between 
75% and 100%. Only 6% of the studies had adequate congruency between their theoretical and 
operational definitions. As such, it is evident that current studies are lacking when developing 
operational definitions that correspond to their theoretical definitions.  
Consequently, when developing the Safety Climate Questionnaire, it was ensured that the 
developed the operational definitions and items that form the questionnaire were consistent with 
safety climate theoretical definition, in order to aid in the development of a theoretically sound 
and reliable assessment tool. An operational definition refers to the methods or procedures that 
describe how a concept or phenomenon should be assessed and measured (Corsini, 2002, p. 668). 
In other words, an operational definitions involves stating how a specific phenomenon should be 
empirically examined.  
2.3.3.1 Safety Culture Operational Definition. “An organizational culture of safety is 
supported when both upper level management and frontline workers place high value on safety. 
Endorsement of these values can be measured through self-report measures, as well as expressed 
in implicit, taken-for-granted cues observed and discovered in organization meetings, 
discussion, communications, and interactions among all levels of organizational hierarchy. 
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Another indicator of a prevailing safety culture includes the existing number of functional and 
efficient programs and policies that are endorsed by workers. Direct (self-report) and indirect 
manifestations of workers endorsement of safety culture, their personal responsibility, and their 
proactive attitude toward safety are also important psychological indicators of a positive culture 
of safety.  
To assess an organization’s safety culture, multiple methods should be used: self-report 
questionnaires, purposefully selected interviews, focus groups with different groups of 
employees, naturalistic, participant observation of various activities related to safety (i.e., safety 
meetings at different levels, safety minutes, instructions before a shift, execution of various 
programs, peer-to-peer evaluations, coaching, etc.), content and tone of safety related horizontal 
and vertical communication, analysis of documents, and statistical records and reports.” 
2.3.3.2 Safety Climate Operational Definition. “The safety climate of an organization is 
supported by the perceptions of employees that are developed and shared between management 
and employees. Approval of these perceptions and opinions can be measured through self-report 
measures, such as survey questionnaires. Due to the changing nature of safety climate, frequent 
assessments should be conducted to determine any changes in within the organization’s safety 
perceptions and attitudes. 
To assess the safety climate of an organization, survey questionnaires should assess 
worker’s perceptions and opinions on a variety of safety climate related factors, including: 
employees’ perceptions and opinions of their organization’s safety policies and procedures, 
employees own adherence to policies and procedures, the extent to which other employees 
adhere to the policies and procedures within the organization, their perception of the 
effectiveness of the safety training employees receive, employees’ perception of management’s 
approach to reporting incidents and punishing safety violations, the communication between 
frontline employees and management regarding safety, the effectiveness of the organization’s 
safety equipment, employees’ perceptions of safety leadership, the extent to which employees 
look out for one another’s safety, and employees’ own perceptions and opinions regarding the 
conflict between safety and production.”  
2.4 Discussion for Study One 
To validate the conceptualizations of these concepts, I analyzed the review articles that 
addressed the same conceptual confusion for the safety culture and climate theoretical definitions 
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(Cooper, 2000; Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 1999; Wiegmann et al., 
2004). These review articles demonstrate that there seem to be eight main aspects that form 
safety culture:  
(1) Safety culture encompasses safety issues at the organizational level. 
(2) Safety culture occurs at the group level and involves a shared, collective commitment 
to safety. 
(3) Safety culture involves the behaviors of management and employees.  
(4) Safety culture includes the individual’s attitudes, beliefs, and norms regarding safety.   
(5) A strong safety culture is reflected in improving the organization’s safety 
performance and willingness to learn from incidents. 
(6) Safety culture includes employee empowerment and commitment to safety.  
(7) Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable, and resistant to change. 
(8) Safety culture is a holistic, implicit concept that is dependent on the constructed 
systems of meanings, as well as, the assumptions and expectations of organizational members. 
These eight main aspects associated with safety culture in the literature, corresponded the 
most significant aspects identified in the theoretical definition analysis, further supporting the 
developed theoretical definitions for safety culture.  
Review articles were also analyzed that further confirmed the theoretical definition for 
safety climate (Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 1999; Wiegmann et al., 
2004; Zohar 1980). These review articles demonstrate that there seem to be five main aspects 
that form safety climate:  
(1) Safety climate involves the perceptions or opinions of organizational members.  
(2) Safety climate is both an individual and a group phenomenon.  
(3) Safety climate is dependent on the current situation or work environment and is 
sensitive to external pressures.  
(4) Safety climate involves the manifest, surface perceptions of employees at a specific 
point in time, and these perceptions are easily changeable. 
(5) Safety climate is a subcomponent of safety culture.  
These five main aspects associated with safety climate in the literature, corresponded the 
most significant aspects identified in the theoretical definition analysis, further supporting the 
developed theoretical definitions for safety climate.  
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 2.4.2 Relationship between safety culture and safety climate. The next research 
question asked whether safety culture and safety climate assessed the same or distinct constructs, 
or whether safety climate should be considered a subcomponent of safety culture.  
 It is evident that safety culture and safety climate must be somewhat related as both 
constructs assess individual employees safety views, shared attitudes of the group, and the 
impact of policies and the working environment on safety (See Table 2-1 and Table 2-2). 
However, it is also evident that safety culture and safety climate are not assessing the exact same 
non-technological aspects of safety as there are many discrepancies between the two constructs. 
Firstly, while safety climate involves perceptions, opinions, and impressions, safety culture 
encompasses attitudes, beliefs, values, and norms. Secondly, safety climate represents the more 
easily observable, surface features of safety, while safety culture involves the deeply-held, 
implicit assumptions that are believed and followed by employees. Finally, safety climate is a 
temporary phenomenon that represents safety perceptions at a specific point in time and is 
subject to change. Conversely, safety culture is a more stable phenomenon that is long-lasting 
and difficult to change and the goal of developing a positive safety culture is to improve and 
enhance the safety performance of the organization. 
Based on both the classification of aspects and the common consensus within the 
literature, safety climate seems to be a subcomponent of safety culture, where safety climate 
includes the surface perceptions of safety culture. Within the theoretical definition analysis, 27% 
of the compiled theoretical definitions stated that safety climate was a subcomponent of safety 
culture. None of the definitions mentioned that safety climate was a distinct construct from 
safety culture. Furthermore, of the included review articles, three out of five state that safety 
climate is a subcomponent of safety culture (Cox & Flin, 1998; Mearns & Flin, 1999; Wiegmann 
et al., 2004). As such, safety climate appears to be a subcomponent of safety culture, which is in 
line with Choudhry and colleagues (2007b) beliefs.  
 2.4.3 Congruency between theoretical and operational definitions. The next research 
question focused on the congruency between the safety theoretical definitions and operational 
definitions in the literature.  
 The theoretical and operational definition analysis indicated that 55% of the definitions 
were missing their corresponding operational definition, suggesting that 55% of the current 
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studies did not develop both a theoretical definition and an operational definition when 
developing an assessment tool. Thirteen percent of the studies had a congruency rating below 
50%, suggesting that their theoretical definition and operational definition did not closely match. 
Twenty-six percent of the studies had a congruency rating between 50% and 74%, suggesting 
that their theoretical definition and operational definitions matched on some aspects, but not on 
others. Finally, 6% of the studies had a congruency rating between 75% and 100%, suggesting 
that the theoretical and operational definitions were closely matched. No studies obtained a 
congruency rating above 85%. As such, these results indicate that current studies need to 
improve the congruency between their theoretical and operational definitions when developing 
assessment tools.  
CHAPTER THREE 
STUDY TWO 
3.1 Study Two: Development and Evaluation of the Safety Climate Questionnaire 
 The purpose of study two part one was to develop and pilot the Saskatchewan Safety 
Climate Questionnaire, while the purpose of study two part two was to administer the 
questionnaire in the College of Engineering to determine its psychometric properties and 
evaluate the safety climate in the College of Engineering.  
3.1.1 Part 1: Development of a Safety Climate Questionnaire 
3.1.1.1 Purpose. The purpose of study two part one was to utilize the developed 
theoretical and operational definitions for safety climate to design a questionnaire based on these 
definitions. The questionnaire was piloted on students in the College of Engineering to determine 
its suitability and make any needed improvements. 
3.1.1.2 Materials. The materials used in study two was the 62 item Saskatchewan Safety 
Climate questionnaire that I created. Consequently, the procedure section below provides a 
detailed description of how the questionnaire was developed.  
3.1.1.3 Procedure. The theoretical definition of safety climate developed in part one of 
study one was used as the foundation for the assessment tool.  
“Safety climate reflects what employees perceive regarding safety within their 
organization, where “perceive” refers to the employees’ awareness, interpretation, and opinion 
formation regarding specific safety events. These opinions are developed by individual 
employees, but when these opinions become shared, they are what form the safety climate of an 
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organization. The major aspect of safety climate involves how employees perceive the safety 
attitudes and behaviors of both management and fellow co-workers, their organization’s safety 
policies, and the safety of their work environment. Safety climate is sensitive to external 
influence and involves the temporary, surface features of safety culture, which only captures the 
safety of the organization at a specific point in time.”  
From this theoretical definition, a corresponding operational definition for safety climate 
was developed that was tailored specifically to the College of Engineering and used to develop 
scale items for the assessment tool. The operational definition is below. 
“The safety climate in the College is supported by the perceptions of students that are 
developed and shared between instructors, teaching assistants, and students. Approval of these 
perceptions and opinions can be measured through self-report measures, such as survey 
questionnaires. Due to the changing nature of safety climate, frequent assessments should be 
conducted to determine any changes in within the College’s safety perceptions and attitudes. 
To assess the safety climate of the College, survey questionnaires should assess student’s 
perceptions and opinions on a variety of safety climate related factors, including: students’ 
perceptions and opinions of their College’s safety policies and procedures, students own 
adherence to policies and procedures, the extent to which other students adhere to the policies 
and procedures within the College, the effectiveness of the safety training students receive, 
students’ perception of their instructor’s approach to reporting incidents and punishing safety 
violations, the communication between students and instructors regarding safety, the 
effectiveness of the College’s safety equipment, students’ perceptions of the safety leadership of 
their instructors and teaching assistants, the extent to which students look out for one another’s 
safety, and students’ own perceptions and opinions regarding the conflict between safety and 
efficiency.”   
Existing safety culture and safety climate assessment tools were analyzed based on their 
validity and reliability. Items from the assessment tools that reported adequate reliability and 
validity were included in the potential pool of items for the survey questionnaire (See Appendix I 
for list of assessment tools). The researcher classified them based on whether or not they 
corresponded to the above safety climate definition. Items were included if the content of the 
item was congruent with the aspects identified in the theoretical definition for safety climate. See 
38 
  
Appendix J for the list of the classified items. Another rater then categorized the uncertain items 
based on whether or not they corresponded to the safety climate definition..  
The remaining items that correspond with the theoretical definition were grouped into 
subsections (i.e., safety policies, safety training, etc.). These subsections were identified based on 
the developed operational definition as well as on common themes that occurred around many 
items (e.g., many items referred to safety policies). The wording of the items was adjusted for 
use in a university/lab setting.  
Several demographic questions about gender, age, and year of study of the participant 
were asked to examine these factors in relation to safety climate scores. Whether the participant 
had previous work experience in industry was also assessed as students who had been previously 
exposed to industry level safety regulations may have a different approach to safety than students 
who lacked this experience. Questions about whether the participant had experienced or 
witnessed an injury or near miss were also asked in order to determine the relationship between 
an individual’s safety climate score and exposure to injury. The term “near miss” was used as it 
is a common term used in both the literature and industry that simply refers to any event that 
could have resulted in an injury (Jones, Kirchsteiger, & Bjerke, 1999). 
The questionnaire was then assessed by two experts in the field. These experts assessed 
the items based on their applicability for the College of Engineering at the University of 
Saskatchewan and provided their feedback. The recommended changes to the items were 
implemented and the draft survey was piloted on engineering students in the College.  
3.1.2 Piloting the Questionnaire 
The purpose of this pilot study was to determine whether the Saskatchewan Safety 
Climate Questionnaire is easily understood by participants, to collect feedback from participants 
regarding the structure of the questionnaire, and to conduct preliminary psychometric analysis on 
the survey’s results.  
3.1.2.1 Participants. The pilot sample included 35 participants. During class time 
twenty-three participants completed the online survey and 12 completed the paper-and-pencil 
survey. The demographics for the pilot sample are presented in Table 3-1. As Table 3-1 
indicates, the majority of participants are male (66%), born in 1994 (34%), in geological 
engineering (34%), and have previous work experience (80%). 
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Table 3-1. Demographics Frequency and Percentage 
Demographic Frequency Percent (%) 
Gender   
Male 23 65.7 
Female 12 34.3 
Year of Birth   
1995 5 14.3 
1994 12 34.3 
1993 10 28.6 
1992 1 2.9 
1991 1 2.9 
1990 3 8.6 
1989 or earlier 3 8.6 
Year of Study   
Third year 1 2.9 
Fourth year 17 48.6 
Fifth year or above 17 48.6 
Engineering Discipline    
Chemical and Biological Engineering  3 8.6 
Civil Engineering 2 5.7 
Geological Engineering 12 34.3 
Environmental Engineering 8 22.9 
Electrical Engineering 1 2.9 
Mechanical Engineering 9 25.7 
Previous Work in Industry   
Yes 28 80 
No 7 20 
Total 35 100 
 
3.1.2.2 Procedure. The pilot survey was conducted in November 2016. During a senior 
engineering class, participants were given the choice to either complete an online version of the 
survey through Fluid Surveys or to complete a paper and pencil version of the survey provided 
by the researcher. The survey took approximately 15 to 20 minutes to complete. After 
completion of the survey, participants were presented with a Debriefing Form and were asked if 
they had any comments or suggestions regarding the design and format of the survey 
3.1.2.2.1 Participants’ suggestions. Several participants said they found the policies and 
procedures section of the survey difficult as they had little exposure and knowledge of the 
College of Engineering’s safety procedures. However, the researcher chose to keep the policies 
and procedures section included in the survey, as it provided valuable data. Some of the 
participants did seem to have some basic knowledge of the policies, and the fact that many 
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participants were unfamiliar with the safety policies provided necessary data about the safety 
knowledge in the College of Engineering.  
Additional feedback suggested that the safety experiences and knowledge gained in the 
College of Engineering should be compared to that in industry. While this is a very interesting 
direction of the research, it is beyond the scope of this project, but may be addressed with future 
research.  
And finally, several participants suggested that the items repeated themselves or were 
redundant. However, as some redundancy is necessary to determine reliability and the fact that 
the questionnaire was only 15 to 20 minutes in length, resulted in all items remaining in the 
questionnaire. Furthermore, reliability analysis did not suggest that the items were redundant; 
however this will be discussed at length below.  
3.1.2.3 Results. In order to prepare the data for analysis the following steps were taken:  
(1) The negatively worded items were reverse coded to allow for reliability analysis to be 
conducted. (2) The total scale scores were created for each safety subscale (i.e., safety policies, 
safety training, etc.) as well as for the overall safety climate score. Total scale score were created 
using both “sum” and “mean”.  (3) Normality plots with tests were calculated to determine if the 
data were normally distributed. The Q-Q plots, as well as the comparison of the 5% trimmed 
mean to the mean indicated that the items in each subscale were normally distributed. (4) 
Frequency analysis, descriptive analysis, reliability alpha-coefficient, inter-item correlations, and 
item-total score correlations were conducted in order to analyze the usefulness of the data.  
3.1.2.4 Statistical Analysis of the Items. When analyzing the usefulness of the items, the 
researcher examined three different aspects:  
1. Whether the distribution of the answers was normal or whether there were any 
abnormalities or unusual patterns, as very strong agreement or very strong 
disagreement suggested there may be problems with the wording of the item.  
2. Whether the inter-item correlations were non-significant or negative, as this suggests 
that items within the same subcategory are unrelated to one another 
3. Whether Cronbach’s alpha was adequate and what the alpha would become if certain 
items were deleted.  
These criteria were used to determine if the items should remain, be re-worded, or be removed.  
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3.1.2.4.1 Safety climate scale. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale items was .94. An alpha 
this high suggests that the items are measuring the same safety construct. Next, each subcategory 
was analyzed separately to determine the adequacy of the items. Overall, all subcategories 
demonstrated a normal distribution, evident from the normalcy plots and tests conducted. For 
each subcategory, the mean was compared to the 5% trimmed mean and no significant 
differences were found. Furthermore, all plots indicated a normal distribution.  
 3.1.2.4.2 Safety policies. All items in the safety policies subcategory were adequate (See 
Table 3-2). Cronbach’s alpha for safety policies was .788 which exceeds the minimum guideline 
of .70 (Santos, 1999). Some of the items were slightly skewed towards “agree”, however, the 
majority were normally distributed. Only items 4 and 7 would have resulted in a higher alpha if 
removed, and this increase only resulted in an alpha of .793 and .805 respectively. Seeing as 
these two items were normally distributed and the inter-item correlations were mostly 
significant, no items were removed from the policies section.  
Table 3-2. Item Analysis of Safety Policies 
 Normally 
Distributed 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
Alpha 
Alpha if item deleted 
1. When safety rules or procedures are changed, 
the changes are promptly communicated to all 
affected students. 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
6 were 
significant 
out of 13 
.788 
.768 
2. My college values students’ correct 
observation of safety rules and procedures.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
3 .788 
.784 
3. Students can explain health and safety 
policies in the College. 
Normal 1 .788 
.785 
4. Not all the health and safety rules or 
procedures are strictly followed here. Reverse 
Normal 3 .788 
.793 higher 
5. Some health and safety rules or procedures 
are difficult to follow. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(disagree) 
6 .788 
.757 
6. In my college, disregarding safety policies 
and procedures is rare. 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
2 .788 
.785 
7. It would help students to work more safely if 
safety procedures were more realistic. Reverse 
Normal 2 .788 
.805 higher 
8. All the safety rules and procedures in my 
college really work. 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
7 .788 
. 760 
9. Safety procedures are carefully followed. Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
5 .788 
.772 
10. Some safety rules and procedures do not 
need to be followed to get the task done safely 
Reverse 
Normal 4 .788 
.780 
11. Some health and safety rules and procedures 
are not really practical. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
8 .788 
.758 
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12. Safety is considered when changes are made 
to rules and procedures. 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
10 .788 
.746 
13. Safety is not sacrificed for speed during a 
task. 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
6 .788 
.761 
14. Safety is not sacrificed for quality during a 
task. 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
3 .788 
.779 
3.1.2.4.3 Safety training. All items in the safety training subcategory were adequate (See 
Table 3-3). Cronbach’s alpha for safety training was .708 which exceeds the minimum guideline 
of .70. The majority of the items were normally distributed. Only items 3 and 4 would have 
resulted in a higher alpha if removed; however, the increase was minimal and these items were 
normally distributed and the inter-item correlations were mostly significant. As such, the safety 
training items were not changed.  
Table 3-3. Item Analysis of Safety Training 
 Normally 
Distributed 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
Alpha 
Alpha if item deleted 
1. Students have the necessary competence to 
perform tasks in a safe manner because of the 
safety training they have received.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
4 were 
significant 
out of 5 
.708 
.589 
2. Most of the safety training students receive is 
effective.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
3 .708 
.653 
3. It would help students to work more safely if 
we received more frequent safety training. 
Reverse 
Normal 2 .708 
.739 higher 
4. It would help students to work more safely if 
we were given better quality safety training. 
Reverse 
Normal 2 .708 
.720 higher 
5. Our safety training program ensures all 
students who do the same task learn to do it the 
same safe way.  
Normal 3 .708 
.672 
6. When asked to do a new job or task, students 
receive enough training to be able to do it safely. 
Normal 4 .708 
.613 
3.1.2.4.4 Safety communication. The items in the safety communication subcategory 
were also adequate (See Table 3-4). The alpha for safety communication was .711. Only two 
items, items 4 and 5, would have resulted in a higher Cronbach’s alpha if removed, resulting in 
an increase of .722 and .725 respectively. These items were normally distributed and the 
majority of the inter-item correlations were significant. Consequently, none of the safety 
communication items were changed or removed.  
Table 3-4. Item Analysis of Safety Communication 
 Normally 
Distributed 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
Alpha 
Alpha if item deleted 
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1. Students are recognized for working safely.  Slightly skewed 
(disagree) 
6 were 
significant 
out of 12 
.711 
.675 
2. Reporting a safety problem will not result in 
negative repercussions for the persons reporting 
it. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(disagree) 
3 .711 
.708 
3. Students are rewarded for taking quick action 
to identify a safety problem.  
Normal 3 .711 
.688 
4. It would help students to work more safely if 
the instructors recognized and praised our safe 
behaviour. Reverse 
Normal 2 .711 
.722 higher 
5. Students are not blamed for acting unsafely. Normal 4 .711 
.725 higher 
6. If students violate safety regulations they will 
be disciplined.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
4 .711 
.704 
7. Students are not comfortable reporting a 
safety violation, because they will be 
disciplined. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
1 .711 
.711 
8. Students’ suggestions about safety would be 
acted upon if they expressed them to the 
instructors. 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
2 .711 
.686 
9. There is good communication in the College 
between instructors and students about health 
and safety issues. 
Normal 5 .711 
.675 
10. Safety information is always brought to our 
attention by our instructor. 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
6 .711 
.664 
11. Our instructor does not always inform us of 
current safety concerns and issues. Reverse 
Normal 6 .711 
.679 
12. Students frequently offer ideas and 
suggestions to improve safety. 
Normal 3 .711 
.703 
13. Accidents that happen here are always 
reported and discussed. 
Normal 3 .711 
.666 
3.1.2.4.5 Safety attitudes about instructors. Cronbach’s alpha for safety attitudes about 
instructors was adequate at .781. Some of the items were slightly skewed towards agreement. 
However, the majority of the inter-item correlations were significant and none of the items 
would have resulted in a higher Cronbach’s alpha if removed. Consequently, there were no areas 
of concerns for this subcategory (See Table 3-5).  
Table 3-5. Item Analysis of Attitudes about Instructors 
 Normally 
Distributed 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
Alpha 
Alpha if item deleted 
1. In my college, the instructor acts quickly to 
correct safety problems.  
Normal 
 
4 were 
significant 
out of 9 
.781 
.763 
2. Corrective action is always taken when the 
college is told about unsafe practices.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
6 .781 
.735 
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3. In my college, instructors pay serious 
attention to the safety of students.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
1 .781 
.777 
4. Instructors and supervisors express concern if 
safety procedures are not adhered to.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
4 .781 
.751 
5. The college clearly considers the safety of 
students of great importance.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
5 .781 
.756 
6. Instructors sometimes turn a blind eye to 
people who are not observing the health and 
safety procedures. Reverse 
Normal 2 .781 
.782  
7. Our college supplies enough safety 
equipment. 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
 
5 .781 
.756 
8. Our college checks equipment to make sure it 
is free of faults.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
3 .781 
.778 
9. Sometimes conditions here hinder my ability 
to work safely. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
2 .781 
.759 
10. I cannot always get the equipment I need to 
do the task safely. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
4 .781 
.763 
3.1.2.4.6 Safety attitudes about fellow students. The subcategory for safety attitudes 
about fellow students was the only category that had an alpha below the suggested guidelines at 
.667. The majority of the items were normally distributed. However, the number of significant 
inter-item correlations was low for some of the items. Only, two items, items 3 and 7, would 
have resulted in a higher Cronbach’s alpha if removed, resulting in an alpha of .668 and .672 
respectively. This increase would have been minimal. Furthermore, upon assessing these two 
items, at face value they are useful items to have in the questionnaire (i.e., “I ask my fellow 
students to stop work which I believe is performed in an unsafe manner, Students and instructors 
accept safety violations as long as there are no accidents”). The lower than recommended alpha 
could be due to two factors. Firstly, this subcategory only has seven items, which may have 
resulted in the low alpha. Additionally, it is also possible that there are two separate factors 
within this subcategory that are assessing two different constructs. Looking at the items within 
this subcategory there seems to be two separate constructs, one assessing safety cooperation 
between fellow students and the other assessing safety violations of other students. Additional 
participants are needed to confirm the presence of these two factors using a confirmatory factor 
analysis. Ultimately, no items were removed or changed within this subcategory (See Table 3-6). 
  
45 
  
Table 3-6. Item Analysis of Attitudes about Fellow Students 
 Normally 
Distributed 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
Alpha 
Alpha if item deleted 
1. I am encouraged by my fellow students to 
report any safety concerns I may have.  
Normal 
 
2 were 
significant 
out of 6 
.667 
.620 
2. Students take no responsibility for each 
other’s safety. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
0 .667 
.663 
3. I ask my fellow students to stop work which I 
believe is performed in an unsafe manner.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
1 .667 
.668 higher 
4. My fellow students look out for my safety.  Normal 
 
3 .667 
.586 
5. When I see a fellow student working at-risk, I 
caution him or her.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
 
3 .667 
.584 
6. In my college, there is significant peer 
pressure to discourage unsafe practices.  
Slightly skewed 
(disagree) 
3 .667 
.617 
7. Students and instructors accept safety 
violations as long as there are no accidents.  
Reverse 
Normal 1 .667 
.672 higher 
3.1.2.4.7 Own safety reflections. The final subcategory, reflections on one’s own safety 
attitudes, had an alpha of .879, which is adequate. The majority of the items were normally 
distributed and most of the inter-item correlations were significant. Only two items, items 1 and 
12, would have resulted in a higher alpha if removed, and this increase was minimal. 
Consequently, none of the items in this subcategory were removed (See Table 3-7).  
Table 3-7. Item Analysis of Own Safety Reflections 
 Normally 
Distributed 
Inter-Item 
Correlations 
Alpha 
Alpha if item deleted 
1. I tend to take more risks in my tasks when 
instructors aren't present. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
 
5 were 
significant 
out of 11 
.879 
.883 higher 
2. If I make a mistake that has significant safety 
consequences and nobody notices, I do not tell 
anyone about it. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
11 .879 
.856 
3. I believe the most important part of 
completing a task is being safe.  
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
10 .879 
.859 
4. I believe that safety issues are not assigned a 
high priority in my College. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
8 .879 
.870 
5. I do not skip any safety step even to increase 
work efficiency.  
Normal 
 
10 .879 
.860 
6. I cannot avoid taking risks in my College. 
Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
7 .879 
.879 
7. I believe some tasks here are difficult to do 
safely. Reverse 
Normal 9 .879 
.865 
8. I pride myself on my ability to work safely.  Normal 
 
8 .879 
.866 
46 
  
9. I hope to be known as a safe worker.  Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
10 .879 
.863 
10. I only get involved in safety activities 
because I'm required to do so. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
6 .879 
.878 
11. When people ignore safety procedures here, 
I feel it is none of my business. Reverse 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
9 .879 
.857 
12. I practice the safety attitudes and behaviors I 
have learned in the College of Engineering in 
other contexts (i.e., home, work). 
Slightly skewed 
(agree) 
3 .879 
.888 higher 
3.1.3 Conclusion 
Overall, none of the items in the safety survey were removed and only one section of 
questions was altered. Questions in the injury and accident section were worded differently in 
order to obtain more standardized answers. In the pilot survey, the participants were asked to fill 
in the blank on how many injuries they witnessed or experienced. This format resulted in 
answers ranging from 0 to “a few”, which made it difficult to classify the number of injuries and 
near misses experienced by participants. Consequently, answer categories in the final version of 
the survey were changed so that participants chose from a series of options rather than fill in the 
blank. In the pilot questionnaire, the question asked “how many times have you experienced a 
minor injury” and allowed the participant to enter in any number of their choosing, However, the 
finalized version of the questionnaire had specific answer categories, such as “never”, “1 to 5 
times”, “6 to 9 times”, and “10 or more times.” Answer categories for these options were 
designed based on the responses participants provided in the pilot survey.  
As the pilot survey was found to be reliable with this sample and no significant changes 
were made to the survey, the data obtained in the pilot sample were incorporated into the overall 
sample pool. For the question that was changed, the researcher manually entered the pilot data 
responses into the correct answer categories. The final version of the survey is provided in 
Appendix R.  
3.2 Part 2: Evaluation of Safety Climate in the College of Engineering 
 The majority of research on safety climate has been focused on the industrial setting, 
such that construction sites, mines, and hospitals have been the main focus of safety research. 
However, it is also important to assess the safety climate in other settings, such as university 
campuses, particularly when these colleges have experimental laboratories, testing grounds, or 
practice factories where safety may be a concern (Wu, Liu, & Lu, 2007). Wu and colleagues 
(2007) administered a safety climate questionnaire to 100 universities in Taiwan and found that 
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safety climate was related to the presence of a safety management and safety committee. 
Additionally, safety climate was found to relate to safety training, as individuals who received 
more safety training were more likely to report an improved safety climate, compared to those 
with little or no safety training. Consequently, it is important to examine safety climate within 
universities and colleges in order to determine the safety climate at specific institutions, as well 
as a means of improving safety climate within universities (Wu, Liu, & Lu, 2007). Finally, it is 
also important to assess safety climate within Canada, as different countries and cultures will 
have a variety of safety climates and different facilitators and barriers associated with improving 
their specific safety climate.  
3.2.1.1 Purpose. The purpose of part two of study two was to use the developed 
questionnaire to examine the psychometric properties of the scale and to evaluate the safety 
climate in the College of Engineering at the University of Saskatchewan. The following research 
questions were examined:  
1. What are the main psychometric properties of the developed Safety Climate 
Questionnaire? 
2. What is the safety climate in the College of Engineering? Are there significant 
differences between reported scores on the safety climate subscales? 
3. How are the Safety Climate scores associated with the demographic variables (i.e., 
gender, year of study, discipline, experience with injuries, etc.) obtained in the College of 
Engineering? 
3.2.1.2 Participants. The sample consisted of 232 participants from three sections of a 
senior engineering classes attended in January 2017, as well as the 35 participants included from 
the pilot sample. One hundred eighty-seven participants completed the online version of the 
questionnaire and 80 completed the paper-and-pencil version of the questionnaire. Nine 
participants failed to complete the questionnaire, as such these questionnaires were removed 
from analysis. However, due to an administration error, 43 paper-and-pencil versions of the 
questionnaire were missing the last page, which had 12 items. Consequently, the results have two 
different sample sizes depending on the subscale, as the final subscale, Reflections on one’s own 
safety attitudes, only has a sample size of 215. Consequently, the final number of surveys used in 
the analysis was 258, with 215 having complete data.  
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As Table 3-8 indicates, the majority of participants were male (80%), born between 1993 
and 1995 (80%), and in mechanical engineering (26%), civil engineering (22%), or chemical and 
biological engineering (21%). The majority of participants had previous work experience in 
industry (75%).  
Table 3-8. Demographics Frequency and Percentage 
Demographic Frequency Percent (%) 
Gender   
Male 207 80.2 
Female 51 19.8 
Year of Birth   
1996 2 0.8 
1995 66 25.6 
1994 103 39.9 
1993 37 14.3 
1992 13 5.0 
1991 8 3.1 
1990 7 2.7 
1989 11 4.3 
1988 3 1.2 
1987 or earlier 8 3.1 
Year of Study   
Third year 4 1.5 
Fourth year 178 69.0 
Fifth year or above 76 29.5 
Engineering Discipline    
Chemical and Biological Engineering  55 21.3 
Civil Engineering 57 22.1 
Geological Engineering 19 7.4 
Environmental Engineering 13 5.0 
Electrical Engineering 26 10.1 
Computer Engineering 11 4.3 
Engineering Physics 9 3.5 
Mechanical Engineering 68 26.4 
Previous Work in Industry   
Yes 194 75.2 
No 64 24.8 
Total 258 100 
As Table 3-9 indicates, 32% of participants had experienced at least one near miss, 10% 
had experienced at least one minor injury, and 2% had experienced a major injury. Forty-six 
percent of participants had witnessed at least one near miss on campus, 25% had witnessed a 
minor injury, and 10% had witnessed a major injury. These percentages indicate that injuries and 
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accidents are fairly uncommon on campus and in the College of Engineering. While near misses 
and minor injuries may occur occasionally, major injuries are rare.  
Table 3-9. Experiencing and Witnessing Injuries 
Type of Injury Frequency of Injury Frequency Percent (%) 
Experiencing Injuries    
Near Miss Never 176 68.2 
 1 to 5 times 73 28.3 
 6 to 9 times 4 1.6 
 10 or more 5 1.9 
Minor Injury Never 233 90.3 
 1 to 5 times 20 7.8 
 6 to 9 times 5 1.9 
 10 or more 0 0 
Major Injury Never 252 97.7 
 1 to 5 times 6 2.3 
 6 to 9 times 0 0 
 10 or more 0 0 
Witnessing Injuries    
Near Miss Never 139 53.9 
 1 to 5 times 100 38.8 
 6 to 9 times 7 2.7 
 10 or more 12 4.7 
Minor Injury Never 195 75.6 
 1 to 5 times 59 22.9 
 6 to 9 times 1 0.4 
 10 or more 3 1.2 
Major Injury Never 232 89.9 
 1 to 5 times 26 10.1 
 6 to 9 times 0 0 
 10 or more 0 0 
Fatality Never 254 98.4 
 1 to 5 times 4 1.6 
 6 to 9 times 0 0 
 10 or more 0 0 
Total  258 100 
3.2.1.3 Procedure. For each of the three classes, a time was agreed upon that was 
convenient for the professor and their class to participate in the safety questionnaire. At the 
beginning of class, the researcher briefly introduced the project and went over the consent form. 
The participants chose whether they wanted to complete the online version of the questionnaire 
or the paper-and-pencil version. The online version of the survey was sent as a link to the 
professor in advance and the professor either emailed the link to their students or posted the link 
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on blackboard. The researcher provided the paper-and-pencil copies to students who did not have 
a laptop or phone available. The paper-and-pencil versions of the questionnaire were collected 
once completed and entered into Fluid Surveys manually. The survey took participants 
approximately 20 minutes to complete.  
3.2.2 Results  
In order to prepare the data for analysis the following steps were taken: 
1. Participants who did not complete the survey were removed from the analysis. Several 
items had missing data, as such Little’s MCAR was calculated to determine if the data 
was missing at random. The Little’s MCAR test resulted in chi-square = 1143.45 (df = 
1080, p = .088), which indicated that the data was missing at random. To input the 
missing data an expectation maximization (EM) technique was used, with inferences 
assumed based on the likelihood of the normal distribution (Tabachnick, Fidell, & 
Osterlind, 2001). 
2. The negatively worded items were reverse coded to allow for reliability analysis to be 
conducted. 
3. The total scale scores were created for each safety subscale (i.e., safety policies, safety 
training, etc.) as well as for the safety climate questionnaire.  
4. Normality plots with tests were calculated to determine if the data were normally 
distributed. The Q-Q plots, as well as the comparison of the 5% trimmed mean to the 
mean indicated that the items in each subscale were normally distributed.  
3.2.3 Psychometric analysis 
 The purpose of the psychometric analysis is to examine the quality of the questionnaire 
items and the questionnaire as a whole. It includes the following steps: item analysis, reliability 
analysis, exploratory factor analysis, and validity analysis.  
 3.2.3.1 Item analysis. Item analysis involves evaluating the quality of items using a 
number of parameters (Varma, 2006). Within this item analysis the following parameters were 
analyzed: mean, standard deviation, frequency and percentage of each answer choice, 
Cronbach’s alpha, and Pearson correlation of the items’ score with the questionnaire total score.  
Mean is the average of participants’ responses. Standard deviation is a measure of how 
far the scores deviate from the average score. If the standard deviation is low, there is little 
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variability. If the standard deviation is high, this indicates the scores are spread out from the 
mean.   
The frequency and percentage of participants’ answer choices is assessed to determine 
the distribution of the answer on the questionnaire answer scale. If all participants indicate an 
answer choice of “neutral” this may indicate a problematic item as there is not enough variability 
in the answer choices. The distribution of the Safety Climate Questionnaire is displayed in 
Appendix Q.  
Internal consistency is a type of reliability that measures how well items on a test assess 
the same construct or idea. Internal consistency is assessed using Cronbach’s alpha and .70 is 
often considered the acceptable cut-off value (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Osterlind, 2001). The 
Cronbach’s alpha for each subscale was assessed based on whether the alpha would increase if a 
specific item was deleted. The Cronbach’s alpha increased significantly with the deletion of a 
certain item, this indicates that this item may be problematic.  
 Pearson correlation values range for -1.0 to +1.0. A large positive Pearson coefficient 
value indicates that participants with high safety climate questionnaire scores are also reporting 
high scores on individual items. A low Pearson coefficient value would indicate that participants 
with high overall safety climate scores are reporting low safety climate scores on individual 
items, which would indicate an anomaly in the items. A Pearson value of 0.25 is recommended, 
although the value should be at least 0.15 (Varma, 2006).  
 3.2.3.1.1 Safety policies. Appendix K displays the means, standard deviations, 
Cronbach’s alpha, frequency and percentage of each answer choice, and Pearson correlation 
coefficients for the safety policies subscale.  
The mean for the items for safety policies range from 2.76 for item 7 to 4.14 for item 2. 
The majority of the items are between 3.0 and 4.0. The standard deviation of the items range 
from .74 for item 2 to 1.35 for item 12. For safety policies the Cronbach’s alpha was .795, which 
exceeds the minimum guideline of .70. Comparing the Cronbach’s alpha of .795 to the 
Cronbach’s alpha if an item is deleted indicates that none of the items would result in a higher 
Cronbach’s alpha if deleted which indicates the good quality of the include items.  
For the frequency and percentage of answer choices, the results were fairly normally 
distributed with the majority of participants selecting “neutral” or “agree”. Few participants 
selected strongly disagree, with this answer choice selected most commonly for item 7 at 9%. 
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Participants were most likely to choose “neutral” for items 3, 7, and 10. Participants were mostly 
likely to choose “agree” for items 1, 2, 8, 9, 12, 13, and 14. The Pearson correlation value for 
each item was above the recommended guideline of 0.25 and all items were significantly 
associated with the mean total scale score.  
3.2.3.1.2 Safety training. Appendix L displays the means, standard deviations, 
Cronbach’s alpha, frequency and percentage of each answer choice, and Pearson correlation 
coefficient for the safety training subscale. The mean for the items for safety training range from 
2.52 for item 4 to 3.71 for item 1. The standard deviation of the items range from .926 for item 6 
to 1.10 for item 3. For safety training Cronbach’s alpha is .74, which exceeds the minimum 
guideline of .70. Comparing the Cronbach’s alpha of .74 to the Cronbach’s alpha if an item is 
deleted indicates that the deletion of item 3 would result in a Cronbach’s alpha of .743, however, 
this increase is minor.  
For the frequency and percentage of answer choices, the results were fairly normally 
distributed with the majority of participants selecting “neutral” or “agree”. Participants were 
most likely to choose “neutral” for items 3, 4, and 5. Participants were mostly likely to choose 
“agree” for items 1, 2, 5, and 6. The Pearson correlation value for each item was above the 
recommended guideline of 0.25 and all items were significantly associated with the mean total 
scale score.  
3.2.3.1.3 Safety communication. Appendix M displays the means, standard deviations, 
Cronbach’s alpha, frequency and percentage of each answer choice, and Pearson correlation 
coefficient for the safety communication subscale.  
The mean for the items for safety communication range from 1.89 for item 2 to 3.79 for 
item 10. The majority of the items are between 2.0 and 3.0. The standard deviation of the items 
range from .88 for item 10 to 1.57 for item 13. For safety communication the Cronbach’s alpha 
was .663, which does not meet the minimum guideline of .70. Comparing the Cronbach’s alpha 
of .663 to the Cronbach’s alpha if an item is deleted indicates that there were three items that 
would result in a higher alpha if deleted. These included item 5 at .668, item 2 at .674, and item 4 
at .677. Deletion of any of these items alone does not result in a Cronbach’s alpha that meets the 
minimum guideline of .70. If all three of these items are deleted, the resulting Cronbach’s alpha 
is .702. 
53 
  
For the frequency and percentage of answer choices, the results were fairly normally 
distributed with the majority of participants selecting “neutral” or “disagree”. Participants were 
most likely to choose “neutral” for items 1, 3, 5, and 12. Participants were mostly likely to 
choose “disagree” for items 2, 4, 5, and 12. The Pearson correlation value for each item was 
above the minimum recommended guideline of 0.15.  Items 2 and 4 were below the 
recommended guideline of 0.25, but all other items were higher than 0.25.  
3.2.3.1.4 Attitudes about instructors. Appendix N displays the means, standard 
deviations, Cronbach’s alpha, frequency and percentage of each answer choice, and Pearson 
correlation coefficient for the attitudes about instructors subscale.  
The mean for the items for safety attitudes about instructors range from 2.73 for item 8 to 
4.03 for item 5. The majority of the items are between 3.0 and 4.0. The standard deviation of the 
items range from .84 for item 5 to 1.70 for item 8. For attitudes about instructors Cronbach’s 
alpha is .789, which exceeds the minimum guideline of .70. Comparing the Cronbach’s alpha of 
.789 to the Cronbach’s alpha if an item is deleted indicates that Cronbach’s alpha would be .794 
if item 8 was deleted.  
For the frequency and percentage of answer choices, the results were fairly normally 
distributed with the majority of participants selecting “neutral” or “agree”. Few participants 
selected strongly disagree, with this answer choice selected most commonly for item 7 and 8 at 
3% each. Participants were most likely to choose “neutral” for items 1, 6, 7, and 8. Participants 
were mostly likely to choose “agree” for items 1, 3, 4, and 5. The Pearson correlation value for 
each item was above the recommended guideline of 0.25 and all items were significantly 
associated with the mean total scale score.  
3.2.3.1.5 Attitudes about fellow students. Appendix O displays the means, standard 
deviations, Cronbach’s alpha, frequency and percentage of each answer choice, and Pearson 
correlation coefficient for the attitudes about fellow students subscale.  
The mean for the items for attitudes about fellow students range from 2.91 for item 6 to 
3.90 for item 5. The standard deviation of the items range from .74 for item 5 to 1.27 for item 7. 
For attitudes about fellow students Cronbach’s alpha is .610, which does not exceed the 
minimum guideline of .70. Comparing the Cronbach’s alpha of .610 to the Cronbach’s alpha if 
an item is deleted indicates that the Cronbach’s alpha would be .614 if item 6 was deleted and 
the alpha would be .641 if item 7 was deleted. 
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For the frequency and percentage of answer choices, the results were fairly normally 
distributed with the majority of participants selecting “neutral” or “agree”. Few participants 
selected strongly disagree, with this answer choice selected most commonly for item 6 at 5%. 
Participants were most likely to choose “neutral” for items 1, 4, and 6. Participants were mostly 
likely to choose “agree” for items 2, 3, 4, and 5. The Pearson correlation value for each item was 
above the recommended guideline of 0.25 and all items were significantly associated with the 
mean total scale score.  
3.2.3.1.6 Reflections on one’s own safety attitudes. Appendix P displays the means, 
standard deviations, Cronbach’s alpha, frequency and percentage of each answer choice, and 
Pearson correlation coefficient for reflections on one’s own safety attitudes subscale.  
The mean for the items for own safety reflections range from 3.04 for item 10 to 4.07 for 
item 9. The majority of the items are between 3.0 and 4.0. The standard deviation of the items 
range from .74 for item 9 to 1.13 for item 6. For reflections on one’s own safety attitudes 
Cronbach’s alpha is .789, which exceeds the minimum guideline of .70. Comparing the 
Cronbach’s alpha of .789 to the Cronbach’s alpha if an item is deleted indicates that Cronbach’s 
alpha would be .792 if item 10 was deleted. 
For the frequency and percentage of answer choices, the results were fairly normally 
distributed with the majority of participants selecting “neutral” or “agree”. Few participants 
selected strongly disagree, with this answer choice selected most commonly for item 10 at 6%. 
Participants were most likely to choose “neutral” for items 2, 5, 10, and 11. Participants were 
mostly likely to choose “agree” for items 8, 9, 11, and 12. The Pearson correlation value for each 
item was above the recommended guideline of 0.25 and all items were significantly associated 
with the mean total scale score.  
Overall, the items for the safety policies subscale seem appropriate and do not indicate 
any problematic items and the scale is normally distributed (See Appendix Q). The items for the 
safety training subscale also seem appropriate and do not indicate any problematic items. The 
majority of the items for the safety communication subscale seem appropriate; however, items 
two, four, and five may be problematic. In future versions of this scale, and in the shortened 
version of the Safety Climate Questionnaire, these items should be removed. For the attitudes 
about instructors subscale the items seem appropriate and do not indicate any issues. While 
Cronbach’s alpha is lower than the recommended guideline, the items for the attitudes about 
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fellow students subscale seem appropriate as all are normally distributed and the Pearson 
correlation is acceptable. And finally, the items for the own safety reflections subscale seem 
appropriate and do not indicate any problematic items.  
 3.2.3.2 Reliability analysis. Internal consistency was calculated as it is a standard aspect 
of psychometric analysis and it assesses how inter-related the items are to one another. 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for the entire safety scale and for each individual subscale, with 
the alphas presented in Table 3-10. 
Table 3-10. Cronbach's alpha for scale and subscales 
Scale Cronbach’s Alpha 
Safety Climate Scale .920 
Safety Policies .795 
Safety Training .740 
Safety Communication .663 
Attitudes about Instructors .789 
Attitudes about Fellow Students .610 
Reflections on One’s Own Safety Attitudes .789 
As Table 3-10 illustrates, Cronbach’s alpha met the minimum guidelines of .70 for all 
subscales except safety communication and fellow students’ attitudes. Removal of any of the 
items in these two subscales did not result in an alpha that meets the minimum of .70, suggesting 
that the lower Cronbach’s alpha on these items was not due to low quality of items.  
 3.2.3.3 Exploratory factor analysis. Exploratory factor analysis is a statistical technique 
that reveals the structure of the scale by determining which items form subsets. Items within a 
subset should be correlated with one another, but should not be strongly correlated with items in 
other subsets (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Osterlind, 2001). An exploratory factor analysis was 
conducted as it is a standard aspect of psychometric analysis, checks the dimensionality of the 
scale, and it provides the student researcher with a broad range of statistical experience. 
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on each subscale to determine the underlying 
structure of the safety climate items. A factor loading cut-off of .40 was used as Tabachnick, 
Fidell, and Osterlind (2001) suggest a .40 cut-off is useful for interpretive purposes. Hair and 
colleagues (1998) also argue that a .40 cut-off is sufficient so long as the sample size exceeds 
200 participants and the sample size for this study is 258. An exploratory factor analysis using 
principal axis factoring and an oblique rotation using direct oblimin was performed on each 
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subscale. The scree plot, eigenvalues, and parallel analysis test was used to indicate the number 
of factors identified in each subscale.  
 3.2.3.3.1 Safety policies. For safety policies, a three-factor model appeared to best fit to 
the data. The factors loaded cleanly on one factor and none of these items cross-load on any 
other factor. With the cut-off of .40, all 14 items loaded on one factor, with the majority of items 
exceeding the cut-off at .50 or higher. In sum, there were three factors within the safety policies 
subscale, consisting of: skills and knowledge of safety policies, safety versus production, and 
practicality of safety policies (See Table 3-11). 
Table 3-11. Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis for Safety Policies 
 Factor Loadings 
Item Knowledge 
of Policies 
Safety vs. 
Production 
Practicality 
of Policies 
When safety rules or procedures are changed, the 
changes are promptly communicated to all affected 
students 
.54 -.03 -.01 
My college values in the students correct observation 
of safety rules and procedures  
.52 -.06 -.10 
Students can explain health and safety policies in the 
College 
.55 .05 -.03 
Not all the health and safety rules or procedures are 
strictly followed here 
.45 .15 .14 
Some health and safety rules or procedures are 
difficult to follow 
.22 .08 .61 
In my college, disregarding safety policies and 
procedures is rare 
.60 -.01 .02 
It would help students to work more safely if safety 
procedures were more realistic 
.13 .12 .50 
All the safety rules and procedures in my college 
really work 
.57 -.04 .21 
Safety procedures are carefully followed .60 -.17 .14 
Some safety rules and procedures do not need to be 
followed to get the task done safely 
-.11 -.10 .55 
Some health and safety rules and procedures are not 
really practical 
-.06 -.14 .80 
Safety is considered when changes are made to rules 
and procedures 
.42 -.14 -.10 
Safety is not sacrificed for speed during a task .14 -.83 .04 
Safety is not sacrificed for quality during a task .06 -.88 .09 
Eigenvalues 3.99 1.86 1.55 
% of variance 28.52 13.26 11.04 
Note: Factor loadings over .40 appear in bold. 
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3.2.3.3.2 Safety training. For the safety training subscale, a two-factor model appeared to 
best fit to the data. The factors loaded cleanly on one factor and none of these items cross-load 
on any other factor. All factors exceeded the cut-off of .40. In sum, there were two factors within 
the safety training subscale, consisting of: current safety training effectiveness and improvements 
to future training (See Table 3-12). 
Table 3-12. Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis for Safety Training 
 Factor Loadings 
Item Current 
Training 
Training 
Improvement 
Students have the necessary competence to perform tasks in a 
safe manner because of the training they have received 
.72 .02 
Most of the safety training students receive is effective  .85 -.12 
It would help students to work more safely if we received more 
frequent safety training 
-.01 .68 
It would help students to work more safely if we were given 
better quality safety training 
.03 .84 
Our safety training program ensures all students who do the 
same task learn to do it in the same safe way 
.56 .02 
When asked to do a new job or task, students receive enough 
training to be able to do it safely 
.61 .10 
Eigenvalues 2.69 1.32 
% of variance 44.79 21.96 
Note: Factor loadings over .40 appear in bold. 
3.2.3.3.3 Safety communication. For the safety communication subscale, a two-factor 
model appeared to best fit to the data. The factors in this solution did not load as cleanly. One 
item double-loaded on two factors and four items did not meet the cut-off of .40. There were two 
factors within the safety communication subscale, consisting of: student safety engagement and 
reporting and instructors disclosure of safety information (See Table 3-13). 
Table 3-13. Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis for Safety Communication 
 Factor Loadings 
Item Student 
Engagement 
and 
Reporting 
Instructors 
Disclosure 
of 
Information 
Students are recognized for working safely .26 -.38 
Reporting a safety problem will not result in negative 
repercussions for the persons reporting it 
.14 .25 
Student are rewarded for taking quick action to identity a safety 
problem 
.68 -.03 
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It would help students to work more safely if the instructors 
recognized and praised our safe behavior 
-.03 -.18 
Students are not blamed for acting unsafely .24 .25 
If students violate safety regulations they will be disciplined .46 .06 
Students are not comfortable reporting a safety violation because 
they will be disciplined 
.45 .04 
Students’ suggestions about safety would be acted upon if they 
expressed them to the instructors 
.51 -.05 
There is good communication in the College between instructors 
and students about health and safety issues 
.42 -.46 
Safety information is always brought to our attention by our 
instructor 
.18 -.71 
Our instructor does not always inform us of current safety 
concerns and issues 
.05 -.46 
Students frequently offer ideas and suggestions to improve safety .47 -.09 
Accidents that happen here are always reported and discussed .47 -.01 
Eigenvalues 2.85 1.75 
% of variance 21.95 13.45 
Note: Factor loadings over .40 appear in bold. 
3.2.3.3.4 Attitudes about instructors. For the attitudes about instructors subscale a two-
factor model appeared to best fit to the data. The factors loaded cleanly on one factor and none of 
these items cross-load on any other factor. All factors exceeded the cut-off of .40. Overall, there 
were two factors within the attitudes about instructors subscale, consisting of: visible safety 
leadership and the effectiveness of the safety equipment (See Table 3-14). 
Table 3-14. Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis for Attitudes about Instructors 
 Factor Loadings 
Item Visible 
Safety 
Leadership 
Effectiveness 
of 
Equipment 
In my college the instructor acts quickly to correct safety 
problems 
.69 .07 
Corrective action is always taken when the college is told about 
unsafe practices  
.71 .13 
In my college instructors pay serious attention to the safety of 
students 
.56 -.15 
Instructors and supervisors express concern if safety procedures 
are not adhered to 
.63 -.07 
The college clearly considers the safety of students of great 
importance 
.48 -.26 
Instructors sometimes turn a blind eye to people who are not 
observing the health and safety procedures 
.16 -.49 
Our college supplies enough safety equipment .30 -.43 
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Our college checks equipment to make sure it is free of faults .43 .01 
Sometimes conditions here hinder my ability to work safely -.12 -.80 
I cannot always get the equipment I need to do the task safely -.03 -.81 
Eigenvalues 3.73 1.58 
% of variance 37.25 15.76 
Note: Factor loadings over .40 appear in bold. 
3.2.3.3.5 Attitudes about fellow students. For attitudes about fellow students, a two-
factor model appeared to best fit to the data. The factors loaded cleanly on one factor and none of 
these items cross-load on any other factor. All factors exceeded the cut-off of .40. Overall, there 
were two factors within the attitudes about fellow students subscale, consisting of: looking out 
for fellow students and peer support (See Table 3-15). 
Table 3-15. Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis for Attitudes about Fellow Students 
 Factor Loadings 
Item Looking out 
for Fellow 
Students 
Peer 
Support 
I am encouraged by my fellow students to report any safety 
concerns I may have 
.23 .30 
Students take no responsibility for each other’s safety  -.11 .59 
I ask my fellow students to stop work which I believe is performed 
in an unsafe manner 
.59 .11 
My fellow students look out for my safety .17 .57 
When I see a fellow student working at-risk I caution him or her .81 -.08 
In my college there is significant peer pressure to discourage unsafe 
practices 
.30 .01 
Students and instructors accept safety violations as long as there are 
no accidents 
.03 .24 
Eigenvalues 2.33 1.09 
% of variance 33.25 15.52 
Note: Factor loadings over .40 appear in bold. 
3.2.3.3.6 Own reflections about safety. For one’s own reflections about safety subscale a 
two-factor model appeared to best fit to the data. Most of the factors loaded cleanly on one factor 
and none of these items cross-load on any other factor. However, two items did not meet the .40 
cut-off. Overall, there were two factors within the own safety reflections subscale, consisting of: 
valuing safety as a priority and job hindrances (See Table 3-16). 
Table 3-16. Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis for Reflections on Own Safety Attitudes 
 Factor Loadings 
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Item Valuing 
Safety as a 
Priority 
Job 
Hindrances 
I tend to take more risks in my tasks when instructor’s aren’t 
present 
.41 .13 
If I make a mistake that has significant consequences and nobody 
notices I do not tell anyone about it 
.57 .04 
I believe the most important part of competing a task is being safe .53 .08 
I believe that safety issues are not assigned a high priority in my 
college 
.23 .37 
I do not skip any safety step even to increase work efficiency .59 .08 
I cannot avoid taking risks in my college -.01 .69 
I believe some tasks here are difficult to do safely .01 .79 
I pride myself on my ability to work safely .70 -.10 
I hope to be known as a safe worker .69 -.05 
I only get involved in safety activities because I’m required to do 
so 
.46 -.20 
When people ignore safety procedures here I feel it is none of my 
business 
.60 .11 
I practice the safety attitudes and behaviors I have learned in the 
College of Engineering in other contexts (i.e., home, work) 
.35 .19 
Eigenvalues 3.85 1.62 
% of variance 32.09 13.48 
Note: Factor loadings over .40 appear in bold. 
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Figure 3-1 displays the means and standard deviations of the safety subscales identified 
by the exploratory factor analysis (EFA).  
As can be seen from Figure 3-1, safety scores are highest for Safety versus Production, 
Current Training, Peer Support, and Effectiveness of Equipment. Safety scores were lowest for 
Practicality of Policies, Training Improvement, and Student Engagement. 
Overall, the exploratory factor analysis found clear and easily interpretable factors for 
four out of six of the subscales. Safety communication had several items that double loaded or 
did not meet the .40 cut-off. The own reflections about safety subscale also had two items that 
did not meet the .40 cut-off. Consequently, a shortened version of the scale was created that only 
included items with high factor loadings.  
3.2.3.4 Shortened version of scale. The dimensions identified by the EFA were used to 
form a shortened version of the Saskatchewan Safety Climate Questionnaire. Using the EFA 
factor loadings a conservative shortened scale was created and a cut-off of .60 was used, as 
Figure 1-1. Means and Standard Deviations for Safety Subscales Identified by EFA 
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factor loadings of .60 or higher are considered strong (Cabrera-Nguyen, 2010). The shortened 
version of the scale included 27 items and can be viewed in Appendix S.  
Following this, the 27 item scale was compared to the 62 item scale to determine its 
effectiveness. Firstly, the shortened scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .861. While the internal 
consistency of the scale was not as high as the 62 items scale, it was still adequate.  
Next, both the 62 item scale and the 27 item scale were correlated with participants’ 
gender, year of study, discipline, previous work experience, and experience with injuries. The 
results are displayed in Table 3-17, which demonstrates that the 62 item scale and the 27 item 
scale are highly correlated with one another at .951, and the correlations for both the 62 item 
scale and the 27 item scale with the other variables are in the same direction and display the 
same significance levels.  
Finally, an independent samples t-test was conducted with both the 62 item scale and the 
27 item scale, comparing these scales to previous work experience and experience with injuries. 
For participants’ previous work experience, both the 27 item scale (p = .040) and the 62 item 
scale (p = .027) demonstrated similar significance values.  
For participants’ experience with injuries, both the 27 item scale and the 62 item scale 
demonstrated similar significance values. For the 62 item scale, the independent samples t-test 
found that there was a significant relationship between safety climate and experiencing injuries, 
t(256) = 2.24, p = .026, d = .295, in which individuals with no injury experience (M = 3.37, SD = 
.447) reported higher safety climate scores, compared to individuals with injury experience (M = 
3.24, SD = .448). For the 27 item scale, the independent samples t-test found that there was a 
significant relationship between safety climate and experiencing injuries, t(256) = 2.38, p = .018, 
d = .315, as individuals with no injury experience (M = 3.52, SD = .489) reported higher safety 
climate scores, compared to individuals with injury experience (M = 3.37, SD = .477). 
Table 3-17. Correlation Results for 62 item and 27 item scales 
  62 item 
scale 
27 item 
scale 
Gender Discipline Work 
Experience 
Experience 
Injuries 
62 item 
scale 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .951** -.004 -.045 .138* -.139* 
27 item 
scale 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.951** 1 .021 -.053 .128* -.147* 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
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 In sum, the shortened version of the Safety Climate Questionnaire consists of 27 items 
and has demonstrated adequate reliability, high correlation with the 62-item scale, and results 
that are in the expected directions and of similar significance levels as those found with the 62-
item measure. As such, the 27-item measure may be a more efficient version of the original 
Saskatchewan Safety Climate Questionnaire.  
3.2.3.5 Validity analysis. Validity refers to the degree that a scale measures what it is 
intending to measure (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Osterlind, 2001). Specifically, construct validity 
refers to “the extent to which any test measures the underlying hypothetical qualities or factors of 
whatever it is intended to measure” (Corsini, 2002, p. 213). Convergent validity is a subset of 
construct validity that demonstrates that the results of a scale are consistent with theory.  
This results of this study suggest that the Saskatchewan Safety Climate Questionnaire has 
adequate convergent construct validity for this sample population, as the results of the study are 
in the predicted direction and in line with current theory on safety climate. A high safety climate 
score should be related to lower incidences of injuries and accidents (Smith, Huang, Ho, & Chen, 
2006). As such, it was predicted that students in the College of Engineering with high safety 
climate scores would also be less likely to experience or witness injuries and near misses. This 
prediction was confirmed and in the predicted direction.  
Furthermore, several measures were taken to ensure that the Safety Climate 
Questionnaire was valid. Firstly, a pool of 247 items were compiled and analyzed based on their 
congruence with the developed safety climate theoretical definition (Appendix J). Only items 
that had been previously assessed by other researchers and found to have adequate reliability and 
validity were included in the questionnaire. Furthermore, the items were assessed by two experts 
in the field, safety and engineering, to ensure they were applicable to the population under study. 
Finally, the questionnaire was piloted on a sample of engineering students in order to obtain 
feedback and further assess the applicability of the questionnaire.  
Further evidence towards the preliminary validation of the Safety Climate Questionnaire 
was demonstrated through the exploratory factor analysis and item analysis of the questionnaire. 
These psychometric analyses ensure that problematic items are identified and the dimensionality 
of the scale is acceptable. Any issues that are identified in the Safety Climate Questionnaire were 
remedied in the shortened version of the scale.  
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3.2.4 Answering Research Questions about Climate in the College  
After developing and analyzing the quality of the developed questionnaire, the same data 
was then used to describe and analyze the safety climate that exists in the College of 
Engineering. The results are then further expanded upon in the discussion section. For analyses 
where a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted, diagnostic tests were 
also conducted. Multivariate analysis of variance is used to assess if a combination of multiple 
dependent variables varies as a function of the independent variable or treatment variable. 
Conducting one MANOVA, rather than multiple ANOVAs, reduces the risk of Type I errors 
(Tabachnick, Fidell, & Osterlind, 2001). Diagnostics were conducted to ensure the data were 
suitable for multivariate analysis of variance. Firstly, there was no multicollinearity, as 
correlations between subscales were within acceptable ranges, below .80 (Tabachnick, Fidell, & 
Osterlind, 2001). Furthermore, mahalanobis distance was calculated for each case. Seven cases 
exceeded the critical chi-square values of 16.81 and were removed. The 42 scores lost in the 
administration error were also removed from the analysis by default when the values that 
exceeded chi-square’s critical value were removed. Analyses were conducted both with and 
without the 42 cases removed and the significant findings were not affected by the removal of 
these cases.  
3.2.4.1 Significant difference between subscales. In order to answer research question 
two and determine whether significant differences were present between the safety climate 
subscales a paired samples t-test was conducted. The safety subscale with the highest mean score 
was compared to the safety subscale with the lowest mean score to determine if they were 
significantly different from one another. Table 3-18 displays the sample size, mean, and standard 
deviation for each subscale. 
Table 3-18. Mean and Standard Deviation of Safety Subscales 
Safety Climate Subscales  N Mean Standard Deviation 
Safety Policies 258 3.35 .601 
Safety Training 258 3.31 .657 
Safety Communication 258 2.83 .532 
Attitudes about Instructors 258 3.54 .699 
Attitudes about Fellow Students 258 3.45 .528 
Reflections on One’s Own Safety 
Attitudes 
215 3.54 .548 
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Reflections on one’s own safety attitudes (M = 3.54, SD = .548) was compared to safety 
communication (M = 2.83, SD = .532). There was a significant difference between own safety 
attitudes and safety communication, t(214) = 16.046, p = .001, d = 1.31. Following this, 
reflections on one’s own safety attitudes was compared to the subscale with the next lowest 
mean, safety training (M = 3.31, SD = .657). There was a significant difference between own 
safety attitudes and safety training, t(214) = 4.860, p = .001, d = .385. Next, reflections on one’s 
own safety attitudes was compared to the next smallest subscale, safety policies (M = 3.35, SD = 
.601). There was a significant difference between own safety attitudes and safety policies, t(214) 
= 4.490, p = .001, d = .289. Next, reflections on one’s own safety attitudes was compared to the 
next smallest subscale, attitudes about fellow students (M = 3.45, SD = .528). There was a 
significant difference between own safety attitudes and attitudes about fellow students, t(214) = 
2.636, p = .009, d = .162. Finally, reflections on one’s own safety attitudes was compared with 
attitudes about instructors (M = 3.54, SD = .699). There was no significant difference between 
own safety attitudes and safety policies, t(214) = .023, p = .982, d = .002. 
Overall, the safety subscales are significantly different from one another. Figure 3-2 
displays a profile diagram of the means for the safety climate subscales. As the figure illustrates, 
attitudes about instructors and own safety reflections have the highest safety score. Attitudes 
about fellow students has the next highest safety score, followed by safety policies. The safety 
training subscale and the safety communication subscale have the lowest safety scores and may 
require the most improvement.   
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Figure 3-2. The Level and Structure of Safety Climate in the College of Engineering 
3.2.4.2 Gender. A one-way MANOVA was performed with six dependent variables: 
safety policies, safety training, safety communication, instructor attitudes, fellow students’ 
attitudes, and own safety reflections. The independent variable was gender (male or female). 
Box’s M test was statistically non-significant, suggesting that the assumptions of equality of 
variance-covariance was not violated, F = .630, p = .900. Pillai’s Trace criterion did not reveal a 
multivariate effect for the categorical variable of gender, V = .037, F(6, 201) = 1.30, p = .260, 2 
= .037. Consequently, participants’ gender was not related to the safety climate subscales and 
further testing via discriminant analysis was not performed.  
3.2.4.3 Year of study. A one-way MANOVA was performed with six dependent 
variables: safety policies, safety training, safety communication, instructor attitudes, fellow 
students’ attitudes, and own safety reflections. The independent variable was year of study, 
which had three levels: third year, fourth year, and fifth year or above. Box’s M test was 
statistically non-significant, suggesting that the assumptions of equality of variance-covariance 
was not violated, F = .863, p = .641. With the use of Pillai’s Trace, the combined dependant 
variables were not significantly affected by year of study, V = .064, F(12, 402) = 1.10, p = .358, 
2 = .032. Consequently, participants’ year of study was not related to the safety climate 
subscales and further testing via discriminant analysis was not performed.  
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3.2.4.4 Discipline. A one-way MANOVA was performed with six dependent variables: 
safety policies, safety training, safety communication, instructor attitudes, fellow students’ 
attitudes, and own safety reflections. The independent variable was participant’s discipline, 
which had eight levels: chemical and biological engineering, civil engineering, geological 
engineering, environmental engineering, electrical engineering, computer engineering, 
engineering physics, and mechanical engineering. Box’s M test was statistically non-significant, 
suggesting that the assumptions of equality of variance-covariance was not violated, F = 1.078, p 
= .261. With the use of Pillai’s Trace, the combined dependant variables were not significantly 
affected by discipline, V = .250, F(42, 200) = 1.24, p = .140, 2 = .042. Consequently, 
participants’ discipline was not related to the safety climate subscales and further testing via 
discriminant analysis was not performed.  
However, while discipline was not related to the safety subscales, a one-way ANOVA 
found a relationship between the safety climate score and participants’ discipline. There was 
homogeneity of variance as assessed by Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances (p = .799) and a 
statistically significant difference between the participants’ discipline and the overall safety 
climate score, F(7,250) = 2.061, p = .048, 2 = .055. Comparison testing with Tukey could not be 
conducted as the sample size was too small for some of the sub-disciplines. Descriptive analysis 
indicates that participants in the Chemical and Biological Engineering discipline had the highest 
safety climate score (M = 3.46, SD = .412), while participants in the Environmental (M = 3.14, 
SD = .437) and Computer Engineering (M = 3.19, SD = .330) had the lowest safety climate 
scores. 
3.2.4.5 Previous work experience. Box’s M test was statistically non-significant, 
suggesting that the assumptions of equality of variance-covariance was not violated, F = 1.151, p 
= .285. A one-way MANOVA was performed on six dependent variables: safety policies, safety 
training, safety communication, attitudes about instructors, attitudes about fellow students, and 
reflections on one’s own safety attitudes. The independent variable was previous work 
experience (i.e., experience or no experience). Pillai’s Trace criterion did not reveal a 
multivariate effect for the categorical variable of previous work experience, V = .059, F(6, 201) 
= 2.10, p = .055, 2 = .059. Consequently, participants’ previous work experience was not related 
to the safety climate subscales and further testing via discriminant analysis was not performed.  
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However, an independent samples t-test was conducted comparing previous work 
experience to the overall safety climate score. Previous work experience (i.e., experience or no 
experience) was the grouping variable, while the safety climate score was the dependent 
variable. Levene’s test was non-significant (F = .206, p = .650), suggesting that homogeneity of 
variance was not violated. The independent samples t-test found that there was a significant 
relationship between safety climate and previous work experience, t(256) = -2.22, p = .027, d = 
.328, as individuals with no previous work experience (M = 3.44, SD = .415) reported higher 
safety climate scores, compared to individuals with previous work experience (M = 3.29, SD = 
.457). 
3.2.4.6 Experiences with near misses and injuries. Box’s M test was statistically non-
significant, suggesting that the assumptions of equality of variance-covariance was not violated, 
F = 1.149, p = .287. A one-way MANOVA was performed on six dependent variables: safety 
policies, safety training, safety communication, attitudes about instructors, attitudes about fellow 
students, and reflections on one’s own safety attitudes. The independent variable was experience 
of injuries (i.e., experience or no experience). Experience of injuries included near misses, minor 
injuries, and major injuries. Pillai’s Trace criterion revealed a multivariate effect for the 
categorical variable of injury experience, V = .064, F(6, 201) = 2.29, p = .036, 2 = .064. To 
investigate this multivariate effect, a discriminant analysis was conducted.  
 For the discriminant analysis, seven cases that exceeded the critical chi-square values of 
16.81 were removed. The grouping variable was “experiencing injuries” and the independent 
variables were safety policies, safety training, safety communication, attitudes about instructors, 
attitudes about fellow students, and reflections on one’s own safety attitudes. 
The canonical correlation was .253; thus, 6.4% of the variance in whether one does or 
does not experience injuries could be accounted for by the safety climate subscales. Inspection of 
the structure matrix revealed that four dimensions of the safety climate scale appeared to 
correlate substantially with experience with injuries. Specifically, safety training exceeded the 
.30 threshold at .857, attitudes about instructors at .615, safety policies at .555, and attitudes 
about fellow students at .408. The other dimensions, reflections on one’s own attitudes and 
safety communication, did not meet the .30 threshold. The mean group centroid for experiencing 
injuries was -.343, whereas the mean group centroid for no experience with injuries was .198. As 
such, those who had experienced injuries reported lower safety climate scores in comparison to 
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those who did not experience injuries. Classification results indicated that, of the 132 participants 
who had not experienced an injury, 120 could be classified correctly on the basis of a linear 
combination of the six safety dimensions (a “hit” rate of 90.9%). Of the 76 participants who had 
experienced an injury, 17 could be classified accurately (a “hit” rate of 22.4%). Thus, the model 
is more accurate at classifying students who have not experienced an injury compared to those 
who have.  
In sum, the combined effect of the safety training, attitudes about instructors, safety 
policies, and attitudes about fellow students’ subscales were related to participants’ injuries and 
near miss experience. Participants with high scores on these subscales were more likely to have 
fewer experiences with injuries and near misses, compared to participants with low scores on 
these subscales.  
3.2.4.7 Witnessing near misses and injuries. Box’s M test was statistically non-
significant, suggesting that the assumptions of equality of variance-covariance was not violated, 
F = .877, p = .622. A one-way MANOVA was performed on six dependent variables: safety 
policies, safety training, safety communication, attitudes about instructors, attitudes about fellow 
students, and reflections on one’s own safety attitudes. The independent variable was witnessing 
injuries (witnessed or not witnessed). Witnessing injuries included near misses, minor injuries, 
major injuries, and fatalities. Pillai’s Trace criterion revealed a multivariate effect for the 
categorical variable witnessing injuries, V = .131, F(6, 201) = 5.03, p = .001, 2 = .131. To 
investigate this multivariate effect, a discriminant analysis was conducted.  
 For the discriminant analysis, the grouping variable was witnessing injuries and the 
independent variables were safety policies, safety training, safety communication, attitudes about 
instructors, attitudes about fellow students, and reflections on one’s own safety attitudes. The 
canonical correlation was .361; thus, 13.0% of the variance in whether one has or has not witness 
an injury could be accounted for by the safety climate subscales. Inspection of the structure 
matrix revealed that four dimensions of the safety climate scale appeared to correlate 
substantially with witnessing injuries. Specifically, safety training exceeded the .30 threshold at 
.847, attitudes about instructors at .592, safety policies at .455, and own safety reflections at 
.349. The other dimensions, safety communication and attitudes about fellow students, did not 
meet the .30 threshold. The mean group centroid for witnessing injuries was -.334, whereas the 
mean group centroid for not witnessing injuries was .446. As such, those who had witnessed 
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injuries reported lower safety climate scores in comparison to those who did not witness injuries. 
Classification results indicated that, of the 89 participants who had not witnessed an injury, 47 
could be classified correctly on the basis of a linear combination of the six safety dimensions (a 
“hit” rate of 52.8%). Of the 119 participants who had witnessed an injury, 93 could be classified 
accurately (a “hit” rate of 78.2%). Thus, the model is more accurate at classifying individuals 
who had witnessed an injury, compared to those who had not.  
In sum, the combined effect of the safety training, attitudes about instructors, safety 
policies, and own safety reflections subscales were significantly related to whether participants’ 
witnessed injuries or near misses. Participants with high scores on these subscales were more 
likely to have witnessed fewer injuries and near misses, compared to participants with low scores 
on these subscales.  
3.2.4.8 Concluding statement. Overall, gender and year of study were not related to the 
safety climate score or the subscales. Participants’ discipline was not related to the safety 
subscales, but it was related to the safety climate score, as participants in the Chemical and 
Biological Engineering discipline had the highest safety climate scores, while participants in the 
Environmental and Computer Engineering discipline had the lowest safety climate scores. 
Additionally, participants’ previous work experience was not related to the safety subscales, but 
it was related to the safety climate score, as participants with no previous work experience 
reported higher safety climate scores, compared to individuals with previous work experience. 
There was a significant relationship between the safety subscales and participants’ experiences 
with near misses and injuries and whether they had witnessed a near miss or injury. Participants 
with high scores on the safety training, attitudes about instructors, safety policies, and attitudes 
about fellow students were more likely to have fewer experiences with injuries and near misses, 
compared to participants with low scores on these subscales. Participants who had witnessed 
fewer injuries and near misses were more likely to report high scores on safety training, attitudes 
about instructors, safety policies, and own safety reflections subscales, compared to participants 
who had witnessed more injuries and near misses.  
3.2.5 Analysis of Students’ Comments 
Comments from participants were analyzed separately based on subscale and common 
themes were identified. Overall, students in the College of Engineering view safety in the 
College in a variety of ways. Some students suggest that they are dissatisfied with the current 
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safety practices and would like to see them improved. Conversely, other students indicate that 
their work requires very little high risk behavior and that further emphasis on safety would be 
unnecessary. Each subscale was analyzed for themes separately.  
3.2.5.1 Safety policies. There were five themes identified from the 47 comments on 
safety policies (See Table 3-19). For the first theme, fifteen participants stated that safety policies 
in the College of Engineering are explained to students and students are familiar with the safety 
policies and procedures in the College. Fifteen participants stated that students are not aware of 
the safety policies and procedures in the College. Seven participants stated that students do not 
always follow the safety policies even if they are aware of them, due to time constraints or poor 
safety equipment. Finally, five participants stated that they were disappointed in the safety 
policies in the College and five participants claimed they would like safety policies to be more 
accessible to students and to be taught in class.  
Table 3-19. Safety Policies Classified by Theme 
Theme Number of 
Participants/ 
Theme 
Additional Comments 
Safety policies are 
explained and known 
to students 
15 -Labs explain safety procedures well 
-There is a safety handbook 
-Logic of safety policies makes sense 
-Safety days and lab manual are all that is needed 
Students are not 
aware of safety 
policies or 
procedures 
15 -Certain policies are not clearly communicated 
-Don’t have much experience with safety procedures 
-The safety procedures do not pertain to me/my discipline 
Students do not 
follow safety policies 
even if they know 
them 
7 -Students won’t leave during fire drill unless told 
-Busy labs can cause negligence (sometimes safety is 
sacrificed a little) 
-Certain safety procedures would be easier to follow if 
equipment (i.e., safety glasses) were in better condition 
I am disappointed in 
the policies 
5 -College’s safety procedures often feels shallow 
-Seems more concerned with legal matters than personal 
safety 
-A lot of safety procedures are overrated/certain safety 
procedures are not necessary 
I would like safety 
policies to be taught 
more 
5 -Only get safety days and we may forget 
-Should be taught every year 
-Policies should be documented so they everyone has access 
to them 
-Procedures in the Hardy lab are not as clearly presented 
-More drills would be nice 
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 3.2.5.2 Safety training. There were six themes identified from the 46 comments on 
safety training (See Table 3-20). The first theme was identified by 17 participants who claimed 
that the current safety training was adequate and/or they did not want additional training. The 
second theme was also identified by 17 participants who claimed that they wanted additional 
safety training. Fourteen participants stated that they had not received enough safety training. 
Additionally, 3 participants stated that they found Safety Days very effective and helpful, while 
another 3 claimed that Safety Days was not effective, primarily because they wanted more 
hands-on practice or they forgot the information they had learned at Safety Days. The last theme 
was identified by 2 participants who stated that safety training practices are not always enforced 
in labs or hands-on practice.  
Table 3-20. Safety Training Classified by Theme 
Theme Number of 
Participants/ 
Theme 
Additional Comments 
Current safety 
training is 
fine/Do not 
want more 
safety training 
17 -Don’t need more training because we are not doing anything 
dangerous 
-TA’s are clear on safety issues 
-WHMIS is enough training 
-More training is not needed as it is impractical and not taken 
seriously 
-Common sense is enough 
-Safety training can be annoying 
Need/Want 
additional safety 
training 
17 -Would enjoy more training, as it’s helpful to apply what is 
learned 
-Need more refreshers and hands-on training 
-More training for machinery and shop 
-Hatch and Hardy lab need more training 
-We only receive brief safety talks before labs 
-Not allowed to operate equipment due to hazards, want to be 
taught how to safety handle it because they will need to in 
industry 
-TA’s do not take safety training seriously 
I have not 
received much 
training 
14 -Most cite Safety Days or WHMIS as the only training they 
receive 
-Expected to read safety manual during own time, not covered in 
class 
-CPR and First Aid are not offered 
-Have only received safety training on trivial tasks 
Found Safety 
Days effective 
 
3 -Would like Safety Days for upper years 
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Did not find 
Safety Days 
effective 
3 -Need more practical lab safety 
-Forgot a lot of information from Safety Days 
Safety training 
lessons are not 
enforced 
2 -Lab does not always have proper safety procedures 
 
 3.2.5.3 Safety communication. There were seven themes identified by the 31 comments 
on safety communication (See Table 3-21). The first theme was that safety was not discussed or 
communicated much, which was identified by 8 participants. The second theme was that safety 
procedures were discussed an adequate amount and that incidents were reported, which was 
identified by 7 participants. Conversely, four participants stated that incidents are not discussed 
and they sometimes go unreported. The fourth theme was that safety procedures and 
communication is not needed because students are not doing anything high risk, which was 
identified by four participants. Two participants claimed that students are not recognized for 
acting safely, two participants would like safety discussed more frequently, and two participants 
were unfamiliar with their College’s approach to safety communication.  
Table 3-21. Safety Communication Classified by Theme 
Theme Number of 
Participants/ 
Theme 
Additional Comments 
Safety is not 
discussed much 
8 -Talked about only at start of labs or Safety Days 
-TA’s discuss more than Instructors 
-TA’s set a bad example 
-Only discussed in Ethics class 
-Safety not discussed for shop work 
-Students are not told about incidents until after they occur 
Incidents/Safety 
procedures are 
reported and/or 
discussed 
7 -Never witnessed an incident 
-Instructors are brief as the students already know what they are 
doing 
-Students are encouraged to come forward 
Incidents go 
unreported 
4 -Don’t want to “rat” out fellow students 
-Rules are not known by students 
-Accidents that occur are never discussed 
Safety measures 
are not needed 
4 -Safety measures/communication are not needed during the 3 
hour labs 
-Labs are not dangerous 
Students are not 
recognized for 
acting safely 
2 -Notice is only taken when they are acting unsafely 
-Should not be the professor’s job to praise students 
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Would like safety 
discussed more 
2 -Monthly safety bulletins and emails with safety statistics would 
be nice 
-More class discussion on safety would be nice (5mins/week) 
-Make standard policies available through PAWS so student 
have access 
Unfamiliar with 
College’s 
approach to safety 
communication 
2  
 
 3.2.5.4 Students’ attitudes about instructors. There were four themes that were 
identified based on the 25 comments on instructor attitudes (See Table 3-22). The first theme, 
which was identified by 10 participants, was that safety equipment was not always adequate and 
that the College should supply better safety equipment. The second theme was that instructors 
display a good safety example and that equipment was always available, which was identified by 
6 participants. The next theme, identified by 6 participants, was that instructors do not always 
show a good example or they may not say anything if a student is being unsafe. The final theme 
was that safety was not considered an issues because nothing was high-risk; this was identified 
by 3 participants.  
Table 3-22. Attitudes about Instructors Classified by Theme 
Theme Number of 
Participants/ 
Theme 
Additional Comments 
College should 
supply safety 
equipment/Eq
uipment is not 
always 
adequate 
10 -Having enough money to buy safety gear should not be a barrier to 
being safe in the labs 
-Would like more safety glasses (sometimes they are stolen) 
-Basic PPE is not always available 
-Metallurgy lab needs another apron 
-Equipment is not cleaned, so it is unpleasant to wear 
-Gloves are worn out, glasses are scratched, ear muffs can spread 
lice and disease 
Instructors 
show good 
safety 
example/Equip
ment is good 
6 -It’s great 
-Safety gear is never missing from labs 
-Instructors take safety into consideration, even for small tasks 
TAs point out unsafe practices 
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Instructors 
sometimes do 
not show good 
safety actions 
6 -Instructors don’t always tell us how to be safe 
-Instructors sometimes show bad examples 
-Instructors were more watchful in first year 
-Most students do not know where the AED is 
-Students do not have access to inspection reports (they don’t know 
if they are doing a good job) 
-Safety communications are usually handled through e-mails, not 
in-class by instructors 
Safety is not 
an issue 
because we 
don’t do 
anything high 
risk 
3  
 
 3.2.5.5 Fellow students’ attitudes. There were four themes identified by the 16 
comments about fellow students’ attitudes (See Table 3-23). The first theme, identified by 7 
participants, was that students help each other to be safe and look out for one another. The 
second theme was the safety was not an issues since practices were not high-risk, which was 
identified by 5 participants. The next theme was that students do not say anything when others 
are being unsafe, which was identified by 2 participants. The final theme was that students do not 
participate in safety, which was identified by one participant.  
Table 3-23. Attitudes about Fellow Students Classified by Theme 
Theme Number of 
Participants/ Theme 
Additional Comments 
Students help each other to 
be safe 
7 -Tell others to put safety glasses back on 
Say something if it is a major violation 
Safety is not an issue because 
we don’t do anything high 
risk 
5  
Students do not step in when 
others are unsafe 
2 -A lot of safety infractions during 
unsupervised work 
-Do not say anything if it is minor 
Students do not participate in 
safety much 
1 -College needs to entice students to be safe 
3.2.5.6 Students’ own reflections on safety. There were four themes identified by the 18 
comments on students’ own reflections on safety (See Table 3-24). The first theme was that 
training and experiences in industry were more helpful than what the college offers, which was 
identified by 6 participants. Five participants stated that safety is not an issue because tasks are 
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not high-risk. Three participants stated that safety in the College could be improved. And the 
final theme was that students value safety, which was identified by 2 participants.  
Table 3-24. Students Own Reflections Classified by Theme 
Theme Number of 
Participants/ 
Theme 
Additional Comments 
The safety 
training/experiences I 
have had in industry 
are more useful than 
what the College 
teaches 
6 -Safety needs to be better communicated in the College 
and needs to be incorporated into all courses and labs 
-I learned very strong safety practices in Industry 
-The only safety training I received was in the workplace 
There are no safety 
risks in my discipline 
5 -Common sense is all that is needed 
Safety in the College 
could be improved 
3 -Safety is only preached due to liability, not well-being of 
students 
-Do not learned much about safety procedures 
Students value safety 2 -Safety is important both inside and outside the College 
 
 In sum, there were a multitude of positive comments regarding the College’s current 
safety climate. There was a total of 74 comments highlighting positive safety perceptions, such 
as, students are familiar with their College’s safety polices, students receive adequate safety 
training, students found Safety Days effective, incidents are frequently reported and discussed, 
instructors model safe behavior, proper safety equipment is provided, students value safety, and 
that further safety measures are not needed as students discipline does not involve them with 
dangerous work.  
 However, there were also 114 contradictory comments that suggested that there are areas 
in need of improvement within the College. Some of these areas of improvement include that 
students are unaware of their College’s safety policies, that these safety policies are not always 
followed even when they are known, that students have not received enough safety training and 
they want additional safety training, that safety is not often discussed and sometimes incidents go 
unreported, that students are not encouraged when they work safely, that safety equipment is not 
always available or useable, that some instructors do not model safe behavior, that students do 
not always participate in safety activities, and that some students report that the safety experience 
they had within industry was more useful that what the College provides. Also, it should be 
noted that these comments are not all from individual students, as many students commented in 
more than one category.  
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3.3 Discussion 
3.3.1 Psychometric Properties of Scale. The psychometric properties of the Safety 
Climate Questionnaire appear to be adequate. Firstly, the overall safety climate scale had an 
alpha of .92, which exceeds the recommended guidelines. Two of the subscales were below the 
recommended cut-off of .70. The item analysis revealed that if items two, four, and five were 
removed from the safety communication subscale Cronbach’s alpha would exceed .70. The 
attitudes about fellow students subscale also had a low alpha, but removal of any of the items did 
not result in an alpha that exceeded .70, suggesting that the lower alpha was not due to 
inappropriate use of items. Coupled with the fact that the overall safety climate alpha was .92, 
this suggests that the internal consistency of the Safety Climate Questionnaire is adequate. 
 In general, the dimensionality of the Safety Climate Questionnaire was adequate. The 
safety policies subscale was the only subscale with three factors, as all other subscales had two 
factors. The safety communication dimensionality was not easily interpretable, as one item 
loaded on two factors and four items did not meet the .40 cut-off. Additionally, on the own 
reflections about safety subscale, two items did not meet the .40 cut-off. All other subscales 
reported easily interpretable factors that did not cross load. The factors identified in the 
exploratory factor analysis were consistent the common safety climate factors found in the 
literature.  
For safety policies, the identified factors consisted of (1) the students skills, knowledge, 
and adherence to safety policies and procedures; (2) the practicality of the policies and 
procedures within the College; and, (3) the priority placed on safety versus production (Flin, 
Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Wang & Lin, 2012). For safety training, the identified 
factors consisted of (1) the current safety training effectiveness, and (2) improvements to future 
safety training (Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000). For safety communication, the 
identified factors consisted of (1) students safety engagement and reporting, and (2) the 
instructors’ disclosure of safety information to students (Bentley & Tappin, 2010; Wamuziri, 
2013). For attitudes about instructors, the identified factors consisted of (1) visible safety 
leadership, and (2) the quality and availability of safety equipment (Wamuziri, 2013; Wang & 
Liu, 2012). For attitudes about fellow students, the identified factors consisted of (1) looking out 
for fellow students, and (2) peer support (Wu, Lin, & Shiau, 2010; Frazier et al., 2013). For 
reflections on one’s own safety attitudes, the identified factors consisted of (1) valuing safety as 
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a priority, and (2) job hindrances (Boughaba et al., 2014; Grosch, Gershon, Murphy, & DeJoy, 
1999). 
 A shortened version of the Safety Climate Questionnaire was developed, both for 
efficiency purposes and to remove any items that may be potentially problematic. Only the most 
relevant items were included, which also removed any problematic items. The shortened version 
of the questionnaire consisted of 27 items. It demonstrated adequate internal consistency and was 
highly correlated with the 62 item version of the scale. Furthermore, when comparing the scales 
to their relationship with experiencing injuries, the 27 item scale had a stronger effect size than 
the 62 item scale, which suggests that the shorter scale may be a useful assessment tool. 
However, further testing of the shortened scale is needed to confirm the scale’s usefulness.  
 Finally, the preliminary results on validation revealed that the safety climate scores were 
in the predicted direction regarding experiences with injuries and accidents. In this case, 
participants with lower safety climate scores were also more likely to have experienced or 
witnessed an injury. This suggests that the safety climate scores are assessing what they intend to 
measure, as lower safety climate scores should be related to higher injury rates (Wu, Liu, & Lu, 
2007).  
3.3.2 Safety Climate in the College of Engineering. Firstly, it was found that there were 
significant differences between the subscales, as participants reported the highest safety climate 
scores for attitudes about instructors and for reflections on one’s own safety attitudes. In 
conjunction with participants’ open-ended responses, for attitudes about instructors, the majority 
of comments stated that improved safety equipment should be supplied. There were also several 
comments that not all instructors exhibited a good safety example at all times. However, an equal 
number of comments stated that instructors displayed a strong safety example and that the safety 
equipment was always provided. Regarding reflections on one’s own safety attitudes, the 
majority of the comments mentioned that there were few safety risks in their specific engineering 
discipline. While others states that the students in the College value safety. Several students did 
state that safety in the College could be improved, particularly as several comments stated that 
the safety training and procedures in industry were superior to those in the College.  
The next highest safety score was attitudes about fellow students, followed by safety 
policies. Comments regarding attitudes about fellow students focused on how well students 
helped one another out and that their tasks in the College were not hazardous. A few students 
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mentioned that other students do not always step in when someone is being unsafe and that 
students do not participate in safety. For safety policies, an equal number of comments stated 
that safety policies are familiar to students as well as unfamiliar to students. Additional 
comments stated that students do not follow policies even when they know them, that students 
are disappointed with the current policies and procedures, and that they would like additional 
lectures or instruction on safety policies and procedures.  
Safety training was the next highest score, with participants reported the lowest safety 
climate score for safety communication. For safety training, an equal number of comments stated 
that students are happy with the current safety training as well as students who would like 
additional safety training. Several students stated that they have not received very much training 
in the College and they would like to attend Safety Days beyond second year. For safety 
communication, the majority of comments stated that safety is not often discussed, that they 
would like safety discussed more frequently, and that students are not recognized or rewarded for 
safe behavior. Contradictory comments stated that incidents often go unreported and that safety 
incidents are usually reported and discussed.  
Regarding the relationship between the demographics and the safety climate in the 
College of Engineering, the results revealed that gender was not related to safety climate or any 
of its subscales. This finding is contradictory to Strahan, Watson, and Lennon (2008), as they 
found that gender was significantly related to safety climate, as males had lower safety climate 
scores than females. However, it is also possible that the sample size for females was too small 
to find significant results, as only 20% (N = 51) of the sample was female. However, the small 
effect size suggests that gender is not related to safety climate regardless of sample size. 
Consequently, this particular population had no differences in safety climate scores for gender. 
Regardless, future research to determine the relationship between gender and safety climate is 
needed. Participants’ year of study was not significantly related to their safety climate scores; 
however, the majority of participants were in their 4th year of study, with a few in their 3rd or 5th 
year. In order to draw more accurate conclusions regarding the relationship between year of 
study and safety climate, participants from the first to final year of study should be included in 
the sample.   
The safety climate subscales were not significantly related to the participants’ discipline 
in the College. However, the overall safety climate scale was significantly related to discipline. 
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The results indicated that participants in the Chemical and Biological Engineering discipline had 
the highest safety climate score, while participants in the Environmental and Computer 
Engineering had the lowest safety climate scores. Further research is needed to determine why 
participants’ in certain disciplines report higher or lower safety scores.  
 While the safety climate subscales were not significantly related to previous work 
experience, the overall safety climate scale was significantly related. The results found that 
participants who had previous work experience in industry (i.e., mining, construction, etc.) had 
lower safety climate scores compared to those with no experience. These findings contradict 
those found in previous studies. Gyekye and Salminen (2010) found that industry workers with 
more work experience exhibit improved safety perceptions, higher job satisfaction, and lower 
accident frequency compared to workers with less work experience. These contradictory findings 
could be due to the fact that the current sample consists of students with very little to no work 
experience. However, open-ended comments from participants on the questionnaire suggest that 
students with experience in industry learn more about safety while in industry than they do 
within the College. As such, students who have been exposed to the stricter safety awareness and 
training in industry may be more likely to notice potential areas of improvement within the 
College, which may be why these participants reported a lower safety climate score than students 
with no previous work experience. Future research is needed to examine this relationship.  
 Finally, it was found that safety climate was related to experiencing and witnessing 
injuries or near misses. Specifically, the safety training, attitudes about instructors, safety 
policies, and attitudes about fellow students’ subscales were significantly related to experiencing 
injuries and near misses. Additionally, safety training, attitudes about instructors, safety policies, 
and own safety reflections subscales were significantly related to witnessing injuries or near 
misses. Individuals who had experienced or witnessed more injuries were more likely to have a 
lower safety climate score. It could be the case that individuals who engage in hazardous 
behavior experience more injuries and, consequently, report lower safety climate scores. 
However, this does not account for the participants with lower safety climate scores who witness 
near misses and injuries. As such, it could be the case that individuals who witness or experience 
more injuries become more safety conscious and notice more areas for safety improvement in the 
in their environment, which results in them reporting lower safety climate scores (Smith & 
Dejoy, 2014).  
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The current study adds to the current literature by providing a theoretical definition for 
safety culture and for safety climate that is supported by current literature and a conceptual 
analysis. The current study also provides operational definitions of these constructs that are 
consistent with their theoretical definitions. Furthermore, a Safety Climate Questionnaire was 
developed that is theoretically sound as it is based on the developed theoretical and operational 
definitions for the safety climate construct. This Safety Climate Questionnaire may be a useful 
means of examining safety climate in colleges and universities.  
4.1.1 Limitations 
 The first limitation is that this study did not collect survey data from instructors and 
technical staff, as this limits the objective data that can be used to validate the questionnaire. 
Additionally, the small sample of females may have limited the chances of finding a statistically 
significant effect of gender. Another limitation involved the development of the Safety Climate 
Questionnaire, as only items from assessment tools that could be accessed through PsycINFO 
were included in the item pool. If the authors wanted payment to access their scale then it was 
not used and this may have limited the variety of items available in the survey.  
 The sample size was adequate for the majority of the analysis performed. However a 
larger sample size across participants’ sub-disciplines may have been able to indicate which 
disciplines exhibited statistically significantly higher or lower safety climate scores compared to 
other disciplines. Post hoc testing could not be conducted as several disciplines had a low sample 
size (n = 9). Furthermore, the generalizability of the study only extends to students in the College 
of Engineering at the University of Saskatchewan. The usefulness of the scale within industry is 
uncertain. 
 Finally, the assessment tool was only developed for safety climate, as safety culture 
assesses the deeply held assumptions and implicit beliefs and norms that one follows which is 
not easily examined through a survey questionnaire that only assesses perceptions (Guldenmund, 
2000). Developing an assessment tool for safety culture would involve interviews, focus groups, 
participant observation, and documents review, as such it was beyond the scope of this study.  
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4.1.2 Future Directions 
 Future research should assess whether gender is related to safety climate, or whether this 
relationship is dependent on the specific population from which the sample is taken. 
Additionally, future research on the Safety Climate Questionnaire used in this study should 
assess the validity of the scale. Preliminary validation suggests that the safety climate scores are 
correlated in the expected direction with injuries and near misses. However, the limited 
incidence of injuries and accidents within the College does not allow for conclusive findings to 
be drawn about the validity of the scale. As such, it may also be useful to assess the criterion-
related concurrent validity and compare the Safety Climate Questionnaire used in this study to 
another widely used safety climate scale to ensure they are correlated.  
 Another area of future research would be to conduct a longitudinal study and assess the 
safety climate scores before and after the participant has experienced or witnessed an injury or 
near miss, as this will provide insight into whether the safety climate scores are lower due to 
engaging in hazardous behavior or due to become more safety conscious. Future longitudinal 
studies could also examine safety climate scores before and after students receive safety training. 
Finally, a shortened version of the Safety Climate Questionnaire should be developed in order to 
make it easier to administer and to remove the items that double loaded or did not meet the cut-
off.  
 Future research is also needed to further understand the relationship between safety 
climate and gender, discipline, and previous work experience in industry. Additionally, the 
shortened version of the Safety Climate Questionnaire had demonstrated preliminary 
applicability; however, the scale still needs to be tested on a sample of participants. Future 
research should examine this scale to confirm its usefulness, both within the College and within 
industry to expand the generalizability of the Safety Climate Questionnaire.  
 Finally, as a survey questionnaire was not an adequate method to assess the safety 
culture, the current study was unable to determine the safety culture within the College. As such, 
future research should develop a safety culture assessment tool that incorporates document 
reviews of safety policies and accident reports, observation of employees to determine the norms 
within the organization, and interviews with both management and employees.   
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4.2 Conclusion 
Safety culture and safety climate are two very popular and intensively used constructs 
when studying the non-technological aspects of occupational safety. The current study analyzed 
these concepts, outlined their structure, provided definitions, and suggested an assessment tool 
for the safety climate construct. This study substantially clarified the conceptual confusion 
around these concepts and may serve as a basis for further psychometric and content-based 
analysis of safety in organizations.  
Based on both the classification of aspects and the common consensus within the 
literature, safety climate seems to be a subcomponent of safety culture, where safety climate 
includes the surface perceptions of safety culture. Based on the theoretical definition for safety 
culture, it is evident that this complex construct cannot be assessed through a perception 
questionnaire. However, the theoretical definition for safety climate formed the basis of the 
developed Saskatchewan Safety Climate Questionnaire. Overall, the psychometric properties of 
the Saskatchewan Safety Climate Questionnaire appeared adequate with only a few minor areas 
of improvement, which were addressed with the shortened version of the scale. It was found that 
participants with previous work experience in industry reported lower safety climate scores. As 
well, participants who had experienced or witnessed a near miss or injury reported lower safety 
climate scores. The developed Saskatchewan Safety Climate Questionnaire may be a useful 
means of examining safety climate within colleges and universities.  
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Appendix A: List of Safety Culture Definitions 
Safety Culture Definitions  
Reference Definition 
Amirah, Asma, 
Muda, and Amin 
(2013) 
“Safety culture can be viewed as a component of the organizational culture that refers 
to the individuals, jobs and organizational characteristics that affect employees’ health 
and safety” (p.283) 
Carroll (1998) “[S]afety culture refers to a high value (priority) placed on worker safety and public 
(nuclear) safety by everyone in every group and at every level of the plant. It also 
refers to expectations that people will act to preserve and enhance safety, take 
personal responsibility for safety, and be rewarded consistent with these values” (p. 
10) 
Choudhry et al. 
(2007b) 
“[S]afety culture could be defined as: the product of individual and group behaviors, 
attitudes, norms and values, perceptions and thoughts that determine the commitment 
to, and style and proficiency of, an organization’s system and how its personnel act 
and react in terms of the company’s on-going safety performance within construction 
site environments” (p. 1008) 
Cooper (2000) “[Organizational culture is the] product of multiple goal-directed interactions between 
people (psychological), jobs (behavioural) and the organisation (situational)” (p. 118) 
“[Safety culture is] that observable degree of effort with which all organisational 
members direct their attention and actions towards improving safety on a daily basis” 
(p. 115) 
“Safety culture is a sub-facet of organisational culture, which is thought to affect 
members' attitudes and behaviour in relation to an organisation's ongoing health and 
safety performance” (p. 111). 
Cox and Cheyne 
(2000) 
“Culture in general, and safety culture in particular, is often characterised as an 
enduring aspect of the organisation with trait-like properties and not easily changed” 
(p. 114) 
Cox and Flin 
(1998) 
“The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety 
management” (p. 191) 
Craig, Das, and 
Khago (2010) 
 
“Safety culture is a concept defined at group or higher level and reflects on the shared 
values among all the . . . organization members [and] . . . is concerned with formal 
safety issues with an organization (p. 1). 
Currie and 
Watterson (2010) 
“The term ‘safety culture’ refers to the way people commit to a personal responsibility 
for safety; the way they act to enhance and maintain safety; the way they are willing to 
learn about safety; and the ways in which they will communicate their concerns about 
safety” (p. 36). 
de Castro, 
Gracia, Peiró, 
Pietrantoni, and 
Hernandez 
(2013) 
“[Safety culture is] that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and 
individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues 
receive the attention warranted by their significance” (p. 232) 
dos Santos 
Grecco, Vidal, 
Cosenza, dos 
Santos, and de 
Carvalho (2014) 
“[Safety culture is related to] personal attitudes and habits of thought and to the style 
of organizations” (p.73) 
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Edwards and 
Armstrong 
(2013) 
“Safety culture can be viewed as the assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, 
values and attitudes shared by members of an organisation, which interact with an 
organisation’s structures and systems and the broader contextual setting to result in 
those external, readily-visible, practices that influence safety” (p. 77) 
Fang and Wu 
(2013) 
 
“[T]he safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the 
commitment to and the style and proficiency of an organization’s health and safety 
management” (p. 139) 
Fernandez-
Muniz, Montes-
Peon, and 
Vazquez-Ordas 
(2007) 
“Safety culture can be viewed as a component of the organizational culture that refers 
to the individuals, jobs, and organizational characteristics that affect employees' health 
and safety” (p. 627) 
Fleming (2007 ) “Safety culture determines the accepted norms and behavior. . . such as adherence to 
safety rules and procedures” (p. 7). 
Frazier et al. 
(2013) 
 
“Safety culture is just one of many within an overall organizational culture . . . 
Organizational culture encompasses the central beliefs, values and assumptions of the 
organization . . . [safety culture is] the values, attitudes, beliefs, risk-perceptions and 
behaviors as they relate to employee safety” (p. 16) 
Geller (1994) “In a [total safety culture], everyone feels responsible for safety and pursues it on a 
daily basis; employees go beyond "the call of duty" to identify unsafe conditions and 
behaviors, and intervene to correct them” (p. 18) 
Guldenmund 
(2000) 
“[O]rganisational culture is a relatively stable, multidimensional, holistic construct 
shared by (groups of ) organisational members that supplies a frame of reference and 
which gives meaning to and/or is typically revealed in certain practices” (p. 225) 
“Safety culture is defined as: those aspects of the organisational culture which will 
impact on attitudes and behaviour related to increasing or decreasing risk” (p. 251) 
Gutierrez (2012) “Organisational culture refers to the set of values, beliefs and accepted behaviors that 
employees share through symbolic means such as myths, stories, rituals, and 
specialized language. These values and beliefs are the social ‘norms’ within an 
organization and influence the way an individual acts when operating the social 
context of that organisation” (p. 4).  “Safety culture is the value and priority placed on 
safety across all levels within an organisation. It refers to the extent to which 
individuals commit to their personal safety (independence) and to safeguarding others 
(interdependence)” (p. 4).  
Hellings, 
Schrooten, 
Klazinga, and 
Vleugels (2007) 
“An integrated pattern of individual and organisational behaviour based upon shared 
beliefs and values that continuously seek to minimise patient harm that may occur 
from the process of care delivery” (p. 621) 
Kennedy and 
Kirwan (1998) 
“[Safety culture] is an abstract concept which is underpinned by the amalgamation of 
individual and group perceptions, thought processes, feelings and behaviour which in 
turn gives rise to the particular way of doing things in the organisation (p. 251)  
Mariscal, 
Herrero, and 
Otero (2012) 
 
“[S]afety culture is reserved to the basic assumptions of the organisation, in other 
words to “traits” that are stable and deep-rooted” (p. 1238) “{S]afety culture concept 
has been amplified beyond classic features of safety management, such as technical 
attention to hazards, the deployment of operational procedures, and regulatory 
compliance programmes, to incorporate principles of leadership and value-sharing, 
enhanced communications and organisational learning, and knowledge about the 
factors which shape individual and group behaviours” (p. 1238) 
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Mearns et al. 
(2003) 
“Most definitions of safety culture invoke shared norms or attitudes so that the level of 
aggregation is considered to be the group” (p. 642)  
Mearns and Flin 
(1999) 
“From a theoretical perspective, safety culture has been described in terms of values, 
beliefs, attitudes, social mores, norms, rules, practices, competencies, and behavior” 
(p. 7). 
Mohamed (2003) “[S]afety culture is a subfacet of organizational culture, which affects workers’ 
attitudes and behavior in relation to an organization’s on-going safety performance” 
(p. 81) 
Nielsen et al. 
(2013) 
“The concept of safety culture is often used to describe the many factors related to 
organizational processes and management practices that have the potential to 
influence safety performance” (p. 81)  
O'Toole (2002) “Safety culture is often seen as a subset of organizational culture, where the beliefs 
and values refer specifically to matters of health and safety” (p. 234) “Safety culture 
has been identified as a critical factor that sets the tone for importance of safety within 
an organization” (p. 231) 
Olive et al. 
(2006) 
“Safety culture can be viewed as the overarching policies and goals set by an 
organization relating to the overall safety of their facility or environment” (p. 133).   
Ostrom, 
Wilhelmsen, and 
Kaplan (1993) 
“[Safety culture includes the] concept that the organisation's beliefs and attitudes, 
manifested in actions, policies, and procedures, affect its safety performance” (p. 163) 
Parker, Lawrie, 
and Hudson 
(2006) 
 
“At the heart of a safety culture is the way in which organisational intelligence and 
collective imagination regarding safety issues are deployed” (p. 553) “The beliefs and 
values that refer specifically to health and safety form the subset of organisational 
culture referred to as safety culture” (p. 552) 
Pidgeon (1991) “[S]afety culture can be conceived of as the constructed systems of meanings through 
which a given worker, or group of workers, understands the hazards of their world . . 
.focuses on the organizational level” (p. 135) 
Pronovost and 
Sexton (2005) 
“Definitions of culture commonly refer to values, attitudes, norms, beliefs, practices, 
policies, and behaviors of personnel” (p. 230) 
Rollenhagen 
(2010) 
“‘Culture’ concerns what and how people believe, feel, think and behave (over time) 
and how this is reflected in collective habits, rules, norms, symbols and artefacts. How 
and to what extent such patterns of cognition, behaviour and associated norms 
influence safety are indeed interesting and important issues – some cultural patterns 
might be helpful whereas other might be less so” (p. 269) 
Singer et al. 
(2003) 
 
“[Safety culture is] commitment to safety articulated at the highest levels of the 
organization and translated into shared values, beliefs, and behavioral norms at all 
levels” (p.113) 
Sorra and Dyer 
(2010) 
 
“Patient safety culture refers to management and staff values, beliefs, and norms about 
what is important in a health care organization, how organization members are 
expected to behave, what attitudes and actions are appropriate and inappropriate, and 
what processes and procedures are rewarded and punished with regard to patient 
safety” (p. 1) 
Turner, Pidgeon, 
Blockley, and 
Toft (1989) 
“The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical practices concerned 
with minimizing the exposure of employees, managers, customers and members of the 
public to conditions considered dangerous or injurious” (p. 7) 
Uttal (1983) “[Organizational culture is] shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things 
work) that interact with a company’s people, organizational structures and control 
systems to produce behavioral norms (the way we do things around here)” (p. 69) 
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Wiegmann, 
Zhang, Von 
Thaden, Sharma, 
and Gibbons 
(2004) 
 
“Safety culture is a concept defined at the group level or higher that refers to the 
shared values among all the group or organization members. Safety culture is 
concerned with formal safety issues in an organization and closely related to, but not 
restricted to, the management and supervisory systems. Safety culture emphasizes the 
contribution from everyone at every level of an organization. The safety culture of an 
organization has an impact on its members’ behavior at work. Safety culture is usually 
reflected in the contingency between reward systems and safety performance. Safety 
culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and learn from errors, 
incidents, and accidents. Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable, and resistant to 
change” (p. 123).  
Wu et al. (2010) “Safety culture is a subset of organizational culture. It is thought to affect the attitudes 
and safety-related behavior of the members of an organization” (p. 423). 
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Appendix B: List of Safety Climate Definitions 
Safety climate definitions  
Reference Definition 
Allen et al. 
(2010) 
“Safety climate refers to a type of organizational climate in which employees perceive 
that management rewards, supports, and expects safe practices” (p. 750) 
Brown and 
Holmes (1986) 
“Climate is defined as a set of perceptions or beliefs held by an individual and/or 
group about a particular entity” (p. 455)  
Cabrera et al. 
(1997) 
“[Safety climate] is defined by the shared perceptions of organisational members 
about their work environment and, more precisely, about their organisational safety 
policies” (p. 257) 
Choudhry et al. 
(2007b) 
“[S]afety climate is a product of safety culture, and is dependent on the prevailing 
safety culture” (p. 1009) 
Colla et al. 
(2005) 
“[Safety climate is the] measurable components of “safety culture” such as 
management behaviors, safety systems, and employee perceptions of safety” (p. 364) 
Cooper and 
Phillips (2004) 
 
“Safety climate refers to the degree to which employees believe true priority is given 
to organizational safety performance, and its measurement is thought to provide an 
early warning of potential safety system failure(s)” (p. 497) “[Safety climate is] is a 
term used to describe shared employee perceptions of how safety management is 
being operationalized in the workplace, at a particular moment in time” (p.497) 
Cox and Cheyne 
(2000) 
“Climate, on the other hand, can be conceived of as a manifestation of organisational 
culture . . . exhibiting more state-like properties. . . viewed as a temporal manifestation 
of culture, which is reflected in the shared perceptions of the organisation at a discrete 
point in time” (p. 114) 
Coyle, Sleeman, 
and Adams 
(1996) 
“Safety climate is best considered a subset of organizational climate. Safety climate 
could be further divided to include such areas as: work practices, work style, operator 
training, and industrial hygiene” (p. 248) 
Currie and 
Watterson (2010) 
“Organisational climate, on the other hand, is perceived as staff perceptions and 
attitudes, which are shaped by the way people feel about the leadership, management, 
information exchange, communication and support in the organisations in which they 
work” (p. 36).  
Dedobbeleer and 
Béland (1991) 
“[C]limate was viewed as molar perceptions people have of their work settings” (p. 
97) 
Denison (1996) “[Climate is the] perceptions of "observable" practices and procedures that are closer 
to the "surface" of organizational life” (p. 622) 
Flin et al. (2000) “Safety climate can be regarded as the surface features of the safety culture discerned 
from the workforce's attitudes and perceptions at a given point in time . . . It is a 
snapshot of the state of safety providing an indicator of the underlying safety culture 
of a work group, plant or organisation” (p. 178) 
Fugas, Silva, and 
Meliá (2012) 
“[Safety climate is} workers’ perceptions of organizational safety policies and 
management safety practices” (p. 469) 
Gutierrez (2012) “[S]afety climate is more about the perception of safety in the workplace. . . and 
subject to change, based on management practices” (p. 4). 
Hon, Chan, and 
Yam (2012) 
“Safety climate, the current-state reflection of the underlying safety culture, highlights 
areas for safety improvement” (p. 4) 
Kennedy and 
Kirwan (1998) 
“The safety climate is . . . a more tangible expression of the safety culture in the form 
of symbolic and political aspects of the organisation” (p. 251) 
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Mariscal et al. 
(2012) 
“Safety climate is used to address “states” of the organisation that are shallow, 
expressed within the context of and influenced by external and temporary 
circumstances” (p. 1238) 
Mearns et al. 
(2003) 
“Safety climate is regarded as a manifestation of safety culture in the behaviour and 
expressed attitude of employees” (p. 642) 
Nielsen et al. 
(2013) 
 
“[S]afety climate is defined as the workers impression of safety resources, and based 
on existing policies and procedures, and how they are enacted, workers will assess 
whether the organization truly prioritize safety” (p. 81) 
Niskanen (1994) “Safety climate refers to a set of attributes that can be perceived about particular work 
organizations (maintenance, construction, and central repair shops) and which may be 
induced by the policies and practices that those organizations impose upon their 
workers and supervisors” (p. 241) 
Olive et al. 
(2006) 
 
“[S]afety climate generally refers to the attitude the people in the organization have 
towards safety. It describes the prevailing influences on safety behaviors and attitudes 
at a particular time” (p. 133). 
Tholen, Pousette, 
and Torner 
(2013) 
“Safety climate is often described as the organisational members’ perceptions of the 
value placed on safety by management” (p. 62) 
“[S]afety climate is considered a phenomenon at the group level” (p. 63) 
Williamson, 
Feyer, Cairns, 
and Biancotti 
(1997) 
 
“Safety climate is argued to be one of the contributors to the climate in organisation . . 
. of the beliefs and perceptions of employees about safety in the workplace . . . safety 
climate is a summary concept describing the safety ethic in an organisation or 
workplace which is reflected in employees’ beliefs about safety and is thought to 
predict the way employees behave with respect to safety in that workplace” (p. 16) 
Zohar (1980) 
 
“[C]limate was viewed as a summary of molar perceptions that employees share about 
their work environments” (p. 96). 
  
   
9
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Appendix C: Safety Culture and Climate Matrix for Theoretical Definition Analysis 
This matrix provides an example of two safety culture definitions and three safety climate definitions and their conceptual analysis. 
The numbers 1 to 27 in the first row correspond to the first 27 aspects illustrated in Appendix D: Descriptions for Safety Culture 
and Climate Aspects. 
Reference Definition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
Carroll 
(1998) 
“[S]afety culture refers to a high value 
(priority) placed on worker safety and 
public (nuclear) safety by everyone in 
every group and at every level of the 
plant. It also refers to expectations that 
people will act to preserve and 
enhance safety, take personal 
responsibility for safety, and be 
rewarded consistent with these values” 
(p. 10) 
   X X           X          X 
Choudhry, 
Fang, and 
Mohamed 
(2007) 
“[S]afety culture could be defined as: 
the product of individual and group 
behaviors, attitudes, norms and values, 
perceptions and thoughts that 
determine the commitment to, and 
style and proficiency of, an 
organization’s system and how its 
personnel act and react in terms of the 
company’s on-going safety 
performance within construction site 
environments” (p. 1008) 
   X X X        X X X  X   X X    X 
Allen, 
Baran, and 
Scott 
(2010) 
“Safety climate refers to a type of 
organizational climate in which 
employees perceive that 
management rewards, supports, 
and expects safe practices” (p. 
750) 
 X  X      X   X  X      X      
Brown and 
Holmes 
(1986) 
“Climate is defined as a set of 
perceptions or beliefs held by an 
individual and/or group about a 
particular entity” (p. 455)  
   X X X       X              
Colla, 
Bracken, 
Kinney, 
and Weeks 
(2005) 
“[Safety climate is the] 
measurable components of 
“safety culture” such as 
management behaviors, safety 
systems, and employee 
perceptions of safety” (p. 364) 
  X   X    X         X  X      
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Appendix D: Descriptions of Safety Culture and Climate Aspects 
 
1. Subcomponent of organizational culture: definition states that safety culture refers to 
or is a part of organizational culture 
2. Subcomponent of organizational climate: definition states that safety climate refers to 
or is a part of organizational climate 
3. Subcomponent of safety culture: definition states that safety climate refers to or is a 
part of safety culture 
4. Individual-centered: definition states that safety climate/culture is held by an individual 
or it involves the employee’s (singular) perceptions, attitudes, behaviors, etc. 
5. Group-centered/Shared: definition states that safety climate/culture is held by a group, 
is shared by organizational members, or involves staff, workers, or employees (plural) 
perceptions, attitudes, behaviors etc. 
6. Perception about an entity/safety: employees perceptions or impressions about safety 
or their general perceptions 
7. Perception about policies: employees perceptions about safety policies 
8. Perception about work environment: employees’ perceptions about their work 
environment, work setting, or work organization 
9. Perception about management attitudes: employees’ perceptions about management 
attitudes, values, or operationalizations   
10. Perception about management behavior: employees’ perceptions about management 
practises, rewards, or actions in regards to safety  
11. Perception about behavior: perceptions of practises or behavior (does not mention 
management behavior) 
12. Attention: involves giving attention to safety or hazards or where the employees direct 
their attention 
13. Beliefs: the definition mentions beliefs about importance of safety 
14. Attitudes: the definition mentions attitudes about safety 
15. Norms: safety culture/climate is defined as norms or refers to habits of thought  
16. Values: definition mentions values or the value placed on safety 
17. Feelings: refers to feelings and how people feel 
18. Thoughts/Cognition: refers to cognitions, how people think, thought processes or habit 
of thought 
19. Management: definition mentions management, safety systems, leadership 
20. Psychological: involves psychological aspect 
21. Behavioral: definition mentions behaviors, practises, or procedures (does not mention 
perception of behavior) 
22. Organizational: definition mentions organizational members, organizational life, 
organizational safety practises, work organization, organization 
23. Situational: safety culture/climate involves the situational aspect or contextual setting or 
social context 
24. Implicit: safety culture/climate involves habits of thought and underlying assumptions 
25. Symbolic Meaning: definition mentions symbolic aspects or use of symbols  
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26. Improve Safety Performance: improving or enhancing safety, provides early warning 
of system failure 
27. Prioritize safety: safety is given priority or valued 
28. Reward: rewards are given for safe behavior  
29. Commitment/Responsibility: employees have a personal responsibility to safety or 
commitment to safety 
30. Stable: safety culture/climate is long lasting 
31. Transient: safety climate/culture is temporary or subject to change, only observable at a 
particular moment in time, short period of time, current-state reflections 
32. Superficial: safety climate/culture is superficial (not that the definition itself is 
superficial or trivial), safety climate/culture is closer to the surface or surface or manifest 
features. 
33. Multiple/Holistic: involves multiple interactions, or holistic construct  
34. Abstract: safety culture/climate is an abstract construct 
35. Policies: definition mentions safety policy or policies 
36. Work Environment: definition mentions work environment, industrial hygiene, or work 
setting 
37. Jobs: the definition states that safety culture/climate refers to jobs 
38. Communication: definition mentions communication or information exchange or the 
ways in which people communicate about safety or involves enhanced communication 
39. Training: definition mentions safety training of any kind 
40. Public safety: refers to members of the public or public safety 
41. Goal-directed: refers to goal-directed or setting goals 
42. Learn about safety: involves learning about safety or organizational learning or learning 
from errors 
43. Other: Whatever else you can come up with as a theme or category that I may have 
missed 
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Appendix E: Instructions for the Definitions Analyses 
 
The Excel document includes a list of 64 safety culture and safety climate definitions, and I ask 
you to analyze these definitions regarding presence or absence of their particular aspects. 
These definitions need to be analyzed based on aspects (e.g. perception about management 
actions, attitudes, beliefs, policies, etc.) 
 
1. Please read through the descriptions for the aspects of safety culture and safety climate 
definitions.  
2. Read the first definition and mark an X in the appropriate box if the definition includes a 
particular aspect (e.g. if a definition mentions that “safety is a phenomenon at the group 
level” then mark an X under the aspect “Group centered/shared”) 
3. Please continue to refer to the list of descriptions of the definitional aspects to ensure that 
each aspect of the definition is being classified appropriately.  
4. If you are unsure if a definition has a particular aspect then insert a “?” in the 
corresponding cell. I will clarify this concern with you later. 
5. If you notice any aspect that is not already included then create a new category at the end 
of the excel sheet. 
6. Lastly, save the Excel spreadsheet with your included checkmarks and send it back to me 
 
Please let me know if you have any questions or if the descriptions provided are not clear! 
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Appendix F: Frequency of Aspects for Safety Culture 
Safety Culture Aspects 4s 3s 2s 1s 
Subset of organizational culture 9 - - - 
Subset of organizational climate - - - - 
Subset of safety culture - - - - 
Individual-centered 13 3 3 6 
Group-centered/shared 19 11 2 1 
Perception about entity 6 - - - 
Perception about policies - - - - 
Perceptions about work environment - - - - 
Perception about management attitudes - - - - 
Perceptions about management behavior - - - 1 
Perceptions about behavior - - - - 
Attention 3 - - - 
Beliefs 14 - - - 
Attitudes  17 1 - - 
Norms 12 - - - 
Values 17 1 - - 
Feelings 2 - - - 
Thoughts/Cognitions 4 - - - 
Management 6 1 - - 
Psychological 1 - 1 - 
Behavioral 27 1 - - 
Organizational 23 11 - - 
Situational 4 - - - 
Implicit 5 - - 1 
Symbolic meaning 3 - - 1 
Improve safety performance 12 1 2 4 
Prioritize safety 5 - 1 2 
Reward  3 - - - 
Commitment/Responsibility 7 - - 4 
Stable 6 - - - 
Transient - - - - 
Manifest - - - - 
Multiple/Holistic 1 - 1 - 
Abstract 1 - - - 
Policies 4 - - 3 
Work environment 2 - - - 
Jobs 3 - - - 
Communication 2 - - - 
Training - - - - 
Public safety 2 - - - 
Goal-directed 2 - - - 
Learn about safety 3 - - - 
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Appendix G: Frequency of Aspects for Safety Climate 
Safety Climate Aspects 4s 3s 2s 1s 
Subset of organizational culture - - - - 
Subset of organizational climate 4 - - - 
Subset of safety culture 7 - - - 
Individual-centered 1 - - 2 
Group-centered/shared 17 - 1 - 
Perception about entity 7 1 1 - 
Perception about policies 2 - - - 
Perceptions about work environment 3 1 1 - 
Perception about management attitudes 1 - - 1 
Perceptions about management behavior 2 1 - - 
Perceptions about behavior 1 - - - 
Attention - - - - 
Beliefs 2 - - - 
Attitudes  4 - - - 
Norms - - - - 
Values 1 - - - 
Feelings 1 - - - 
Thoughts/Cognitions - - - - 
Management 4 - 1 - 
Psychological - - - - 
Behavioral 7 - - 2 
Organizational 4 8 1 3 
Situational - - 1 - 
Implicit - - - - 
Symbolic meaning 1 - - - 
Improve safety performance 2 - - - 
Prioritize safety 2 - - - 
Reward  1 - - - 
Commitment/Responsibility - - - - 
Stable - - - - 
Transient 7 - - - 
Manifest 4 - - - 
Multiple/Holistic - - - - 
Abstract - - - - 
Policies 2 - - 2 
Work environment 4 - 1 2 
Jobs - - - 1 
Communication - 1 - - 
Training 1 - - - 
Public safety - - - - 
Goal-directed - - - - 
Learn about safety - - - - 
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Appendix H: Congruency of Safety Theoretical and Operational Definitions 
Reference Definition Operationalization Congruency 
Amirah, 
Asma, 
Muda, and 
Amin (2013) 
 
“Safety culture can be 
viewed as a component of 
the organizational culture 
that refers to the 
individuals, jobs and 
organizational 
characteristics that affect 
employees’ health and 
safety” (p.283) 
N/A N/A 0% 
Allen et al. 
(2010) 
“Safety climate refers to a 
type of organizational 
climate in which 
employees perceive that 
management rewards, 
supports, and expects safe 
practices” (p. 750) 
My direct supervisor: 
Makes sure we receive all the equipment 
needed to do the job safely, Frequently 
checks to see if we are all obeying the 
safety rules, Discusses how to improve 
safety with us, Uses explanations (not 
just compliance) to get us to act safely, 
Emphasizes safety procedures when we 
are working under pressure, Frequently 
tells us about the hazards in our work, 
Refuses to ignore safety rules when work 
falls behind schedule, Is strict about 
working safely when we are tired or 
stressed, Reminds workers who need 
reminders to work safely, Makes sure we 
follow all the safety rules, Insists that we 
obey safety rules when fixing equipment 
or machines, Says a “good word” to 
workers who pay special attention to 
safety, Is strict about safety at the end of 
the shift, when we want to go home, 
Spends time helping us learn to see 
problems before they arise, Frequently 
talks about safety issues throughout the 
work week, Insists we wear our 
protective equipment even if it is 
uncomfortable 
50% 
Organizational climate: 
No 
Employees perceive: 
Somewhat, only in 
relation to supervisor. 
Management rewards 
and supports safe 
practices: Yes, my 
supervisor makes sure 
was receive all 
equipment needed to 
do job safely and says a 
good word to workers 
who pay special 
attention to safety 
Cabrera et 
al. (1997) 
“[Safety climate] is 
defined by the shared 
perceptions of 
organisational members 
about their work 
environment and, more 
precisely, about their 
organisational safety 
policies” (p. 257) 
Safety climate and safety level scales 
were developed (Isla & Cabrera, in 
press) 
Could not find 
N/A 0% 
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Cappuccio, 
Collins Jr, 
and Eason 
(1997) 
 
N/A Safety and Health Opinion survey 
Majority of personnel can explain policy, 
Majority personnel can give examples of 
management's active commitment to 
safety and health, Management follows 
the rules and occasionally addresses the 
safety behavior of others, Majority of 
personnel feel they have a positive 
impact on identifying and resolving S&H 
issues, Majority of personnel believe 
they have the necessary resources to do 
their job, Comprehensive safety surveys 
are conducted; but updates and corrective 
action sometimes lags, A hazard analysis 
program exists; but few are aware of 
results, Inspection are conducted by 
trained personnel and all items are 
corrected, repeat hazards seldom found, 
All incidents are investigated and 
effective prevention is implemented 
N/A 0% 
Cappuccio et 
al. (1997) 
 
N/A Safety and Health Opinion survey 
See Appendix for survey example 
Majority of personnel can explain policy, 
Majority personnel can give examples of 
management's active commitment to 
safety and health, Management follows 
the rules and occasionally addresses the 
safety behavior of others, Majority of 
personnel feel they have a positive 
impact on identifying and resolving S&H 
issues, Majority of personnel believe 
they have the necessary resources to do 
their job, Comprehensive safety surveys 
are conducted; but updates and corrective 
action sometimes lags, A hazard analysis 
program exists; but few are aware of 
results, Inspection are conducted by 
trained personnel and all items are 
corrected, repeat hazards seldom found, 
All incidents are investigated and 
effective prevention is implemented 
N/A 0% 
Carroll 
(1998) 
“[S]afety culture refers to a 
high value (priority) 
placed on worker safety 
and public (nuclear) safety 
by everyone in every 
group and at every level of 
the plant. It also refers to 
Safety Culture Questionnaire 
The goals for the safety culture 
assessment: “to assess the strength of the 
safety culture within Engineering, and to 
encourage discussion of safety culture 
and human performance that will 
70% 
High priority on 
worker safety: 
Somewhat, Too many 
people at the plant are 
worried about being 
blamed for mistakes 
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expectations that people 
will act to preserve and 
enhance safety, take 
personal responsibility for 
safety, and be rewarded 
consistent with these 
values” (p. 10) 
increase awareness and reinforce positive 
aspects.” 
“Too many people at the plant are 
worried about being blamed for 
mistakes,” “We try hard to avoid 
conflicts and public differences of 
opinion,” “Talking about near-misses 
and minor problems just wastes time and 
gets people in trouble,” “Senior 
Management makes workers feel 
uncomfortable about raising concerns,” 
“I feel personally responsible for the 
safety of the whole plant, not just for 
doing my job,” and “The safety culture 
has substantially improved over the last 
few years.”  
The two open-ended questions were: (1) 
Think of something that happened at the 
plant recently that shows how strong or 
weak the safety culture is. If you were 
the Vice President in charge of nuclear 
operations, what would you do to 
improve the plant safety culture? 
and Talking about 
near-misses and minor 
problems just wastes 
time and gets people in 
trouble 
High priority on public 
safety: No 
By everyone in every 
group: No, seems more 
individual 
People will preserve 
and enhance safety: 
Yes, Think of 
something that 
happened at the plant 
recently that shows 
how strong or weak the 
safety culture is and 
The safety culture has 
substantially improved 
over the last few years. 
Take responsibility for 
safety: Yes, I feel 
personally responsible 
for the safety of the 
whole plant, not just 
for doing my job. 
Be rewarded: No 
Choudhry, 
Fang, and 
Mohamed 
(2007) 
“[S]afety culture could be 
defined as: the product of 
individual and group 
behaviors, attitudes, norms 
and values, perceptions 
and thoughts that 
determine the commitment 
to, and style and 
proficiency of, an 
organization’s system and 
how its personnel act and 
react in terms of the 
company’s on-going safety 
performance within 
construction site 
environments” (p. 1008) 
N/A N/A 0% 
Choudhry et 
al. (2007b) 
 “[S]afety climate is a 
product of safety culture, 
and is dependent on the 
N/A N/A 0% 
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prevailing safety culture” 
(p. 1009) 
Colla et al. 
(2005) 
 
“[Safety climate is the] 
measurable components of 
“safety culture” such as 
management behaviors, 
safety systems, and 
employee perceptions of 
safety” (p. 364) 
N/A 
See Colla_2005 Word Doc for Table 
Provides overview of safety 
questionnaires, doesn’t provide survey 
questions 
N/A 0% 
M. D. 
Cooper 
(2000) 
“[Organizational culture is 
the] product of multiple 
goal-directed interactions 
between people 
(psychological), jobs 
(behavioural) and the 
organisation (situational)” 
(p. 118) 
“[Safety culture is] that 
observable degree of effort 
with which all 
organisational members 
direct their attention and 
actions towards improving 
safety on a daily basis” (p. 
115) (S climate?) 
“Safety culture is a sub-
facet of organisational 
culture, which is thought 
to affect members' 
attitudes and behaviour in 
relation to an 
organisation's ongoing 
health and safety 
performance” (p. 111). 
Checklist: the degree to which members 
consistently confront others about their 
unsafe acts, the degree to which 
members report unsafe conditions, the 
speed with which members implement 
remedial actions, the degree to which 
members give priority to safety over 
production 
Psychological Aspect: safety climate 
questionnaire, group interviews and 
discussion groups, perhaps using the 
‘Cultural Web’ as the starting point, 
archival data, Repertory Grids, and 
Twenty Statement Tests, and document 
analysis 
Behavioral Aspect: peer observations, 
self-report measures and/or outcome 
measures, risk assessment 
documentation, standard operating 
procedures, permits to work, group 
discussions, number of completed 
remedial actions, risk assessments and/or 
the number of reported near-misses, the 
numbers of people receiving safety 
training, the number of weekly 
inspections completed, the number of 
safety audits conducted 
Situational Aspect: audits of safety 
management systems or weekly 
inspections or environmental surveys 
N/A assessment suggestions, not actual 
survey 
N/A 0% 
SJ Cox and 
Cheyne 
(2000) 
“Culture in general, and 
safety culture in particular, 
is often characterised as an 
enduring aspect of the 
organisation with trait-like 
properties and not easily 
changed. Climate, on the 
Safety Climate (Climate?) assessment 
toolkit  
In my workplace management acts 
quickly to correct safety problems, 
Management acts only after accidents 
have occurred, I believe that safety issues 
are not assigned a high priority, My line 
manager/supervisor does not always 
15% 
Safety Culture: No, 
assessment is 
measuring safety 
climate 
Climate is 
manifestation of 
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other hand, can be 
conceived of as a 
manifestation of 
organisational culture . . . 
exhibiting more state-like 
properties. . . viewed as a 
temporal manifestation of 
culture, which is reflected 
in the shared perceptions 
of the organisation at a 
discrete point in time” (p. 
114) 
inform me of current concerns and 
issues, Some safety rules and procedures 
do not need to be followed to get the job 
done safely, Personally I feel that safety 
issues are not the most important aspect 
of my job, I am sure it is only a matter of 
time before I am involved in an accident, 
There are always enough people 
available to get the job done safely 
organizational culture: 
No 
State-like properties: 
Unknown 
Shared perceptions: 
No, assessing 
individual perceptions 
Discrete point in time: 
Unsure, participants 
make think about event 
that occurred two 
months ago  
Many items that do not 
relate to the theoretical 
definition 
 
Sue Cox and 
Flin (1998) 
 
“The safety culture of an 
organisation is the product 
of individual and group 
values, attitudes, 
perceptions, competencies, 
and patterns of behavior 
that determine the 
commitment to, and the 
style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s health and 
safety management” (p. 
191) 
Case studies: organizations with either 
very low or very high accident rates and 
study factors of that organization 
Comparative studies: comparison of the 
characteristics of high and low accident 
plants/departments 
Psychometric surveys: employees 
attitudes and opinions on safety 
N/A provides overall ways of assessing 
safety in organization, but not a 
specific assessment of safety culture 
with questions 
N/A 0% 
Coyle et al. 
(1996) 
“Safety climate is best 
considered a subset of 
organizational climate. 
Safety climate could be 
further divided to include 
such areas as: work 
practices, work style, 
operator training, and 
industrial hygiene” (p. 
248) 
ORG1 Questionnaire. See page 250. 
How would you rate the induction (pre-
job) training you received? How safe are 
the normal operating procedures for the 
equipment you operate? To what extent 
do supervisors enforce safe working 
procedures? How noisy are the premises? 
To what extent are there ongoing safety 
training programs in the Village? 
How likely is it that you would be 
reprimanded for not using safety 
equipment or protective clothing? How 
satisfactory is the lighting in the section 
of the Village you work in? 
55% 
Work practice: 
Somewhat, To what 
extent do supervisors 
enforce safe working 
procedures? 
Work style: No 
Operator training: Yes, 
How would you rate 
the induction training 
you received? How 
safe are the normal 
operating procedures 
for the equipment you 
operate? 
Industrial hygiene: 
Yes, How noisy are the 
premises? How 
satisfactory is the 
lighting in the section 
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of the Village you work 
in? 
Craig, Das, 
and Khago 
(2010) 
Safety 
culture 
 
“Safety culture is a 
concept defined at a?group 
or higher level and reflects 
on the shared values 
among all the . . . 
organization members 
[and] . . . is concerned with 
formal safety issues with 
an organization (p. 1). 
Safety Questionnaire 
Management takes corrective action, 
crew member and employees are 
encouraged to improve safety, the 
company cares about my health and 
safety, safety briefings and training are 
never overlooked, I do not bend the rules 
to achieve a target, etc. ect. 
 
45% 
Group or higher level: 
Somewhat, includes 
both group and 
individual questions: 
employees are 
encouraged to improve 
safety and I do not 
bend the rules to 
achieve a target 
Shared values among 
all members: No 
Formal safety issues: 
Somewhat, safety 
briefings and training 
are never overlooked 
Currie and 
Watterson 
(2010) 
 “The term ‘safety culture’ 
refers to the way people 
commit to a personal 
responsibility for safety; 
the way they act to 
enhance and maintain 
safety; the way they are 
willing to learn about 
safety; and the ways in 
which they will 
communicate their 
concerns about safety” (p. 
36). 
Safety Climate (again, ‘climate”? 
Questionnaire (SCQ)  
This is a safer place to work than other 
trusts I have worked for, ect. 
Cannot find further questions 
N/A 0% 
Theoretical definition 
is “culture” but items 
are “climate” 
de Castro, 
Gracia, 
Peiró, 
Pietrantoni, 
and 
Hernandez 
(2013) 
 
“[Safety culture is] that 
assembly of characteristics 
and attitudes in 
organizations and 
individuals which 
establishes that, as an 
overriding priority, nuclear 
plant safety issues receive 
the attention warranted by 
their significance” (p. 232) 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safety culture model 
It is composed of 37 attributes clustered 
into five dimensions, referred to as 
characteristics by the IAEA: (1) safety is 
a clearly recognized value; (2) leadership 
for safety is clear; (3) accountability for 
safety is clear; (4) safety is integrated 
into all activities; (5) and safety is 
learning driven. 
Examples: The high priority given to 
safety is shown in documentation, 
communications and decision making, 
Individuals are convinced that safety and 
production go hand in hand, Senior 
management is clearly committed to 
safety, There is a high level of 
compliance with regulations and 
procedures, Good working conditions 
exist with regard to time pressures, 
70% 
Assembly of 
characteristics: Yes, 
characteristics include, 
safety is a value, 
leadership, 
accountability, 
integrated, and learning 
driven  
Assembly of attitudes: 
Yes somewhat: 
questions asked relate 
to employee attitudes 
Organizations and 
individuals: Mostly 
individuals, ask about 
employee attitudes 
about management and 
organization operations 
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workload and stress, The quality of 
documentation and procedures is good, 
A questioning attitude prevails at all 
organizational levels, Learning is 
facilitated through the ability to 
recognize and diagnose deviations, to 
formulate and implement solutions and 
to monitor the effects of corrective 
actions, ect. 
Safety receives priority 
significance: Yes 
 
 
Definition is vague and 
many questions that do 
not relate to definition 
dos Santos 
Grecco, 
Vidal, 
Cosenza, dos 
Santos, and 
de Carvalho 
(2014) 
“[Safety culture is related 
to] personal attitudes and 
habits of thought and to 
the style of organizations” 
(p.73) 
Fuzzy Assessment Model 
Top-level commitment to safety, 
organizational learning, organizational 
flexibility, awareness, just culture, 
emergency preparedness. 
The availability of sufficient workforce 
is ensured in order to ensure that time 
pressure does not compromise quality in 
safety-critical tasks, There is adequate 
information dissemination on safety 
issues and information that is relevant to 
work, There is a system for analysis of 
internal incidents that takes into account 
technical, human and organizational 
factors in equal measure, The extent to 
which there is an open atmosphere 
concerning reporting of errors, deviations 
and problems encountered during the 
execution of tasks, Superiors provide fair 
treatment of subordinates, understanding 
that some errors are inevitable, There is 
regular training for emergencies on site, 
ect. 
60% 
Personal attitudes: Yes, 
questions asked are 
about personal safety 
attitudes 
Habits of thought: No 
Style of organization: 
Yes, There is a system 
for analysis of internal 
incidents that takes into 
account technical, 
human and 
organizational factors 
in equal measure and 
There is regular 
training for 
emergencies on site 
 
Many questions that do 
not relate to definition 
Edwards and 
Armstrong 
(2013) 
“Safety culture can be 
viewed as the assembly of 
underlying assumptions, 
beliefs, values and 
attitudes shared by 
members of an 
organisation, which 
interact with an 
organisation’s structures 
and systems and the 
broader contextual setting 
to result in those external, 
readily-visible, practices 
that influence safety” (p. 
77) 
N/A N/A 0% 
Fang and 
Wu (2013) 
“[T]he safety culture of an 
organization is the product 
Safety Climate Survey Questionnaire. 
See Fang et al., (2006) 
85% 
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 of individual and group 
values, attitudes, 
perceptions, competencies 
and patterns of behavior 
that determine the 
commitment to and the 
style and proficiency of an 
organization’s health and 
safety management” (p. 
139) 
Some health and safety procedures do 
not need to be followed to get the job 
done quickly, people who work here 
often have to take risks, my job is 
repetitive and boring, Accidents which 
happen here are always reported, I fully 
understand the health and safety risks of 
my work, senior management take health 
and safety very seriously, Not all health 
and safety instructions are followed here, 
health and safety is not my problem, 
people here are sometimes pressured to 
work unsafely by their coworkers, 
management does enough to follow-up 
safety inspections, ect. 
 
Individual values: Yes 
some, I fully 
understand the health 
and safety risks of my 
work and my job is 
repetitive and boring 
Group values: Yes 
some, people who work 
here often have to take 
risks and Not all health 
and safety instructions 
are followed here 
Attitudes: Yes some, 
health and safety is not 
my problem  
Perceptions: Yes some, 
people here are 
sometimes pressured to 
work unsafely by their 
coworkers 
Competencies: No  
Patterns of behavior: 
Yes, people who work 
here often have to take 
risks 
Commitment to safety: 
Sort of, Some health 
and safety procedures 
do not need to be 
followed to get the job 
done quickly 
Proficiency to safety 
management: Yes, but 
only perceptions of 
management 
commitment to safety 
Fernandez-
Muniz, 
Montes-
Peon, and 
Vazquez-
Ordas (2007) 
 
“Safety culture can be 
viewed as a component of 
the organizational culture 
that refers to the 
individuals, jobs, and 
organizational 
characteristics that affect 
employees' health and 
safety” (p. 627) 
Safety culture measurement 
Includes questions on safety policy, 
employee incentives, training in 
occupational hazards, communication in 
prevention matters, preventative 
planning, emergency planning, internal 
control, benchmarking techniques, 
managers’ attitudes, managers’ behavior, 
employee involvement, safety 
performance. 
My Firm coordinates its health and 
safety policies with other HR policies to 
40% 
Component of 
organizational culture: 
No evidence 
Individuals: No, asks 
more about general 
employee behavior, not 
the specific individual 
taking the survey 
Jobs: Not really 
Organizational 
characteristics: Yes, 
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ensure commitment and well-being of 
workers, Incentives frequently offered to 
workers to put in practice principles and 
procedures of action (e.g., correct use of 
protective equipment), There is a fluent 
communication embodied in periodic 
and frequent meetings, campaigns or oral 
presentations to transmit principles and 
rules of action, Worker given sufficient 
training period when entering firm, 
changing jobs or using new technique, 
Systematic inspections conducted 
periodically to ensure effective 
functioning of whole system, Firm's 
accident rates regularly compared with 
those of other organizations from same 
sector using similar production 
processes, Managers consider that it is 
fundamental to monitor activities in 
order to maintain and improve safety 
activities, Firm managers take 
responsibility for health and safety as 
well as quality and productivity, 
Employees comply with safety 
regulations, etc. ect.  
asks about 
management’s attitudes 
and behavior, and the 
overall organization’s 
workings 
Affect health and 
safety: Yes 
 
Many questions that do 
not relate to definition 
 
Fleming 
(2007 ) 
“Safety culture determines 
the accepted norms and 
behavior. . . such as 
adherence to safety rules 
and procedures” (p. 7). 
Safety Culture Maturity Assessment 
Managers receive safety training, safety 
performance is not monitored at the 
department level, Departmental safety 
performance is tracked, managers do not 
visit worksite to specifically discuss 
safety, Supervisors are trained to be 
effective safety leaders, Supervisors 
safety performance is not evaluated, 
there are no formal systems to involve 
workers in safety, injury incidents are 
investigated by a team, extensive safety 
rules written by engineering and 
management, Maintenance only happens 
when equipment is no longer useable, 
ect. 
65% 
Accepted norms: Sort 
of  
Behavior: Sort of, but 
focuses more on 
policies and training 
Adherence to safety 
rules: Yes, broadly 
Adherence to 
procedures: Somewhat 
 
 
Many questions that do 
not relate to definition 
 
Frazier, 
Ludwig, 
Whitaker, 
and Roberts 
(2013) 
 
“Safety culture is just one 
of many (many 
cultures?)within an overall 
organizational culture . . . 
Organizational culture 
encompasses the central 
beliefs, values and 
The 2010 revision of the Safety Culture 
Survey 
Four broad scales: (a) management 
concern for safety (16 questions), (b) 
peer support for safety (10 questions), (c) 
personal responsibility for safety (7 
55% 
Subcomponent of 
organizational culture: 
No evidence for this 
Values: No 
Assumptions: No 
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assumptions of the 
organization . . . [safety 
culture is] the values, 
attitudes, beliefs, risk-
perceptions and behaviors 
as they relate to employee 
safety” (p. 16) 
questions), and (d) safety management 
systems (54 questions). 
Safety is not compromised when 
determining production schedules, 
overtime, and staffing, When I see a 
coworker working at-risk, I caution 
him/her, Employees often "short cut" 
safe work practices, Managers, 
supervisors, and employees all know 
what behaviors will result in discipline, 
All incidents, even minor ones, are 
thoroughly investigated if they have 
potential for serious injury, Safety is 
considered when changes are made to 
rules and procedures, When asked to do 
a new job or task, I receive enough 
training to be able to do it safely, I am 
comfortable raising safety concerns to 
my supervisor and manager, Safety 
audits/inspections are conducted 
regularly in my area, Employees are 
involved in conducting safety audits and 
inspections, Safety meetings help 
improve safety. Ect. 
Attitudes: Yes, Safety 
is not compromised 
when determining 
production schedules, 
overtime, and staffing 
Beliefs: Yes, Safety is 
not compromised when 
determining production 
schedules, overtime, 
and staffing 
Risk-perceptions: No 
Behaviors: Yes, when I 
see a co-worker 
working at-risk, I 
caution him/her 
Geller 
(1994) 
“In a [total safety culture], 
everyone feels responsible 
for safety and pursues it on 
a daily basis; employees 
go beyond "the call of 
duty" to identify unsafe 
conditions and behaviors, 
and intervene to correct 
them” (p. 18) 
N/A N/A 0% 
Guldenmund 
(2000) 
“[O]rganisational culture is 
a relatively stable, 
multidimensional, holistic 
construct shared by 
(groups of ) organisational 
members that supplies a 
frame of reference and 
which gives meaning to 
and/or is typically revealed 
in certain practices” (p. 
225) 
“Safety culture is defined 
as: those aspects of the 
organisational culture 
which will impact on 
N/A N/A 0% 
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attitudes and behaviour 
related to increasing or 
decreasing risk” (p. 251) 
Gutierrez 
(2012) 
“Organisational culture 
refers to the set of values, 
beliefs and accepted 
behaviors that employees 
share through symbolic 
means such as myths, 
stories, rituals, and 
specialized language. 
These values and beliefs 
are the social ‘norms’ 
within an organization and 
influence the way an 
individual acts when 
operating the social 
context of that  
organization” (p. 4).  
“Safety culture is the value 
and priority placed on 
safety across all levels 
with and  organization. It 
refers to the extent to 
which individuals commit 
to their personal safety 
(independence) and to 
safeguarding others 
(interdependence)” (p. 4). 
 
N/A N/A 0% 
Hellings, 
Schrooten, 
Klazinga, 
and Vleugels 
(2007) 
 
“An integrated pattern of 
individual and 
organisational behaviour 
based upon shared beliefs 
and values that 
continuously seek to 
minimise patient harm that 
may occur from the 
process of care delivery” 
(p. 621) 
The Patient Safety Culture Hospital 
questionnaire 
Hospital units do not coordinate well 
with each other,  
Hospital managers seem interested in 
patient safety only after an adverse event 
happens, Things fall between the cracks 
when transferring patients from one unit 
to another, “Staff worry that mistakes 
they make are kept in their personnel 
file, We work in crisis mode, trying to do 
too much, too quickly, ect. 
50% 
Individual: No, 
questions are broad and 
ask about hospital and 
staff 
Organizational 
behavior: Yes, Hospital 
units do not coordinate 
well with each other 
Shared beliefs: No, can 
only assess each 
individual individually 
Minimize patient harm: 
Yes, Hospital managers 
seem interested in 
patient safety only after 
an adverse event 
happens 
 
ISAG (1991) “Safety culture is that 
assembly of characteristics 
and attitudes in 
N/A N/A 0% 
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organizations and 
individuals which 
establishes that, as an 
overriding priority, nuclear 
plant safety issues receive 
the attention warranted by 
their significance” (p. 380) 
Kennedy and 
Kirwan 
(1998) 
“[Safety culture] is an 
abstract concept which is 
underpinned by the 
amalgamation of 
individual and group 
perceptions, thought 
processes, feelings and 
behaviour which in turn 
gives rise to the particular 
way of doing things in the 
organisation (p. 251) 
 
Safety Culture and Operability 
(SCHAZOP) approach 
Day-to-day activities, including safety 
management, real roles, and the 
personnel fulfilling these roles 
The SCHAZOP technique will attempt to 
identify:  
1. areas where the safety management 
process is `vulnerable' to failures (these 
are defined in terms of safety 
management error modes);  
2. the potential consequences of the 
safety management failure;  
3. the potential (safety culture) `failure 
mechanisms' associated with the safety 
management failure; and  
4. the factors which influence the 
likelihood of the safety management 
failures manifesting themselves. 
N/A doesn’t have specific questions, I 
think it is individually tailored to each 
organization 
N/A 0% 
Mariscal, 
Herrero, and 
Otero (2012) 
 
“[S]afety culture is 
reserved to the basic 
assumptions of the 
organisation, in other 
words to “traits” that are 
stable and deep-rooted, 
while safety climate is 
used to address “states” of 
the organisation that are 
shallow, expressed within 
the context of and 
influenced by external and 
temporary circumstances” 
(p. 1238) 
“[S]afety culture concept 
has been amplified beyond 
classic features of safety 
management, such as 
technical attention to 
RADAR matrix for safety culture 
Safety is a clearly recognized value, 
accountability for safety is clear, safety is 
integrated into all activities, leadership 
process with regard to safety, safety is 
learning driven. 
A policy has been put in place for 
obtaining and using information through 
publications, sharing with other  
Information on the socio-economic 
environment is obtained systematically.  
The organization has efficient processes 
for providing information on its products 
and services, such as  
The organization has internal channels 
for providing information and 
communicating that are both formal  
Workers have access to the media 
5% 
Basic assumptions: No 
Stable and deep-rooted: 
No 
 
This definition and 
operationalization do 
not match well 
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hazards, the deployment of 
operational procedures, 
and regulatory compliance 
programmes, to 
incorporate principles of 
leadership and value-
sharing, enhanced 
communications and 
organisational learning, 
and knowledge about the 
factors which shape 
individual and group 
behaviours” (p. 1238) 
There is an effective, two-way 
communication process that ensures the 
correct communication of safety  
The good working and effectiveness of 
the communication system is assessed 
systematically 
All workers are informed of the 
hazards/risks found in their work posts 
on completion of risk and hazard 
K. Mearns, 
Whitaker, 
and Flin 
(2003) 
“Most definitions of safety 
culture invoke shared 
norms or attitudes so that 
the level of aggregation is 
considered to be the 
group” (p. 642) 
 
Offshore Safety Questionnaire (OSQ) 
When decisions are being made about 
safety issues which may affect you, how 
involved do you feel? 
My line manager/supervisor does not 
always inform me of current concerns 
and issues 
I don’t get praise for working safely 
My supervisor cares about safety more 
than the average worker 
Senior management show a lack of 
commitment to health and safety 
I ignore safety regulations to get the job 
done 
The written safety rules and instructions 
are easy for people to follow 
Incentives encourage me to break the 
rules 
45% 
Shared norms: No, 
assesses individual 
attitudes 
Attitudes: Yes, My 
supervisor cares about 
safety more than the 
average worker 
Safety climate is 
manifestation of safety 
culture: No evidence 
for 
Behavior: Yes, I ignore 
safety regulations to 
get the job done 
 
Many questions that do 
not relate to definition 
 
K. J. Mearns 
and Flin 
(1999) 
“From a theoretical 
perspective, safety culture 
has been described in 
terms of values, beliefs, 
attitudes, social mores, 
norms, rules, practices, 
competencies, and 
behavior” (p. 7). 
N/A N/A 0% 
Mohamed 
(2003) 
“[S]afety culture is a 
subfacet of organizational 
culture, which affects 
workers’ attitudes and 
behavior in relation to an 
organization’s on-going 
safety performance” (p. 
81) 
N/A N/A 0% 
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Nielsen, Eid, 
Hystad, 
Saetrevik, 
and Saus 
(2013) 
 
“The concept of safety 
culture is often used to 
describe the many factors 
related to organizational 
processes and management 
practices that have the 
potential to influence 
safety performance” (p. 
81) 
“[S]afety climate is 
defined as the workers 
impression of safety 
resources, and based on 
existing policies and 
procedures, and how they 
are enacted, workers will 
assess whether the 
organization truly 
prioritize safety” (p. 81) 
Norwegian offshore risk and safety 
climate inventory’’ (NORSCI) 
Individual intention and motivation, 
management prioritization, and safety 
routines 
I report any dangerous situations I see, 
Safety is my number one priority when I 
work, I ask my colleagues to stop work 
which I believe is performed in an unsafe 
manner, I stop work if I believe that it 
may be dangerous for me or others to 
continue, In practice, production takes 
priority over health, environment and 
safety, Reports about accidents or 
dangerous situations are often 
‘‘embellished’’, here are often 
concurrent work operations which lead to 
dangerous situations, Deficient 
maintenance has caused poorer safety, I 
have the necessary competence to 
perform my job in a safe manner, I have 
easy access to personal protective 
equipment, The management takes input 
from the safety delegates seriously 
70% 
Climate scale 
Workers impressions of 
resources: Yes, In 
practice, production 
takes priority over 
health, environment 
and safety  
Based on policies and 
procedures: Somewhat, 
Reports about accidents 
or dangerous situations 
are often 
‘‘embellished’’ 
Prioritize safety: Yes, 
Safety is my number 
one priority when I 
work 
O'Toole 
(2002) 
“Safety culture is often 
seen as a subset of 
organizational culture, 
where the beliefs and 
values refer specifically to 
matters of health and 
safety” (p. 234) 
“Safety culture has been 
identified as a critical 
factor that sets the tone for 
importance of safety 
within an organization” (p. 
231) 
A 41-item safety perception survey was 
distributed to all employees, including 
plant office employees. 
Have your company’s efforts encouraged 
you to work more safely? Are employees 
adequately informed about the results of 
their exposure monitoring? Are 
employees checked on a routine basis to 
see whether they are doing their job 
safely? Do your coworkers support the 
company’s safety program? Are 
employees who are using drugs or 
alcohol on the job able to work 
undetected? Have you been properly 
trained to respond to an emergency 
situation in your work area? Is off-the-
job safety a part of your company’s 
safety program? 
55% 
Subcomponent of 
organizational culture: 
No evidence of this 
Beliefs: Yes, but also 
attitudes 
Values: No 
Sets the tone for safety: 
Yes but vague 
 
Many questions that do 
not relate to definition,  
 
Olive, 
O’Connor, 
and Mannan 
(2006) 
 
“Safety culture can be 
viewed as the overarching 
policies and goals set by 
an organization relating to 
the overall safety of their 
N/A N/A 0% 
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facility or environment” 
(p. 133).  
Ostrom, 
Wilhelmsen, 
and Kaplan 
(1993) 
“[Safety culture includes 
the] concept that the 
organisation's beliefs and 
attitudes, manifested in 
actions, policies, and 
procedures, affect its 
safety performance” (p. 
163) 
EG&G Idaho Safety Norm Survey 
See Appendix 
Around here people don’t think much 
about safety, Safety personnel are 
unavailable when we need help, Around 
here, people take pride in how safely we 
operate, In this company people work 
safely even when the boss isn’t looking, 
The way we work now is safe enough, 
Timely feedback is seldom provided 
when a safety hazard is reported, There 
are so many procedures that get in the 
way of doing the job safely, people 
carefully follow the written procedures, 
People are willing to expend a great deal 
of effort to get a job done safely, ect 
65% 
Organization’s beliefs: 
No, it’s the individual 
employees’ beliefs 
Attitudes: Yes, Around 
here people don’t think 
much about safety, 
Actions: Yes, People 
are willing to expend a 
great deal of effort to 
get a job done safely 
Policies: Sort of, 
people carefully follow 
the written procedures 
Parker, 
Lawrie, and 
Hudson 
(2006) 
 
“At the heart of a safety 
culture is the way in which 
organisational 
intelligence? and collective 
imagination? regarding 
safety issues are deployed” 
(p. 553) 
“The beliefs and values 
that refer specifically to 
health and safety form the 
subset of organisational 
culture referred to as safety 
culture” (p. 552) 
Have both concrete and abstract 
measures for  
Pathological: You look out for yourself 
Reactive: After accident work-site 
hazard management is brought in, but 
there is little systematic use 
Calculative: Commercially available 
technique is used to meet management 
requirements, but this leads to little 
action 
Proactive: Job safety observation 
techniques are accepted by the workforce 
and regarded as standard practice 
Generative safety culture: Job safety 
analysis is revised regularly and 
employees and supervisors are not afraid 
to tell each other about hazards 
See Figure 2 for breakdown of traits 
 
20% 
Beliefs and values: 
Yes, but also attitudes, 
behaviors, training, 
management policies, 
ect 
 
Many questions that 
are not covered in the 
limited definition 
Pidgeon 
(1991) 
“[S]afety culture can be 
conceived of as the 
constructed systems of 
meanings through which a 
given worker, or group of 
workers, understands the 
hazards of their world . . 
.focuses on the 
organizational level” (p. 
135) 
N/A N/A 0% 
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Pronovost 
and Sexton 
(2005) 
 
“Definitions of culture 
commonly refer to values, 
attitudes, norms, beliefs, 
practices, policies, and 
behaviors of personnel” (p. 
230) 
The Safety Climate Survey (SCSu) 
The culture of this clinical area makes it 
easy to learn from the mistakes of others. 
The senior leaders in my hospital listen 
to me and care about my concerns. 
Medical errors are handled appropriately 
in this clinical area. 
Management/leadership does not 
knowingly compromise safety concerns 
for productivity. I receive appropriate 
feedback about my performance. I am 
satisfied with the availability of 
physician clinical leadership. I believe 
that most adverse events occur as a result 
of multiple system failures and are not 
attributable to one individual’s actions. 
Ect.  
60% 
Using safety climate 
survey to assess safety 
culture 
Values: No 
Attitudes: Yes, I 
believe that most 
adverse events occur as 
a result of multiple 
system failures and are 
not attributable to one 
individual’s actions 
Norms: No 
Beliefs: Yes, I believe 
that most adverse 
events occur as a result 
of multiple system 
failures and are not 
attributable to one 
individual’s actions 
Practises: Yes, I 
receive appropriate 
feedback about my 
performance 
Policies: No 
Behaviors: Yes, I 
receive appropriate 
feedback about my 
performance 
Reiman and 
Pietikäinen 
(2012) 
 
N/A Provides examples of drive indicators 
and monitor indicators for safety. 
E.g. Drive indicators: management is 
actively committed to, and visibly 
involved in, safety activities, (2) number 
of management walk arounds per month, 
(3) number of times safety is a topic in 
the management meetings 
Monitor indicators: the extent to which 
the personnel report that their work is 
meaningful and important, (2) the extent 
to which human performance tools are 
utilized in daily practice and (3) the 
extent to which personnel consider safety 
as a value that guides their everyday 
work 
N/A 0% 
Rollenhagen 
(2010) 
“‘Culture’ concerns what 
and how people believe, 
feel, think and behave 
N/A N/A 0% 
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(over time) and how this is 
reflected in collective 
habits, rules, norms, 
symbols and artefacts. 
How and to what extent 
such patterns of cognition, 
behaviour and associated 
norms influence safety are 
indeed interesting and 
important issues – some 
cultural patterns might be 
helpful whereas other 
might be less so” (p. 269) 
Singer et al. 
(2003) 
 
“[Safety culture is] 
commitment to safety 
articulated at the highest 
levels of the organization 
and translated into shared 
values, beliefs, and 
behavioral norms at all 
levels” (p.113) 
Stanford/PSCI Culture Survey 
Organization, Department, Production, 
Reporting/seeking help, Shame/self-
awareness 
See Table 3 for sample survey 
 
N/A 0% 
Sorra and 
Dyer (2010) 
 
“Patient safety culture 
refers to management and 
staff values, beliefs, and 
norms about what is 
important in a health care 
organization, how 
organization members are 
expected to behave, what 
attitudes and actions are 
appropriate and 
inappropriate, and what 
processes and procedures 
are rewarded and punished 
with regard to patient 
safety” (p. 1) 
AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient 
Safety Culture 
Patient safety issues, medical error and 
event reporting and includes 42 items 
that measure 12 dimensions or 
composites of patient safety culture 
See Table 4 for survey composites 
I am rewarded for taking quick action to 
identify a serious mistake, Senior 
management has a clear picture of the 
risk associated with patient care, In my 
department, disregarding policy and 
procedure is rare, I have witnessed a 
coworker do something that appeared to 
me to be unsafe patient care, In the last 
year I have done something that was not 
safe for the patient, Asking for help is a 
sign of incompetence, I will suffer 
negative consequences if I report a 
patient safety problem, I am asked to cut 
corners to get the job done, Senior 
management considers patient safety 
when program changes are discussed, 
etc. 
80% 
Management values: 
Yes, Senior 
management considers 
patient safety when 
program changes are 
discussed 
Staff values: No 
Beliefs: Yes, I will 
suffer negative 
consequences if I 
report a patient safety 
problem 
Norms: No 
Expected behavior: 
Yes, I am asked to cut 
corners to get the job 
done 
Attitudes: Yes, I will 
suffer negative 
consequences if I 
report a patient safety 
problem 
Actions: Yes, In the 
last year I have done 
something that was not 
safe for the patient 
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Rewards: Yes, I am 
rewarded for taking 
quick action to identify 
a serious mistake 
Turner, 
Pidgeon, 
Blockley, 
and Toft 
(1989) 
“The set of beliefs, norms, 
attitudes, roles and social 
and technical practices 
concerned with 
minimizing the exposure 
of employees, managers, 
customers and members of 
the public to conditions 
considered dangerous or 
injurious” (p. 7) 
N/A N/A 0% 
Uttal (1983) “[Organizational culture 
is] shared values (what is 
important) and beliefs 
(how things work) that 
interact with a company’s 
people, organizational 
structures and control 
systems to produce 
behavioral norms (the way 
we do things around here)” 
(p. 69) 
N/A N/A 0% 
Wiegmann, 
Zhang, Von 
Thaden, 
Sharma, and 
Gibbons 
(2004) 
 
“Safety culture is a 
concept defined at the 
group level or higher that 
refers to the shared values 
among all the group or 
organization members. 
Safety culture is concerned 
with formal safety issues 
in an organization and 
closely related to, but not 
restricted to, the 
management and 
supervisory systems. 
Safety culture emphasizes 
the contribution from 
everyone at every level of 
an organization. The safety 
culture of an organization 
has an impact on its 
members’ behavior at 
work. Safety culture is 
usually reflected in the 
contingency between 
Tools for assessing safety culture can be 
classified as either qualitative or 
quantitative methods. Qualitative 
methods include employee observations, 
focus group discussions, historical 
information reviews, and case studies. In 
contrast, quantitative approaches attempt 
to numerically measure or score safety 
culture using procedures that are often 
highly standardized and calibrated such 
as highly structured interviews, surveys 
and questionnaires, and Q-sorts. 
N/A provides suggestions for ways of 
assessment safety culture, but no 
actual assessments 
N/A 0% 
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reward systems and safety 
performance. Safety 
culture is reflected in an 
organization’s willingness 
to develop and learn from 
errors, incidents, and 
accidents. Safety culture is 
relatively enduring, stable, 
and resistant to change” (p. 
123).  
Wu, Lin, and 
Shiau (2010) 
 
“Safety culture is a subset 
of organizational culture. It 
is thought to affect the 
attitudes and safety-related 
behavior of the members 
of an organization” (p. 
423). 
Employer safety leadership scale 
Operations manager safety leadership 
scale 
Safety professional safety leadership 
scale 
Safety Culture Scale 
See Table 5 for items of Safety Culture 
Scale 
All colleagues understand emergency 
response equipment, All colleagues 
understand injury reporting procedures, 
Colleagues often fall or slip at work, 
Colleagues regularly attend safety 
training, Colleagues participate in the 
setting of safety policy 
75% 
Subcomponent of 
organizational culture: 
No evidence for this 
Attitudes: Yes, All 
colleagues understand 
injury reporting 
procedures 
Behavior: Yes, 
Colleagues often fall or 
slip at work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
   
1
2
3
 
Appendix I: List of Safety Culture and Climate Assessment Tools 
Safety 
Climate 
Assessment 
Tools 
Author Info about Questionnaire/Items Reliability Validity 
Reliability and 
validity of a 
safety climate 
questionnaire 
Arghami, 
S., Nouri 
Parkesta
ni, H., & 
Alimoha
mmadi, I. 
(2013).  
The factors on the scale included: management commitment to safety, safety 
communication, supportive environment, work environment, formal training, 
priority of safety, and personal priorities and need for safety (descending order in 
amount of variance) 
My company values in the workers correct observation of safety rules and 
procedures  
Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient was 
calculated to measure 
the internal 
consistency of the 
instrument with 0.70 
specified as an 
acceptable level 16and 
was found to be equal 
to 0.93 for the entire 
questionnaire. The 
alphas were also 
calculated separately 
for each factor as 
.954 for the first, .830 
for the second, .793 
for the third, .803 for 
the fourth, .774 for 
the fifth, .740 for the 
sixth and .547 for the 
seventh  
As the initial instrument, 
a questionnaire was 
formed on the basis 
of Table 1 and translated 
into Persian via linguistic 
validity approach. 
Correlations of subscales 
with the total scale score 
was calculated to show 
the validity of the 
instrument. Since the 
main purpose of 
exploratory factor 
analysis is data reduction 
to define a set of 
common underlying 
dimensions known as 
factors, priori criteria 
should be established in 
order to get a certain 
number of factors 
extracted. The most 
commonly criteria 
include: eigenvalues 
higher than 1 latent root 
criteria), and scree test 
criterion 
The safety 
attitudes quest
ionnaire - 
ambulatory 
version: 
psychometric 
properties of 
Bondevi
k, G. T., 
Hofoss, 
D., 
Hansen, 
E. H., & 
Deilkås, 
Nurse input is well received in this office. 
 In this office, it is difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with patient care. 
 Disagreements in this office are resolved appropriately (i.e., not who is right but 
what is best for the patient). 
 I have the support I need from other personnel to care for patients. 
 It is easy for personnel in this office to ask questions when there is something 
that they do not understand. 
The Cronbach alphas 
ranged from 0.67 to 
0.83 for the factor 
scores Teamwork 
climate, Safety 
climate, Working 
conditions, Job 
Since several studies find 
that the factor Stress 
recognition does not vary 
significantly between 
organizational units 
[21, 26], and also has 
problems regarding 
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the Norwegian 
translated 
version for the 
primary care 
setting 
E. C. T. 
(2014).  
 The physicians and nurses here work together as a well-coordinated team. 
Safety climate 
I would feel safe being treated here as a patient. 
 Medical errors are handled appropriately in this office. 
 I receive appropriate feedback about my performance. 
 In this office, it is difficult to discuss errors. 
 I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any patient safety concerns I may 
have. 
 The culture in this office makes it easy to learn from the errors of others. 
 I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding patient safety in this 
office. 
This office does a good job of training new personnel. 
 All the necessary information for diagnostic and therapeutic decisions is 
routinely available to me. 
 This office deals constructively with problem personnel. 
 Trainees in my discipline are adequately supervised. 
Job satisfaction 
I like my job. 
 Working in this office is like being part of a large family. 
 This office is a good place to work. 
 I am proud to work at this office. 
 Morale in this office is high. 
Perceptions of management 
The management of this office supports my daily efforts. 
 Office management does not knowingly compromise the safety of patients. 
 The levels of staffing in this office are sufficient to handle the number of 
patients. 
 I am provided with adequate, timely information about events in the office that 
might affect my work. 
When my workload becomes excessive, my performance is impaired. 
 I am less effective at work when fatigued. 
 I am more likely to make errors in tense or hostile situations. 
 Fatigue impairs my performance during emergency situations (e.g. code or 
cardiac arrest). 
satisfaction and 
Perceptions of 
management 
(Table 4) 
construct validity [27], it 
cannot be considered a 
valid factor for 
measuring patient safety  
The factors reflect the 
correlation structure in 
the item responses. Valid 
factors should thus 
reflect a thematic logic 
that is coherent with the 
purpose of the 
questionnaire. CFA 
provides goodness-of-fit 
indices, which show how 
the survey responses 
comply with the pre-
hypothesised factor 
model. 
Development 
and validation 
of an 
Integrated 
Organizational 
Safety 
Brondino
, M., 
Pasini, 
M., & da 
Silva, S. 
Safety Communication 
1.02. Space to discuss in meeting  
1.05. Management attention to workers ideas to improve safety  
1.12. Workers consultation on safety issues 
Information supply on safety issues  
Safety Training 
In this case it’s better 
to use construct 
reliability (the degree 
to which the scale 
indicators reflect an 
underlying factor), 
To test construct validity 
in multilevel 
confirmatory factor 
analysis the five steps 
described above, from 
the CFA to the final 
  
 
   
1
2
5
 
Climate questi
onnaire with 
multilevel 
confirmatory 
factor analysis 
C. A. 
(2013) 
1.09. Investments on safety training  
1.16. Quality of safety training Safety values  
1.07. Management care about safety in production schedule  
1.10. Management care about safety in moving-promoting people  
1.14. Management care about safety on a delay in production schedule  
Safety systems  
1.08. Management effort on safety improvement  
1.11. Management reaction to solve safety hazard  
1.17. Power given to safety officers Supervisor safety climate scale Supervisor’s 
effort to improve safety  
2.01. Supervisor’s care about safety rules when a delay in production schedule 
occurs  
2.06. Supervisor’s show care to provide workers needed safety equipment  
2.08. Supervisor’s care about the use of safety equipment 2.09. Supervisor’s care 
concerning safety rules when workers are tired  
2.10. Supervisor’s care about all safety rules  
2.11. Supervisor controls the compliance of all the workers Supervisor’s reactions 
to workers behaviours  
2.02. Supervisor discusses with workers on safety improvement  
2.03. Supervisor’s care concerning workers safety awareness  
2.04. Supervisor’s coaching about safety care  
2.05. supervisor praise to very careful safety behaviours Co-workers’ safety 
climate scale  
Safety communication  
3.05. Team members’ speaking on safety on the week  
3.06. Team members’ discussing about incident prevention  
3.09. Team members’ discussion about safety hazard Safety mentoring  
3.01. Team members’ emphasis to peer on safety care when under pressure  
3.03. Team members care about peers safety awareness  
3.04. Team members mentoring to peer about working safely  
Safety values  
3.02. Team members care about safety at the shift end  
3.08. Team members care about safety when tired 3.12. Team members care 
about safety when a delay in production schedule occurs Safety systems  
3.07. Team members care about other workers’ safety equipment  
3.10. Team members remind safety equipment use  
3.11. Team members care about other members’ safety compliance 
and average variance 
extracted (AVE, the 
average percentage of 
variation explained 
among the items) 
The factors 
composite reliability 
coefficients of the 
four-factor 
covariance model and 
of the second-order 
factor model were in 
both cases above the 
threshold value for 
acceptable reliability: 
For the four 
correlated factor 
model, construct 
reliability and 
variance extracted 
(AVE) were: Values 
(.81; AVE .59), 
Safety System (.78; 
AVE .54), Safety 
Communication (.79; 
AVE .56) and 
Training (.82; AVE 
.60); for the second-
order factor model 
construct reliability 
and variance 
extracted were: 
Values (.81; AVE 
.59), Safety System 
(.78; AVE .54), 
Safety 
Communication (.79; 
AVE .56) and 
Training (.82; AVE 
.60). 
MCFA, were performed. 
Table 2 shows models’ 
fit indexes, step by step, 
for the chosen final 
models for each scale. 
The Criterion-related 
validity appears good: 
the more the safety 
climate scores, the less 
the self-report number of 
injuries and micro-
accidents 
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Safety Climate 
Survey 
Cappucci
o, W. R., 
Collins 
Jr, G. E., 
& Eason, 
C. A. 
(1997) 
Management Leadership and Employee Participation 
A. Clear worksite safety and health policy 
1. (4) Work force can explain, and fully embraces, S & H policy 
(3) Majority of personnel can explain policy 
(2) Some personnel can explain policy 
(1) Management can provide or state policy 
(0) There is no apparent policy 
B. Management leadership and example 
2. (4) All personnel can give examples of management's active commitment to 
safety and health 
(3) Majority personnel can give examples of management's active commitment to 
safety and health 
(2) Some personnel can give examples of management's active commitment to 
safety and health 
(1) Some evidence exists that management is committed to safety and health 
(0) Safety and health does not appear to be a management value or significant 
concern 
3. (4) Personnel report management always follows the rules and addresses the 
safety behavior of others 
(3) Management follows the rules and usually addresses the safety behavior of 
others 
(2) Management follows the rules and occasionally addresses the safety behavior 
of others 
(1) Management generally appears to follow basic safety and health rules 
(0) Management does not appear to follow the basic safety and health rules set for 
others 
C. Employee involvement 
4. (4) All personnel have ownership of safety and health and can describe their 
active roles 
(3) Majority of personnel feel they have a positive impact on identifying and 
resolving S&H issues 
(2) Some personnel feel they have a positive impact on identifying and resolving 
S&H issues 
(1) Employees frequently feel that their safety and health input will be considered 
by supervision 
(0) Employee involvement in safety and health issues is not encouraged or 
rewarded 
D. Resources for safety and health 
5. (4) All personnel believe they have the necessary resources to meet their 
responsibilities 
The reliability of the 
survey was examined 
by selecting a small 
group of individuals 
(n=5) and performing 
a test-retest 
examination (data not 
shown) on the survey 
instrument. 
Content validity of the 
survey was examined by 
having a group of 
ERDEC safety engineers 
and specialists review the 
survey questions and 
responses for 
appropriateness to this 
facility 
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(3) Majority of personnel believe they have the necessary resources to do their job 
(2) Resources are spelled out for all; but there may be a reluctance to use them 
(1) Resources exist, but most appear to be out of the control of the employee 
(0) Personnel do not have adequate authority and resources to perform assigned 
responsibilities 
II. Workplace Analysis 
A. Hazard identification (safety survey) 
6. (4) In addition to corrective action, regular safety surveys result in updated 
hazard inventories 
(3) Comprehensive safety surveys are conducted periodically and drive 
appropriate corrective action 
(2) Comprehensive safety surveys are conducted; but updates and corrective 
action sometimes lags 
(1) Safety or health professionals survey in response to accidents, complaints, or 
compliance activity 
(0) There is no evidence of any comprehensive hazard survey having been 
conducted 
B. Routine hazard analysis 
7. (4) Employees have had input to the hazard analysis for their jobs 
(3) A current hazard analysis exists for all jobs, processes, or phases and is 
understood by all 
employees 
(2) A current hazard analysis exists for all jobs, processes, or phases and is 
understood by many 
employees 
(1) A hazard analysis program exists; but few are aware of results 
(0) There is no routine hazard analysis system in place at this facility 
C. Hazard identification (inspection) 
8. (4) Well trained employees at all levels conduct frequent and varied 
inspections, hazards of any kind 
are rare 
(3) Inspection are conducted by trained personnel and all items are corrected, 
repeat hazards seldom 
found 
(2) Inspection are conducted by trained personnel, most items corrected, but some 
hazards still in 
evidence 
(1) An inspection program exists; but coverage and corrective action is not 
complete; hazards are in 
evidence 
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(0) There is no routine inspection program at this facility; many hazards can be 
found 
D. Hazard reporting system 
9. (4) Employees feel comfortable identifying and self correcting hazards 
(3) A comprehensive system for gathering hazard information exists; is positive, 
rewarding and 
effective 
(2) A system exists for hazard reporting; employees feel they can use it; but it 
may be slow to 
respond 
(1) A system exists for hazard reporting; but employees may find it unresponsive 
or be unclear on its 
use 
(0) No formal hazard reporting system exists and/or employees do not appear 
comfortable reporting 
hazards 
E. Accident/incident investigation 
10. (4) All loss-producing incidents and "near misses" are investigated for root 
cause with effective 
prevention 
(3) All incidents are investigated and effective prevention is implemented 
(2) Incidents generally investigated; cause identification/correction maybe 
inadequate 
(1) Some investigation of incidents takes place, but root cause is seldom 
identified, correction is 
spotty 
(0) Injuries are either not investigated or investigation is limited to report writing 
required for 
compliance 
F. Injury/illness analysis 
11. (4) All employees are fully aware of incident trends, causes, and means of 
prevention 
(3) Trends fully analyzed and displayed, common causes communicated, 
management ensures 
prevention 
(2) Data is centrally collected and analyzed; common causes communicated to 
concerned supervisors 
(1) Data is centrally collected and analyzed; but not widely communicated for 
prevention 
(0) Little or no effort is made to analyze data for trends, causes, and prevention 
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III. Hazard Prevention and Control 
A. Awareness of facility/equipment maintenance 
12. (4) Operators are trained to recognize maintenance needs and perform/order 
maintenance on 
schedule 
(3) An effective preventive maintenance schedule is in place and applicable to all 
equipment 
(2) A preventive maintenance schedule is in place and is usually followed except 
for higher 
priorities 
(1) A preventive maintenance schedule is in place; but is often allowed to slide 
(0) There is little or no attention paid to preventive maintenance; break-down 
maintenance is the 
rule 
B. Emergency equipment 
13. (4) Facility is fully equipped for emergencies, all systems and equipment in 
place and regularly 
tested, all personnel know how to use equipment and communicate during 
emergencies 
(3) Well equipped with appropriate emergency phones and directions, most 
people know what to do 
(2) Emergency phones, directions, and equipment in place; but only emergency 
teams know what to 
do 
(1) Emergency phones, directions, and equipment in place; but employees show 
little awareness 
(0) There is little evidence of an effective effort at providing emergency 
equipment and information 
C. Medical program (emergency care) 
14. (4) Personnel fully trained in emergency medicine are always available on-site 
(3) Personnel with basic first aid skills are always available on-site 
(2) Personnel with basic first aid skills are usually available with community 
assistance near-by 
(1) Either on-site or near-by community aid is always available on every shift 
(0) Neither on-site nor community aid can be ensured at all times 
IV. Safety and Health Training 
A. Employees learn hazards, and how to protect themselves and others 
15. (4) Employees can demonstrate proficiency in, and support of, all areas 
covered by training 
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(3) Facility committed to high quality employee hazard training, ensures all 
participate, regular 
updates 
(2) Facility provides legally required training, makes effort to include all 
personnel 
(1) Training is provided when need is apparent, experienced personnel assumed to 
know material 
(0) Facility depends on experience and informal peer training to meet needs 
B. Supervisors learn responsibilities, and underlying reasons 
16. (4) All supervisors assist in worksite analysis, ensure physical protections, 
reinforce training, 
enforce discipline, and can explain work procedures, based on training provided 
to them 
(3) Most supervisors assist in worksite analysis, ensure physical protections, 
reinforce training, 
enforce discipline, and can explain work procedures, based on training provided 
to them 
(2) Supervisors have received basic training, appear to understand and 
demonstrate importance of 
worksite analysis, physical protections, training reinforcement, discipline, 
knowledge of 
procedures 
(1) Supervisors make reasonable effort to meet safety and health responsibilities; 
but have limited 
training 
(0) There is no formal effort to train supervisors in safety and health 
responsibilities 
Content 
validity and 
internal 
consistency of 
the Dutch 
translation of 
the safety 
attitudes quest
ionnaire: An 
observational 
study. 
Devriend
t, E., Van 
den 
Heede, 
K., 
Coussem
ent, J., 
Dejaeger, 
E., 
Surmont, 
K., 
Heylen, 
D., ... & 
1. Nurse input is well received in this clinical area (1)  
2. In this clinical area, it is difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with 
patient care (1)  
3. Disagreements in this clinical area are resolved appropriately (i.e.; not who is 
right but what is best for the patient) (1)  
4. I have the support I need from other personnel to care for patients (1)  
5. It is easy for personnel here to ask questions when there is something that they 
do not understand (1) 
6. The physicians and nurses here work together as a well-coordinated team (1)  
7. I would feel safe being treated here as a patient (2)  
8. Medical errors are handled appropriately in this clinical area (2) 
9. I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding patient safety in this 
clinical area (2)  
Several studies 
measured the internal 
consistency of the 
instrument and the 
scales in different 
settings, with 
Cronbach's alpha 
values for the 
different scales 
ranging from 0.68 to 
0.89 
The Dutch translation of 
the SAQ was tested for 
content validity (Lynn, 
1986 and Polit et al., 
2007). Content validity 
was examined by the 
same expert panel as in 
phase 1. Content validity 
indexes were rated as 
good when I-CVI, S-
CVIAve and S-CVIUAwere 
at least 0.78, 0.90, and 
0.80, respectively 
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Milisen, 
K. 
(2012).  
10. I receive appropriate feedback about my performance (2) 
11. In this clinical area, it is difficult to discuss errors (2)  
12. I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any patient safety concerns I may 
have (2)  
13. The culture in this clinical area makes it easy to learn from the errors of others 
(2)  
14. My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I expressed them to 
management (2)  
15. I like my job (5)  
16. Working here is like being part of a large family (5) 
17. This is a good place to work (5)  
18. I am proud to work in this clinical area (5) 
19. Morale in this clinical area is high (5) 
20. When my workload becomes excessive, my performance is impaired (3) 
21. I am less effective at work when fatigued (3)  
22. I am more likely to make errors in tense or hostile situations (3)  
23. Fatigue impairs my performance during emergency situations (e.g. emergency 
resuscitation, seizure) (3) 
24. Management supports my daily efforts: unit management and hospital 
management (6)  
25. Management does not knowingly compromise pt safety: unit management and 
hospital management (6)  
26. Management is doing a good job: unit management and hospital management 
(6)  
27. Problem personnel are dealt with constructively by our: unit management and 
hospital management (4) 
28. I get adequate, timely info about events that might affect my work, from: unit 
management and hospital management (6) 
29. The staffing levels in this clinical area are sufficient to handle the number of 
patients (6) 
30. This hospital does a good job of training new personnel (4) 
31. All the necessary information for diagnostic and therapeutic decisions is 
routinely available to me (4) 
32. Trainees in my discipline are adequately supervised (4) 
33. Communication breakdowns that lead to delays in delivery of care are 
common (4) 
 Face validity was 
evaluated by two nurses 
and two physicians who 
assessed the Dutch 
version of the SAQ. 
Swedish 
translation and 
psychometric 
testing of the 
Göras, 
C., 
Wallenti
n, F. Y., 
Disagreements in the ORs here are resolved appropriately (i.e., what is best for 
the patient). 
–The physicians and nurses here work together as a well- coordinated team. 
Job satisfaction: positivity about the work experience 
The internal 
consistency of the six 
factors and 30 items 
of the translated 
To assess content 
validity, a validation 
review was performed by 
an expert committee, 
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safety 
attitudes quest
ionnaire (oper
ating room 
version) 
Nilsson, 
U., & 
Ehrenber
g, A. 
(2013).  
–I like my job. 
–This hospital is a good place to work. 
Perceptions of management: approval of managerial action 
–Hospital administration supports my daily efforts. 
–Hospital management is doing a good job. 
Safety climate: perceptions of a strong and proactive organizational commitment 
to safety 
–I would feel perfectly safe being treated here as a patient. 
–Personnel frequently disregard rules or guidelines that are established for the 
OR. 
Working conditions: perceived quality of the OR’s work environment and 
logistical support (staffing, equipment, etc.) 
–Our levels of staffing are sufficient to handle the number of patients. 
–Medical equipment in the ORs here is adequate. 
Stress recognition: acknowledgement of how performance is influenced by 
stressors 
–I am less effective at work when fatigued. 
version of the SAQ 
had Cronbach’s alpha 
values of 0.59 to 
0.83. 
including relevance and 
intelligibility, to 
highlight any items that 
may be inappropriate at a 
conceptual or cultural 
level. 
An approach to construct 
validation, CFA, was 
used for conclusions 
about the conceptual and 
semantic equivalence of 
a translated questionnaire 
[32], as well as to create 
other aspects of 
psychometric evaluation 
[34]. 
University 
safety climate 
questionnaire 
Gutierrez
, 2012 
N/A Internal consistency 
was good except for 
the risk management 
dimension (below 
.70).  
Eigen-values were used 
as a measure of construct 
validity and four of the 
five dimension were 
good (greater than 1). 
Content validity was 
addressed with a review 
of the literature 
A means for 
measuring 
safety climate 
in the 
university 
work setting 
Gutiérrez
, J. M., 
Emery, 
R. J., 
Whitehea
d, L. W., 
& 
Felknor, 
S. A. 
(2013).  
Perceptions of risk management  
Employee's safety commitment  
Department and supervisor's commitment  
Acknowledgement of safety performance  
Administration's safety commitment 
Reliability analysis 
was performed to 
assess the internal 
consistency within 
each group or 
dimension having 
more than one 
question. The 
Cronbach alpha 
coefficient was 
appropriate for Likert 
level responses to 
attitude surveys, 
while the Kuder–
Richardson formula 
For the construct 
validity, a correlation 
matrix was produced and 
factor analysis was 
performed. The sum of 
Eigen-values by the five 
safety climate 
dimensions obtained 
from the factor analysis 
is shown in Table 5. Four 
of the five safety climate 
dimensions had Eigen-
values greater than one, 
thus, following the 
Kaiser Guttman rule, 
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was a special case of 
the alpha coefficient 
that is used when the 
response categories 
are dichotomous 
rather than multi-
level. The Cronbach 
alpha for the 
perceptions of risk 
management 
dimension was lower 
than 0.7, indicating 
these questions were 
not internally 
consistent and may 
need to be reworded. 
these four dimensions 
can be used as indicators 
of safety climate. 
 Content validity analysis 
was addressed by a 
comprehensive review of 
the literature regarding 
safety climate 
dimensions or factors. 
Determining 
Safety Climate 
Factors in the 
Repair, 
Maintenance, 
Minor 
Alteration, 
and 
Addition 
Sector of 
Hong Kong 
Hon, C. 
K., Chan, 
A. P., & 
Yam, M. 
C. 
(2012).  
Management Commitment 
B8          The company really cares about the health and safety of the people who 
work here.  
B21 There is good communication here between management and workers 
about health and safety issues. 
B15 The company encourages suggestions on how to improve health and 
safety.  
B19 I am clear about what my responsibilities are regarding health and safety. 
B38 I think management here does enough to follow up on recommendations 
from safety inspection and accident investigation reports.  
B13 All the people who work in my team are fully committed to health and 
safety.  
B16 There is good preparedness for emergencies here. 
B30 Accidents that happen here are always reported. 
B9 Most of the job-specific safety trainings I receive are effective. 
B3 I fully understand the health and safety risks associated.  
B28 Safety inspection here is helpful to improve the health and safety of 
workers.  
B34 Staff are praised for working safely. 
Safety Rules and Work Practices  
B29 Some jobs here are difficult to do safely.  
B32 Not all the health and safety rules or procedures are strictly followed 
here.  
B20 Some of the workforces pay little attention to health and safety.  
Reliability measures 
the internal 
consistency of the 
latent factors. As 
shown in 
Appendix II, three 
values of CR were 
above the 
recommended level 
of 0.7 (Hair et al. 
2010). All factors 
achieved good 
internal consistency 
Fig. 3 shows that 
convergent validity was 
achieved because all the 
paths in the CFA model 
were significant. Results 
of the discriminant 
validity test in 
Appendix II show that 
the structure has 
dissimilar constructs for 
the three factors because 
no pairs of 95% 
confidence interval of 
factor correlation pass 
through 1.  
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B11 Some health and safety rules or procedures are difficult to follow. 
B35 Supervisors sometimes turn a blind eye to people who are not observing 
the health and safety procedures.  
B17 Sometimes it is necessary to take risks to get the job done 
Responsibility for health and safety 
B10 People are just unlucky when they suffer from an accident.  
B37 Accident investigations are mainly used to identify who should be 
blamed.  
B26 Work health and safety are not my concern.  
B14 Little is done to prevent accidents until someone gets injured. 
Use of a safety 
climate 
questionnaire i
n UK health 
care: factor 
structure, 
reliability and 
usability 
Hutchins
on, A., 
Cooper, 
K. L., 
Dean, J. 
E., 
McIntosh
, A., 
Patterson
, M., 
Stride, C. 
B., ... & 
Smith, C. 
M. 
(2006).  
Teamwork factor 
Input into decisions and collaboration with other staff(Cronbach’s α = 0.84)  
Nurse input is well received where I work.  
Decision making where I work uses input from relevant staff  
The doctors and nurses here work together as a well-coordinated team 
Disagreements where I work are resolved appropriately (i.e. not who is right, but 
what is best for the patient)  
It is easy for staff here to ask questions when there is something that they do not 
understand  
I have the support I need from other staff to care for patients  
I am satisfied with the quality of collaboration that I experience with senior 
doctors where I work 
Safety climate factor 
Attitudes to safety within own team; capacity to learn from errors (Cronbach’s 
α = 0.73)       
I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any patient safety concerns I may 
have 
The culture where I work makes it easy to learn from the errors of others  
I receive appropriate feedback about my performance  
Medical errors are handled appropriately here 
I know the proper channels to which I should direct questions regarding patient 
safety 
The levels of staffing where I work are sufficient to handle the number of patients 
I would feel safe being treated as a patient in this service  
Management does not knowingly compromise the safety of patients 
This organisation is doing more for patient safety now than it did one year ago  
Leadership is driving us to be a safety centred organisation  
My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I expressed them to 
management 
Internal consistency 
reliabilities (how 
clearly a set of items 
measure a single 
theme) were 
satisfactory to good, 
with Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.69 or above 
in all five factors 
(tables 1 and 2). 
Removing a further 
item from the initial 
five items forming 
teamwork factor 2 
improved the internal 
consistency reliability 
of this factor. This 
item (“Briefing staff 
on handovers 
between shifts is 
important for patient 
safety”) 
Face validity: As a result 
of the “thinking aloud” 
exercise, minor 
adaptations were made to 
the questionnaire 
wording before it was 
used in the survey. For 
example, “institution” 
was changed to 
“organisation” and 
“physicians” to 
“doctors”. However, care 
was taken not to alter the 
underlying meaning of 
the items and, for this 
reason, some wording 
was left unchanged—for 
example, the term 
“briefings” (which was 
unfamiliar to a number 
of respondents) and 
“medical error” (which 
several respondents 
associated only with 
doctors/medical 
interventions). 
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The Turkish 
version of the 
safety 
attitudes 
questionnaire: 
psychometric 
properties and 
baseline data 
Kaya, S., 
Barsbay, 
S., & 
Karabulu
t, E. 
(2010).  
Nurse input is well received in this clinical area  
 In this clinical area, it is difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with 
patient care (reversed scores presented=‘higher is better’)  
 Disagreements in this clinical area are appropriately resolved (ie, not who is 
right but what is best for the patient)  
 I have the support I need from other personnel to care for patients  
 It is easy for personnel in this clinical area to ask questions when there is 
something that they do not understand  
 The physicians and nurses here work together as a well-coordinated team  
Safety climate 
 I would feel safe being treated here as a patient  
 Medical errors are handled appropriately in this clinical area 
 I receive appropriate feedback about my performance  
 In this clinical area, it is difficult to discuss errors (reversed scores 
presented=‘higher is better’)  
 I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any patient safety concerns I may 
have.  
 The culture in this clinical area makes it easy to learn from the errors of others 
 I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding patient safety in this 
clinical area  
Job satisfaction 
 I like my job  
 Working in this hospital is like being part of a large family 
 This hospital is a good place to work  
 I am proud to work at this hospital  
 Morale in this clinical area is high 
Stress recognition 
 Fatigue impairs my performance during emergency situations (eg, emergency 
resuscitation, haemorrhaging)  
 When my workload becomes excessive, my performance is impaired  
 I am less effective at work when fatigued  
 I am more likely to make errors in tense or hostile situations 
Perceptions of management 
 Hospital administration supports my daily efforts 
 Hospital management does not knowingly compromise the safety of patients  
 The levels of staffing in this clinical area are sufficient to handle the number of 
patients  
 I am provided with adequate, timely information about events in the hospital 
that might affect my work 
Working conditions 
Composite scale 
reliability for the 
SAQ (0.89) was as 
strong as the SAQ 
reliability (0.90) 
found in the 
international 
benchmark 
data.22 Cronbach 
alphas for all factors 
were greater than 
0.60. 
The construct validity of 
the SAQ containing 30 
items, as judged by the 
goodness-of-fit indices 
from the CFA, was 
generally satisfactory. 
The p value of less than 
0.001 speaks against the 
fit of the model to the 
data, but the TLI (0.969) 
and CFI (0.974) 
exceeded the 
recommended cut-off 
values of 0.90, the 
RMSEA (0.069) was less 
than the critical value of 
0.08, and the SRMR 
(0.061) was below the 
suggested criteria of 
0.10. 
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 This hospital does a good job of training new personnel 
 All the necessary information for diagnostic and therapeutic decisions is 
routinely available to me  
 This hospital constructively deals with problem physicians and employees  
 Trainees in my discipline are adequately supervised 
Nordic Safety 
Climate questi
onnaire (NOS
ACQ-50): A 
new tool for 
diagnosing 
occupational 
safety climate. 
Kines, 
P., 
Lappalai
nen, J., 
Mikkelse
n, K. L., 
Olsen, 
E., 
Pousette, 
A., 
Tharalds
en, J., ... 
& 
Törner, 
M. 
(2011).  
Management accepts workers taking risks when the work schedule is tight 
We who work here have confidence in the management’s ability to deal with 
safety 
Management encourages workers to participate in decisions which affect their 
safety 
Management looks for causes, not guilty persons, when an accident occurs 
Workers’ perceptions of how they themselves relate to safety at work concerning 
if they generally: 
show commitment to safety and are active in promoting safety 
care for each others’ safety 
We who work here take no responsibility for each others’ safety 
Workers’ perceptions of how they themselves relate to safety at work concerning 
if they generally: 
prioritize safety before production goals 
do not resign to hazardous conditions or accept risk-taking 
do not show fearlessness 
We who work here accept dangerous behavior as long as there are no accidentsa  
Workers’ perceptions of how they themselves relate to safety at work concerning 
if they generally: 
discuss safety whenever such issues emerge and learn from experience 
help each other to work safely 
treat safety suggestions from each other seriously and try to work out solutions 
trust each others’ ability to ensure safety in everyday work 
We who work here can talk freely and openly about safety 
Workers’ perceptions of how they themselves relate to safety at work concerning 
if they in general: 
consider formal safety systems as effective, e.g. safety officers, safety 
representatives, safety committees, safety rounds 
see benefit in early planning 
see benefit in safety training 
see benefit in clear safety goals and objectives 
We who work here consider that safety rounds have no effect on safety 
Management safety 
priority, commitment 
and competence 0.87
  
Management safety 
empowerment 0.73
   
Management safety 
justice 0.71 
  
Workers’ safety 
commitment 0.77  
 
Workers’ safety 
priority and risk non-
acceptance 0.80  
 
Safety 
communication, 
learning, and trust in 
co-worker safety 
competence 0.79  
 
Workers’ trust in the 
efficacy of safety 
systems 0.82 
The CFA reported above 
supported the construct 
validity of the seven 
safety climate 
scales. Table 2 shows the 
inter-correlations 
between the scales. Even 
though the scales are 
highly related to each 
other, suggesting the 
possibility of a second 
order safety climate 
factor, all but one of the 
scales had a unique 
component. The 
exception was workers’ 
safety commitment, 
which was highly 
correlated with safety 
communication, learning 
and trust. 
As an indication of the 
criterion validity with 
regard to safety 
motivation and safety 
violations, the bivariate 
correlations between the 
seven safety climate 
variables and the two 
criterion variables were 
calculated 
Ranking of 
working shift 
groups in an 
Khandan, 
M., 
Maghsou
Its categories are (1) management commitment and actions for safety (shown as 
F1 in Table 2), (2) workers’ knowledge and compliance to safety (F2), (3) 
workers’ attitudes toward safety (F3), (4) workers’ participation and commitment 
Questionnaire's 
reliability assessed by 
N/A 
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Iranian 
petrochemical 
company 
using 
ELECTRE 
method based 
on safety 
climate 
assessment 
results 
dipour, 
M., & 
Vosough
i, S. 
(2011). 
to safety (F4), (5) safeness of work environment (F5), and (6) emergency 
preparedness in the organization (F6). 
Cronbach's alpha was 
0.928 
Safety Climate 
Survey: 
reliability of 
results from a 
multicenter 
ICU survey 
Kho, M. 
E., 
Carbone, 
J. M., 
Lucas, J., 
& Cook, 
D. J. 
(2005). 
1) The culture of this clinical area makes it easy to learn from the mistakes of 
others. 
(2) Medical errors are handled appropriately in this clinical area. 6 6 
(3) The senior leaders in my hospital listen to me and care about my concerns. 
(4) The physician and clinical leaders in my areas listen to me and care about my 
concerns. 
(5) Leadership is driving us to be a safety centered institution. 6 6 
(6) My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I expressed them to 
management. 
(7) Management/leadership does not knowingly compromise safety concerns for 
productivity. 
(8) I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any safety concerns 
I may have. 
(9) I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding patient safety. 
(10) I receive appropriate feedback about my performance.  
(11) I would feel safe being treated here as a patient.  
(12) Briefing personnel before the start of a shift is an important part of patient 
safety. (Briefing is defined as informal/formal communication regarding unit 
specifics, in order to plan for possible contingencies.) 
(13) Briefings are common here. 
(14) I am satisfied with the availability of physician clinical leadership.  
(15) I am satisfied with the availability of nursing clinical leadership.  
(16) I am satisfied with the availability of pharmacy clinical leadership.  
(17) I am satisfied with the availability of registered respiratory care 
practitioner clinical leadership 
(18) This institution is doing more for patient safety now than it did 
1 year ago. 
(19) I believe that most adverse events occur as a result of multiple system 
failures and are not attributable to one individual’s actions. 
(20) The personnel in this clinical area take responsibility for patient safety. 
Test-retest reliability 
analysis was 
evaluated on data 
from 31 respondents 
who completed the 
instrument in 
duplicate. Using the 
ICC, the test re-test 
reliability of the 
SCSu was 0.92 (95% 
CI 0.82 to 0.97) and 
of the SCSc was 0.92 
(95% CI 0.82 to 
0.96). 
Using Cronbach’s 
alpha, the internal 
consistency of the 
SCSu was 0.86, of 
the SCSc was 0.80, 
and 0.51 for the 
SCM. 
N/A 
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(21) Personnel frequently disregard rules or guidelines that are established for this 
clinical area. 
(22) Patient safety is constantly reinforced as the priority in this clinical area. 
(23) I am aware that patient safety has become a major area for improvement in 
this institution. 
Railway safety 
climate scales 
Miyachi, 
Murakos
hi, 
Akatsuka
, & 
Suzuki, 
2010 
Job responsibilities are clear 
The job strongly demands promptness 
Autonomous behavior is demanded 
High income/stable job prospects 
Etc. 
 
N/A N/A 
A brief safety 
climate 
inventory for 
petro-
maritime 
organizations 
Nielsen, 
M. B., 
Eid, J., 
Hystad, 
S. W., 
Sætrevik, 
B., & 
Saus, E. 
R. 
(2013).  
Individual intention and motivation 
1. I report any dangerous situations I see  
2. Safety is my number one priority when I work  
3. I ask my colleagues to stop work which I believe is performed in an unsafe 
manner  
4. I stop work if I believe that it may be dangerous for me or others to continue  
Management prioritization 
5. In practice, production takes priority over health, environment and safety  
6. Reports about accidents or dangerous situations are often ‘‘embellished’’  
7. There are often concurrent work operations which lead to dangerous situations  
8. Deficient maintenance has caused poorer safety 
Safety routines 
9. I have the necessary competence to perform my job in a safe manner  
10. I have easy access to personal protective equipment  
11. The management takes input from the safety delegates seriously 
The overall scale 
demonstrated strong 
internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s a = .94). 
This measure of 
authentic leadership 
has also been 
established as a valid 
and reliable 
instrument in other 
studies 
The concurrent and 
predictive validity of the 
safety climate scales 
were investigated by 
means of correlation 
analyses. Table 2 shows 
Pearson product-moment 
correlations between the 
safety climate scales and 
subjective risk 
perception, authentic 
leadership, and 
subjective health 
complaints. The 
predictive validity of the 
instrument was 
supported by meaningful 
correlations with validity 
indicators such as 
leadership, risk 
perception, health 
problems, and affective 
and attitudinal outcomes. 
Identifying 
and addressing 
the limitations 
of safety 
O'Conno
r, P., 
Buttrey, 
S. E., 
O'Dea, 
Item 18 — I am not comfortable reporting a safety violation, because people in 
my command would react negatively toward me;  Item 23 — Command leaders 
permit cutting corners to get a job done;  Item 24 — Lack of experienced 
personnel has adversely affected my command's ability to operate safely;  Item 
30 — My command has increased the chances of a mishap due to inadequate or 
N/A Given this fact, it was 
our original intention to 
conduct a confirmatory 
factor analysis in order to 
establish the construct 
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climate 
surveys 
A., & 
Kennedy, 
Q. 
(2011).  
incorrect risk assessment; and  Item 34 — Based upon my command's personnel 
and other assets, the command is over-committed. 
validity of the CSAS. 
Once a stable factor 
structure was established, 
researchers could begin 
to evaluate the predictive 
validity of the instrument 
or model the factor 
structure for comparison 
within and across 
industries. However, 
during the initial data 
screening process 
(described in this paper), 
it quickly became 
evident that there were 
some serious threat to the 
validity of the data 
collected using the 
instrument. 
Aviation 
safety climate 
questionnaire 
O’Conno
r, O’Dea, 
Kennedy, 
& 
Buttery, 
2011 
This paper reviews 23 studies that have examined safety climate within 
commercial and military aviation. The safety climate factors identified in the 
aviation safety climate questionnaires were found to be consistent with the 
literature examining safety climate in non-aviation high reliability organizations 
N/A Therefore, it was 
concluded that the 
aviation safety climate 
tools had some construct 
validity (the extent to 
which the questionnaire 
measures what it is 
intended to measure). 
However, the majority of 
the studies made no 
attempt to establish the 
discriminate validity (the 
ability of the tool to 
differentiate between 
organizations or 
personnel with different 
levels of safety 
performance) of the 
tools. It is recommended 
that rather than 
constructing more 
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aviation safety climate 
questionnaires, 
researchers should focus 
on establishing the 
construct and 
discriminate validity of 
existing measures by 
correlating safety climate 
with other metrics of 
safety performance 
Safety Climate 
Survey 
Sexton, 
J. B., 
Helmreic
h, R., 
Pronovos
t, P., & 
Thomas, 
E. 
(2003).  
1. The culture of this clinical area makes it easy to learn from the mistakes of 
others. 
2. Medical errors are handled appropriately in this clinical area. 
3. The senior leaders in my hospital listen to me and care about my concerns. 
4. The physician and nurse leaders in my areas listen to me and care about my 
concerns. 
5. Leadership is driving us to be a safety-centered institution. 
6. My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I expressed them to 
management. 
7. Management/leadership does not knowingly compromise safety concerns for 
productivity. 
8. I am encouraged by my colleagues to report any safety concerns I may have. 
9. I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding patient safety. 
10. I receive appropriate feedback about my performance. 
11. I would feel safe being treated here as a patient. 
12. Briefing personnel before the start of a shift (i.e., to plan for possible 
contingencies) is an important part of safety. 
13. Briefings are common here. 
14. I am satisfied with the availability of clinical leadership (please respond to all 
three): 
Physician 
Nursing 
Pharmacy 
15. This institution is doing more for patient safety now, than it did one year ago. 
16. I believe that most adverse events occur as a result of multiple system failures, 
and are not attributable to one individual’s actions. 
17. The personnel in this clinical area take responsibility for patient safety. 
18. Personnel frequently disregard rules or guidelines that are established for this 
clinical area. 
19. Patient safety is constantly reinforced as the priority in this clinical area 
N/A N/A 
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Workforce 
perceptions of 
hospital safety 
culture: 
development 
and validation 
of the 
patient safety 
climate in 
healthcare 
organizations 
survey 
Singer, 
S., 
Meterko, 
M., 
Baker, 
L., Gaba, 
D., 
Falwell, 
A., & 
Rosen, 
A. 
(2007).  
Senior management provides a climate that promotes patient 
safety 
Q8 Senior management has a clear picture of the risk associated 
with patient care 
Q19 Senior management considers patient safety when program 
changes are discussed 
Q11 Senior management has a good idea of the kinds of mistakes 
that actually occur in this facility 
Q17 Good communication flow exists up the chain of command 
regarding patient safety issues 
Q4 Patient safety decisions are made at the proper level by the 
most qualified people 
Q6 Reporting a patient safety problem will not result in negative 
repercussions for the persons reporting it 
Q1 I am provided with adequate resources (personnel, budget, 
and equipment) to provide safe patient care 
Q30 I have enough time to complete patient care tasks safely  
Q29 Loss of experienced personnel has negatively affected my 
ability to provide high-quality patient care  
Q38 Overall, the level of patient safety at this facility is improving  
Q22 Compared with other facilities in the area, this facility cares 
more about the quality of patient care it provides 
Q28 I am asked to cut corners to get the job done  
In my unit, disregarding policy and procedures is rare  
Q7 In my unit, anyone who intentionally violates standard 
procedures or safety rules is swiftly corrected 
Q12 My unit does a good job managing risks to ensure patient safety  
Q9 My unit takes the time to identify and assess risks to ensure 
patient safety 
Q2 My unit emphasizes patient safety procedures and goals to 
new hires in their first 6 months of work 
Q32 In my unit, there is significant peer pressure to discourage 
unsafe patient care 
Q27 Individuals in my unit are willing to report behavior that 
is unsafe for patient care 
Q35 I am rewarded for taking quick action to identify a serious 
mistake 
Q14 My unit recognizes individual safety achievement through 
rewards and incentives 
Q37 My unit provides training on teamwork in order to improve 
Cronbach’s a 
coefficients ranged 
from 0.50 to 0.89. 
Convergent item–scale 
correlations were 
substantial in magnitude, 
ranging from 0.20 to 
0.77 across the nine 
proposed dimensions 
(median 0.51).  
Examination of the 
correlations between 
each item and its 
hypothesized scale in 
contrast to other scales 
revealed good item 
discriminant validity. For 
example, the first row of 
Table 3 (Q5) shows a 
significantly higher 
correlation between the 
item and its hypothesized 
scale (0.77) in contrast to 
other scales (0.00–0.62). 
C 
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patient care performance and safety 
Q24 My unit follows a specific process to review performance 
against defined training goals 
Q13 If I make a mistake that has significant consequences and 
nobody notices, I do not tell anyone about it  
Q10 Asking for help is a sign of incompetence  
Q15 Telling others about my mistakes is embarrassing  
Q21 I will suffer negative consequences if I report a patient safety 
problem  
Q36 I have made significant errors in my work that I attribute to 
my own fatigue 
In the last year, I have witnessed a coworker do something 
that appeared to me to be unsafe for the patient  
Q33 I have never witnessed a coworker do something that 
appeared to me to be unsafe patient care 
Q34 In the last year, I have done something that was not safe for 
the patient  
Q18 I am less effective at work when I am fatigued 
Q20 Personal problems can adversely affect my performance  
Q23 I have learned how to do my own job better by learning 
about mistakes made by my coworkers 
Q26 If people find out that I made a mistake, I will be 
disciplined  
Q31 Clinicians who make serious mistakes are usually 
punished  
The 
development 
of a measure 
of safety 
climate: The 
role of safety 
perceptions 
and attitudes 
Williams
on, A. 
M., 
Feyer, A. 
M., 
Cairns, 
D., & 
Biancotti
, D. 
(1997). 
It would help me to work more safely if my supervisor praised me on safe 
behaviour 
It would help me to work more safely if safety procedures were more realistic 
It would help me to work more safely if management listened to my 
recommendations 
It would help me to work more safely if we were given safety training more often 
It would help me to work more safely if the proper equipment was provided more 
often 
It would help me to work more safely if management carried out more workplace 
safety checks 
It would help me to work more safely if my workmates supported safe behaviour 
It would help me to work more safely if I was rewarded (paid more) for safe 
behaviour 
Our management supplies enough safety equipment 
Our management checks equipment to make sure it is free of faults 
With all 62 items, the 
obtained Cronbach 
alpha was 0.81 (n = 
543) which was 
judged to be good. 
The relationship between 
the two validation 
questions was not strong. 
While study participants 
who reported no dangers 
in their workplace were 
less likely to have 
experienced an accident 
(29.5% accidents 
compared to 70.5% no 
accidents), the group 
who reported dangers in 
their workplace were 
equally likely to have 
experienced an accident 
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There is adequate safety training in my workplace 
Management in my workplace is as concerned with people’s safety as it is with 
profits 
Everybody works safely in my workplace 
All the safety rules and procedures in my workplace really work 
Safety works until we are busy then other things take priority 
If I worried about safety all the time I would not get my job done 
I cannot avoid taking risks in my job 
Accidents will happen no matter what 1 do 
I can’t do anything to improve safety in my workplace 
It is not likely that I will have an accident because I am a careful person 
Not all accidents are preventable, some people are just unlucky 
People who work to safety procedure will always be safe 
In the normal course of my job, I do not encounter any dangerous situations 
(48.0% accidents 
compared to 52.0% no 
accidents). 
Safety 
climate in 
industrial 
organizations: 
theoretical and 
applied 
implications. 
 
Zohar 
(1980) 
Based on the industrial safety literature described above, seven organizational 
dimensions were included in the initial version of the safety climate 
questionnaire. 
Factors: 
Perceived importance of safety training programs 
Perceived management attitudes toward safety 
Perceived effects of safe conduct on promotion 
Perceived level of risk at work place 
Perceived effects of required work pace on safety 
Perceived status of safety officer 
Perceived effects of safe conduct on social status 
Perceived status of safety committee 
An attempt to test the 
second hypothesis 
directly by 
correlating safety 
climate scores with 
standard safety 
measures such as 
accident-frequency 
rate and accident-
severity rate was 
terminated due to the 
apparent lack of 
reliability of these 
measures. This lack 
of reliability resulted 
from the fact that 
these measures were 
based on reports used 
for workers' 
compensation 
purposes. 
Workers were 
interviewed by a team of 
three interviewers who 
read each item aloud and 
recorded subjects' 
agreement to it on the 5-
point scale. These data 
were then factor 
analyzed using a 
principal-components 
factor analysis with 
varimax rotation. This 
procedure resulted in 
eight factors that largely 
overlapped the original 
ones, thus confirming the 
validity of the theoretical 
considerations for 
developing these 
questionnaire items. 
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Appendix J: Classification of Items based on Safety Climate Definition 
Items that fit Items that do not fit Uncertain 
I have the necessary competence to 
perform my job in a safe manner 
(Nielsen et al., 2013) 
Worker given sufficient training 
period when entering firm, 
changing jobs or using new 
technique (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 
2007) 
“Students” learn hazards, and how 
to protect themselves and others 
(Cappucci et al., 1997) 
 
Most of the job-specific safety 
trainings I receive are effective 
(Hon et al., 2012) 
Management supports my daily 
efforts (Devriend et al., 2012)  
My “department” follows a specific 
process to review performance 
against defined training goals 
(Singer et al., 2007) 
It would help me to work more 
safely if we were given safety 
training more often (Williamson et 
al., 1997) 
Management does not knowingly 
compromise patient safety: unit 
management and hospital 
management (Devriend et al., 2012) 
This hospital does a good job of 
training new personnel (Devriend et 
al., 2012) 
Our training program ensures all 
“students” who do the same job 
learn to do it the same way (Frazier 
et al., 2013) 
Management is doing a good job: 
unit management and hospital 
management (Devriend et al., 2012)  
 
All “students” can give examples of 
management's active commitment 
to safety and health (Cappucci et 
al., 1997) 
 
When asked to do a new job or 
task, I receive enough training to be 
able to do it safely (Frazier et al., 
2013) 
Problem personnel are dealt with 
constructively by our: unit 
management and hospital 
management (Devriend et al., 2012) 
 
I get adequate, timely info about 
events that might affect my work, 
from: unit management and hospital 
management (Devriend et al., 2012) 
 
There is follow-up of training needs 
and of efficacy or repercussion of 
training previously given 
(Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007) 
The staffing levels in this clinical 
area are sufficient to handle the 
number of patients (Devriend et al., 
2012) 
 
The “university” really cares about 
the health and safety of the people 
who work here (Hon et al., 2012) 
I tend to work more risky when 
supervisors aren't present. (Frazier 
et al., 2013) 
Hospital management does not 
knowingly compromise the safety 
of patients (Kaya et al., 2010) 
The “university” encourages 
suggestions on how to improve 
health and safety (Hon et al., 2012) 
I also wear all the individual safety 
protection equipment when nobody 
supervises my work (Wang & Liu, 
2012) 
The levels of staffing in this clinical 
area are sufficient to handle the 
number of patients (Kaya et al., 
2010) 
Management does not knowingly 
compromise the safety of patients 
(Hutchins, 2006) 
 
This “university” is doing more for 
“student” safety now than it did one 
year ago (Hutchins, 2006) 
I am provided with adequate, timely 
information about events in the 
hospital that might affect my work 
(Kaya et al., 2010) 
Leadership is driving us to be a 
safety centred organisation 
(Hutchins, 2006) 
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“Instructors” accepts “students” 
taking risks when the work 
schedule is tight (Kines et al., 2011) 
Hospital administration supports 
my daily efforts (Kaya et al., 2010) 
My suggestions about safety would 
be acted upon if I expressed them to 
“my instructor” (Hutchins, 2006) 
Management looks for causes, not 
guilty persons, when an accident 
occurs (Kines et al., 2011) 
The senior leaders in my hospital 
listen to me and care about my 
concerns (Kho et al., 2005) 
We who work here have confidence 
in the management’s ability to deal 
with safety (Kines et al., 2011) 
My suggestions about safety would 
be acted upon if I expressed them to 
management. (Kho et al., 2005) 
The physician and clinical leaders 
in my areas listen to me and care 
about my concerns. (Kho et al., 
2005) 
Management encourages “students” 
to participate in decisions which 
affect their safety (Kines et al., 
2011) 
Management/leadership does not 
knowingly compromise safety 
concerns for productivity. (Kho et 
al., 2005) 
Senior management has a clear 
picture of the risk associated with 
patient care (Singer et al., 2007) 
 
Leadership is driving us to be a 
safety centered institution. (Kho et 
al., 2005) 
Senior management has a good idea 
of the kinds of mistakes that 
actually occur in this facility 
(Singer et al., 2007) 
Senior management considers 
patient safety when program 
changes are discussed (Singer et al., 
2007) 
The management takes input from 
the safety delegates seriously 
(Nielsen et al., 2013) 
It would help me to work more 
safely if management listened to 
my recommendations (Williamson 
et al., 1997) 
I know the proper channels to direct 
questions regarding patient safety in 
this clinical area (Devriend et al., 
2012) 
“Instructors” permit cutting corners 
to get a job done (O’Connor et al., 
2011) 
 
In my “department” management 
acts quickly to correct safety 
problems (Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
I know the proper channels to 
which I should direct questions 
regarding patient safety (Hutchins 
2006) 
Management acts decisively when a 
safety concern is raised (Cox & 
Cheyne, 2000) 
In my “department” management 
turn a blind eye to safety issues 
(Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
Briefing personnel before the start 
of a shift is an important part of 
patient safety. (Kho et al., 2005) 
Management acts only after 
accidents have occurred (Cox & 
Cheyne, 2000) 
Corrective action is always taken 
when management is told about 
unsafe practices (Cox & Cheyne, 
2000) 
Things "fall between the cracks" 
when transferring patients from one 
unit to another (Smits et al., 2008) 
It is easy for “students” here to ask 
questions when there is something 
that they do not understand 
(Devriend et al., 2012) 
In my “department” “instructors” 
show interest in my safety (Cox & 
Cheyne, 2000) 
Problems often occur in the 
exchange of information across 
hospital units (Smits et al., 2008) 
We who work here can talk freely 
and openly about safety (Kines et 
al., 2011) 
“Instructors” and supervisors 
express concern if safety 
procedures are not adhered (Cox & 
Cheyne, 2000) 
My unit emphasizes patient safety 
procedures and goals to new hires 
in their first 6 months of work 
(Singer et al., 2007) 
Safety decisions are made at the 
proper level by the most qualified 
people (Singer et al., 2007) 
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There is good communication here 
between “instructors” and 
“students” about health and safety 
issues (Hon et al., 2012) 
Standard operating procedures have 
been developed for all critical tasks 
(Frazier et al., 2013) 
Management operates an open door 
policy on safety issues (Cox & 
Cheyne, 2000) 
Good communication flow exists 
up the chain of command regarding 
safety issues (Singer et al., 2007) 
Firm coordinates its health and 
safety policies with other HR 
policies to ensure commitment and 
well-being of workers (Fernandez-
Muniz et al., 2007) 
Lessons learned from incidents and 
injuries are communicated to all 
relevant people. (Frazier et al., 
2013) 
Management clearly considers the 
safety of “students” of great 
importance (Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
Written declaration is available to 
all workers reflecting management's 
concern for safety, principles of 
action and objectives to achieve 
(Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007) 
People who work to safety 
procedure will always be safe 
(Williamson et al., 1997) 
There is good communication here 
about safety issues which affect me 
(Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
Management has established in 
writing the functions of 
commitment and participation and 
the responsibilities in safety 
questions for all organization 
members (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 
2007) 
Sometimes it is necessary to depart 
from safety requirements for 
production's sake (Cox & Cheyne, 
2000) 
Safety information is always 
brought to my attention by my 
“instructor” (Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
Safety policy contains commitment 
to continuous improvement, 
attempting to improve objectives 
already achieved (Fernandez-Muniz 
et al., 2007) 
I do not simplify any standard 
operation procedure because of 
being familiar with the operation of 
any equipment (Wang & Liu, 2012) 
My “instructor” does not always 
inform me of current concerns and 
issues (Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
In this clinical area, it is difficult to 
speak up if I perceive a problem 
with patient care (Devriend et al., 
2012) 
My suggestions about safety would 
be acted upon if I expressed them to 
management (Devriend et al., 2012) 
 
When rules or procedures are 
changed, the changes are promptly 
communicated to all affected 
“students” (Frazier et al., 2013) 
In this clinical area, it is difficult to 
discuss errors (Devriend et al., 
2012) 
I am not comfortable reporting a 
safety violation, because people in 
my command would react 
negatively toward me (O’Connor et 
al., 2011) 
My “department” values in the 
“students” correct observation of 
safety rules and procedures 
(Arghami et al., 2013) 
When a mistake is made, but has no 
potential to harm the patient, how 
often is this reported? (Smits et al., 
2008) 
Reports about accidents or 
dangerous situations are often 
‘‘embellished’’ (Nielsen et al., 
2013) 
“Students” can explain, and fully 
embraces, health and safety policy 
(Cappucci et al., 1997) 
When a mistake is made that could 
harm the patient, but does not, how 
often is this reported? (Smits et al., 
2008) 
Telling others about my mistakes is 
embarrassing (Singer et al., 2007) 
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Not all the health and safety rules 
or procedures are strictly followed 
here (Hon et al., 2012) 
When a mistake is made, but is 
caught and corrected before 
affecting the patient, how often is 
this reported? (Smits et al., 2008) 
“Students” feel free to report safety 
hazards (Colarossi, 2012) 
 
Some health and safety rules or 
procedures are difficult to follow 
(Hon et al., 2012) 
In addition to corrective action, 
regular safety surveys result in 
updated hazard inventories 
(Cappucci et al., 1997) 
I think management here does 
enough to follow up on 
recommendations from safety 
inspection and accident 
investigation reports (Hon et al., 
2012) 
In my “department”, disregarding 
policy and procedures is rare 
(Singer et al., 2007) 
Employees have had input to the 
hazard analysis for their jobs 
(Cappucci et al., 1997) 
Accident investigations are mainly 
used to identify who should be 
blamed (Hon et al., 2012) 
It would help me to work more 
safely if safety procedures were 
more realistic (Williamson et al., 
1997) 
Well trained employees at all levels 
conduct frequent and varied 
inspections, hazards of any kind are 
rare (Cappucci et al., 1997) 
All incidents, even minor ones, are 
thoroughly investigated if they have 
potential for serious injury. (Frazier 
et al., 2013) 
All the safety rules and procedures 
in my “department” really work 
(Williamson et al., 1997) 
All loss-producing incidents and 
"near misses" are investigated for 
root cause with effective prevention 
(Cappucci et al., 1997)  
All factors (e.g., inadequate 
training, production pressure, 
excessive overtime) are adequately 
considered during incident analyses 
(Frazier et al., 2013) 
Safety procedures are carefully 
followed (Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
Our levels of staffing are sufficient 
to handle the number of patients 
(Goras et al., 2013) 
“Instructors” regularly visit 
workplace to check work conditions 
or to communicate with “students” 
(Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007) 
Some safety rules and procedures 
do not need to be followed to get 
the job done safely (Cox & Cheyne, 
2000) 
Medical equipment in the ORs here 
is adequate (Goras et al., 2013) 
 
I am less effective at work when 
fatigued (Kaya et al., 2010) 
Some health and safety rules and 
procedures are not really practical 
(Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
I am satisfied with the availability 
of physician clinical leadership. 
(Kho et al., 2005) 
Safety is considered when 
purchasing new tools/equipment 
(Frazier et al., 2013) 
When people ignore safety 
procedures here, I feel it is none of 
my business (Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
I am satisfied with the availability 
of nursing clinical leadership. (Kho 
et al., 2005) 
The people who lead safety efforts 
(e.g., safety reps, safety managers) 
have enough influence and staffing 
to adequately support safety. 
(Frazier et al., 2013) 
Safety is considered when changes 
are made to rules and procedures 
(Frazier et al., 2013) 
I am satisfied with the availability 
of pharmacy clinical leadership. 
(Kho et al., 2005) 
We have enough staff to handle the 
workload (Smits et al., 2008) 
“Students” feel comfortable 
identifying and self-correcting 
hazards (Cappucci et al., 1997) 
I am satisfied with the availability 
of registered respiratory care 
We work in "crisis mode" trying to 
do too much, too quickly (Smits et 
al., 2008) 
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practitioner clinical leadership (Kho 
et al., 2005) 
I am encouraged by my “fellow 
students” to report any safety 
concerns I may have (Devriend et 
al., 2012) 
Lack of experienced personnel has 
adversely affected my command's 
ability to operate safely (O’Connor 
et al., 2011) 
Deficient maintenance has caused 
poorer safety (Nielsen et al., 2013) 
Accidents that happen here are 
always reported (Hon et al., 2012) 
Based upon my command's 
personnel and other assets, the 
command is over-committed 
(O’Connor et al., 2011) 
All personnel have ownership of 
safety and health and can describe 
their active roles (Cappucci et al., 
1997) 
Supervisors sometimes turn a blind 
eye to people who are not observing 
the health and safety procedures 
(Hon et al., 2012) 
I am provided with adequate 
resources (personnel, budget, and 
equipment) to provide safe patient 
care (Singer et al., 2007) 
Employees are involved in 
conducting safety audits and 
inspections. (Frazier et al., 2013) 
 
Reporting a safety problem will not 
result in negative repercussions for 
the persons reporting it (Singer et 
al., 2007) 
I have enough time to complete 
patient care tasks safely (Singer et 
al., 2007) 
Employees involved in creating 
guidelines for procedures and 
instruction manuals (Fernandez-
Muniz et al., 2007) 
I report any dangerous situations I 
see (Nielsen et al., 2013) 
Loss of experienced personnel has 
negatively affected my ability to 
provide high-quality patient care 
(Singer et al., 2007) 
Employees participate actively in 
devising, executing and monitoring 
safety plans (Fernandez-Muniz et 
al., 2007) 
If I make a mistake that has 
significant consequences and 
nobody notices, I do not tell anyone 
about it  (Singer et al., 2007) 
The levels of staffing where I work 
are sufficient to handle the number 
of patients (Hutchins, 2006) 
Colleagues participate in the setting 
of safety policy (Wu et al., 2010) 
Trainees in my discipline are 
adequately supervised (Kaya et al., 
2010) 
Fatigue impairs my performance 
during emergency situations (eg, 
emergency resuscitation, 
haemorrhaging) (Kaya et al., 2010) 
Employees are encouraged to fix 
safety hazards (Colarossi, 2012) 
Sometimes conditions here hinder 
my ability to work safely (Cox & 
Cheyne, 2000) 
Shift changes are problematic for 
patients in this hospital (Smits et 
al., 2008) 
I am never involved in the ongoing 
review of safety (Cox & Cheyne, 
2000) 
All personnel believe they have the 
necessary resources to meet their 
responsibilities (Cappucci et al., 
1997) 
Important patient care information 
is often lost during shift changes 
(Smits et al., 2008) 
Staff feel free to question the 
decisions or actions of those with 
more authority (Smits et al., 2008) 
I have easy access to personal 
protective equipment (Nielsen et 
al., 2013) 
Staff in this unit work longer hours 
than is best for patient care (Smits 
et al., 2008)  
The culture where I work makes it 
easy to learn from the errors of 
others (Hutchins, 2006) 
It would help me to work more 
safely if the proper equipment was 
We use more agency/temporary 
staff than is best for patient care 
(Smits et al., 2008) 
My “department” recognizes 
individual safety achievement 
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provided more often (Williamson et 
al., 1997) 
through rewards and incentives 
(Singer et al., 2007) 
Our management supplies enough 
safety equipment (Williamson et 
al., 1997) 
My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety (Smits et 
al., 2008) 
If people find out that I made a 
mistake, I will be disciplined 
(Singer et al., 2007) 
Our management checks equipment 
to make sure it is free of faults 
(Williamson et al., 1997) 
Clinicians who make serious 
mistakes are usually punished 
(Singer et al., 2007) 
Discipline for safety violations is 
fair and consistent. (Frazier et al., 
2013) 
When my workload becomes 
excessive, my performance is 
impaired (Kaya et al., 2010) 
Managers, supervisors, and 
employees all know what behaviors 
will result in discipline. (Frazier et 
al., 2013) 
Our safety reward/recognition 
program(s) encourage “students” to 
work safely and participate in 
safety activities.  (Frazier et al., 
2013) 
Sometimes I am not given enough 
time to get the job done safely (Cox 
& Cheyne, 2000) 
We are given feedback about 
changes put into place based on 
event reports (Smit et al., 2008) 
Incentives frequently offered to 
workers to put in practice principles 
and procedures of action (e.g., 
correct use of protective 
equipment). (Fernandez-Muniz et 
al., 2007) 
There are always enough people 
available to get the job done safely 
(Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
Patient safety is constantly 
reinforced as the priority in this 
clinical area. (Kho et al., 2005) 
When an event is reported, it feels 
like the person is being written up, 
not the problem (Smit et al., 2008) 
I cannot always get the equipment I 
need to do the job safely (Cox & 
Cheyne, 2000) 
There are often concurrent work 
operations which lead to dangerous 
situations (Nielsen et al., 2013) 
“Students” feel like their mistakes 
are held against them (Smit et al., 
2008) 
Employees frequently offer ideas 
and suggestions to improve safety 
(Frazier et al., 2013) 
Management in my workplace is as 
concerned with people’s safety as it 
is with profits (Williamson et al., 
1997) 
Sometimes it is necessary to take 
risks to get the job done (Hon et al., 
2012) 
Employees provide written 
suggestions in event of any 
deficiencies in working conditions 
(Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007) 
Safety is not compromised when 
determining production schedules, 
overtime, and staffing (Frazier et 
al., 2013) 
Little is done to prevent accidents 
until someone gets injured (Hon et 
al., 2012) 
Colleagues contribute to decisions 
to improve safety (Wu et al., 2010) 
The actions of hospital management 
show that patient safety is a top 
priority (Smit et al., 2008) 
I am aware that safety has become a 
major area for improvement in this 
institution. (Kho et al., 2005) 
I only get involved in safety 
activities because I'm required to do 
so. (Frazier et al., 2013) 
Hospital management seems 
interested in patient safety only 
after an adverse event happens 
(Smit et al., 2008) 
Safety is my number one priority 
when I work (Nielsen et al., 2013) 
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I receive appropriate feedback 
about my performance (Hutchins, 
2006) 
Patient safety is never sacrificed to 
get more work done (Smit et al., 
2008) 
In practice, production takes 
priority over health, environment 
and safety (Nielsen et al., 2013) 
“Students” are praised for working 
safely (Hon et al., 2012) 
Life safety and physical health are 
priceless (Wang & Liu, 2012) 
If I worried about safety all the time 
I would not get my job done 
(Williamson et al., 1997) 
In my unit, there is significant peer 
pressure to discourage unsafe 
“practices” (Singer et al., 2007) 
Medical errors are handled 
appropriately here (Hutchins, 2006) 
Safety is not sacrificed for 
production during a job (Colarossi, 
2012) 
I am rewarded for taking quick 
action to identify a serious mistake 
(Singer et al., 2007) 
Asking for help is a sign of 
incompetence (Singer et al., 2007) 
Safety is more important than 
productivity (Colarossi, 2012) 
It would help me to work more 
safely if my supervisor praised me 
on safe behaviour (Williamson et 
al., 1997) 
When one area in this unit gets 
really busy, others help out (Smits 
et al., 2008) 
Management considers safety to be 
equally as important as production 
(Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
I do not receive praise for working 
safely (Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
In this unit, people treat each other 
with respect (Smits et al., 2008) 
“The Department” provides a work 
climate that promotes safety (Smit 
et al., 2008) 
A no-blame approach is used to 
persuade people acting unsafely 
that their behaviour is inappropriate 
(Cox & Cheyne, 2000) 
I will remind my colleagues about 
rectification when they violate 
safety rules (Wang & Liu, 2012)  
Safety at work is as important as 
safety at home (Colarossi, 2012) 
My supervisor often gives me 
positive feedback when s/he sees 
me working safely (Frazier et al., 
2013) 
I would feel safe being treated as a 
patient in this service (Hutchins, 
2006)  
I think safety is the responsibility of 
not only safety management 
personnel but also everybody 
(Wang & Liu, 2012) 
My supervisor/manager says a good 
word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established safety 
procedures (Smit et al., 2008) 
I am more likely to make errors in 
tense or hostile situations (Kaya et 
al., 2010) 
My “department” does a good job 
managing risks to ensure safety 
(Singer et al., 2007) 
Some of the “students” pay little 
attention to health and safety (Hon 
et al., 2012) 
Mistakes have led to positive 
changes here (Smits et al., 2008) 
My “department” takes the time to 
identify and assess risks to ensure 
safety (Singer et al., 2007) 
We who work here take no 
responsibility for each others’ 
safety (Kines et al., 2011) 
All colleagues understand 
emergency response plans (Wu et 
al., 2010) 
Accidents will happen no matter 
what 1 do (Williamson et al., 1997) 
We who work here accept 
dangerous behavior as long as there 
are no accidents (Kines et al., 2011) 
All colleagues understand 
emergency first aid (Wu et al., 
2010) 
There are systems in place to 
evaluate risks detected in all job 
positions. (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 
2007) 
I ask my colleagues to stop work 
which I believe is performed in an 
Colleagues often fall from high 
places at work (Wu et al., 2010) 
When a lot of work needs to be 
done quickly, we work together as a 
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unsafe manner (Nielsen et al., 
2013) 
team to get the work done (Smits et 
al., 2008) 
I stop work if I believe that it may 
be dangerous for me or others to 
continue (Nielsen et al., 2013) 
Colleagues regularly receive health 
checks (Wu et al., 2010) 
I will not actively teach my 
colleagues when they do not 
understand safety operation 
procedures (Wang & Liu, 2012) 
Safety works until we are busy then 
other things take priority 
(Williamson et al., 1997) 
Everybody works safely in my 
workplace (Williamson et al., 1997) 
In the last year, I have witnessed a 
co-worker do something that 
appeared to me to be unsafe (Singer 
et al., 2007) 
Safety is not sacrificed for speed 
during a job (Colarossi, 2012) 
 
 I have never witnessed a co-worker 
do something that appeared to me 
to be unsafe (Singer et al., 2007) 
Safety is not sacrificed for quality 
during a job (Colarossi, 2012) 
 In the last year, I have done 
something that was not safe (Singer 
et al., 2007) 
The most important part of 
completing a job is being safe 
(Colarossi, 2012) 
 Not all accidents are preventable, 
some people are just unlucky 
(Williamson et al., 1997) 
I believe that safety issues are not 
assigned a high priority (Cox & 
Cheyne, 2000) 
 After we make changes to improve 
safety, we evaluate their 
effectiveness (Smits et al., 2008) 
I do not skip any safety step even 
for increasing work efficiency 
(Wang & Liu, 2012) 
 We are actively doing things to 
improve safety (Smits et al., 2008) 
I cannot avoid taking risks in my 
job (Williamson et al., 1997) 
 Colleagues often fall or slip at work 
(Wu et al., 2010) 
My coworkers look out for my 
safety (Colarossi, 2012) 
 Colleagues often cut themselves 
with equipment at work (Wu et al., 
2010) 
When I see a co-worker working at-
risk, I caution him/her. (Frazier et 
al., 2013) 
 Colleagues often receive electric 
shocks at work (Wu et al., 2010) 
Some jobs here are difficult to do 
safely (Hon et al., 2012) 
  
I pride myself on my ability to 
work safely (Colarossi, 2012) 
  
I hope to be known as a safe worker 
(Colarossi, 2012) 
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Appendix K: Safety Policies Subscale Item Analysis 
    Frequency and (Percentage)  
Items Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Omitted 
Alpha 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1. When safety rules or procedures are 
changed, the changes are promptly 
communicated to all affected students. 
3.60 1.23 .781 2 (1) 23 (9) 46 (18) 122 (47) 51 (20) .551** 
2. My college values students’ correct 
observation of safety rules and procedures.  
4.14 .74 .788 - 7 (3) 23 (9) 150 (58) 77 (30) .437** 
3. Students can explain health and safety 
policies in the College. 
3.07 1.07 .785 10 (4) 44 (17) 106 (41) 74 (29) 16 (6) .487** 
4. Not all the health and safety rules or 
procedures are strictly followed here. 
3.11 1.20 .786 8 (3) 64 (25) 65 (25) 85 (33) 26 (10) .501** 
5. Some health and safety rules or 
procedures are difficult to follow. 
3.10 1.27 .777 8 (3) 47 (18) 70 (27) 92 (36) 24 (9) .589** 
6. In my college, disregarding safety 
policies and procedures is rare. 
3.57 1.21 .777 5 (2) 25 (10) 43 (17) 128 (50) 45 (17) .585** 
7. It would help students to work more 
safely if safety procedures were more 
realistic. 
2.76 1.23 .791 22 (9) 59 (23) 91 (35) 55 (21) 16 (6) .451** 
8. All the safety rules and procedures in my 
college really work. 
3.33 1.22 .769 1 (1) 20 (8) 72 (28) 124 (48) 21 (8) .666** 
9. Safety procedures are carefully followed. 3.52 1.05 .768 4 (2) 18 (7) 66 (26) 135 (52) 26 (10) .688** 
10. Some safety rules and procedures do 
not need to be followed to get the task done 
safely. 
2.94 1.17 .795 15 (6) 71 (28) 74 (29) 71 (28) 19 (7) .389** 
11. Some health and safety rules and 
procedures are not really practical. 
2.77 1.22 .781 11 (4) 73 (28) 72 (28) 74 (29) 9 (4) .549** 
12. Safety is considered when changes are 
made to rules and procedures. 
3.59 1.35 .792 1 (1) 6 (2) 34 (13) 150 (58) 42 (16) .466** 
13. Safety is not sacrificed for speed during 
a task. 
3.66 1.05 .784 3 (1) 36 (14) 44 (17) 123 (48) 49 (19) .505** 
14. Safety is not sacrificed for quality 
during a task. 
3.76 .95 .785 2 (1) 18 (7) 47 (18) 143 (55) 44 (17) .481** 
  
 
   
1
5
3
 
Appendix L: Safety Training Subscale Item Analysis 
    Frequency and (Percentage)  
Items Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Omitted 
Alpha 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1. Students have the necessary competence 
to perform tasks in a safe manner because 
of the safety training they have received.  
3.71 .936 .681 4 (2) 23 (9) 48 (19) 142 (55) 39 (15) .712** 
2. Most of the safety training students 
receive is effective.  
3.67 .960 .688 2 (1) 23 (9) 53 (21) 139 (54) 37 (14) .696** 
3. It would help students to work more 
safely if we received more frequent safety 
training. 
2.73 1.10 .743 32 (12) 82 (32) 70 (27) 62 (24) 10 (4) .583** 
4. It would help students to work more 
safely if we were given better quality safety 
training. 
2.52 1.05 .712 39 (15) 87 (34) 81 (31) 41 (16) 6 (2) .648** 
5. Our safety training program ensures all 
students who do the same task learn to do it 
the same safe way.  
3.53 .995 .711 1 (1) 19 (7) 73 (28) 132 (51) 25 (10) .639** 
6. When asked to do a new job or task, 
students receive enough training to be able 
to do it safely. 
3.70 .926 .685 1 (1) 20 (8) 55 (21) 142 (55) 36 (14) .702** 
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Appendix M: Safety Communication Subscale Item Analysis 
    Frequency and (Percentage)  
Items Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Omitted 
Alpha 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1. Students are recognized for working 
safely.  
2.81 1.00 .648 15 (6) 85 (33) 90 (35) 55 (21) 10 (4) .402** 
2. Reporting a safety problem will not 
result in negative repercussions for the 
persons reporting it.  
1.89 .94 .674 50 (19) 139 (54) 35 (14) 11 (4) 2 (1) .191** 
3. Students are rewarded for taking quick 
action to identify a safety problem.  
2.71 1.38 .602 7 (3) 47 (18) 90 (35) 66 (26) 13 (5) .661** 
4. It would help students to work more 
safely if the instructors recognized and 
praised our safe behaviour.  
2.47 .97 .677 27 (11) 118 (46) 73 (28) 29 (11) 8 (3) .172** 
5. Students are not blamed for acting 
unsafely. 
2.40 1.04 .668 16 (6) 110 (43) 79 (31) 33 (13) 3 (1) .266** 
6. If students violate safety regulations they 
will be disciplined.  
2.83 1.52 .644 6 (2) 30 (12) 62 (24) 103 (40) 13 (5) .500** 
7. Students are not comfortable reporting a 
safety violation, because they will be 
disciplined.  
3.03 1.50 .637 2 (1) 32 (12) 56 (22) 107 (42) 24 (9) .526** 
8. Students’ suggestions about safety would 
be acted upon if they expressed them to the 
instructors. 
3.33 1.30 .619 1 (1) 9 (4) 66 (26) 137 (53) 19 (7) .587** 
9. There is good communication in the 
College between instructors and students 
about health and safety issues. 
3.31 1.10 .622 9 (4) 25 (10) 78 (30) 120 (47) 16 (6) .570** 
10. Safety information is always brought to 
our attention by our instructor. 
3.79 .88 .647 2 (1) 18 (7) 47 (18) 147 (57) 42 (16) .405** 
11. Our instructor does not always inform 
us of current safety concerns and issues. 
3.41 1.00 .662 5 (2) 39 (15) 73 (28) 113 (44) 25 (10) .300** 
12. Students frequently offer ideas and 
suggestions to improve safety. 
2.42 1.02 .634 19 (7) 108 (42) 81 (31) 34 (13) 2 (1) .500** 
13. Accidents that happen here are always 
reported and discussed. 
2.43 1.57 .632 6 (2) 44 (17) 71 (28) 66 (26) 11 (4) .556** 
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Appendix N: Attitudes about Instructors Subscale Item Analysis 
    Frequency and (Percentage)  
Items Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Omitted 
Alpha 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1. In my college, the instructor acts quickly 
to correct safety problems.  
3.53 1.23 .767 1 (1) 7 (3) 45 (17) 159 (62) 25 (10) .616** 
2. Corrective action is always taken when 
the college is told about unsafe practices.  
3.22 1.58 .771 - 6 (2) 39 (15) 142 (55) 27 (11) .644** 
3. In my college, instructors pay serious 
attention to the safety of students.  
3.82 .925 .765 1 (1) 7 (3) 40 (16) 164 (64) 39 (15) .628** 
4. Instructors and supervisors express 
concern if safety procedures are not 
adhered to.  
3.74 1.05 .760 1 (1) 8 (3) 34 (13) 169 (66) 34 (13) .655** 
5. The college clearly considers the safety 
of students of great importance.  
4.03 .846 .765 1 (1) 4 (2) 30 (12) 154 (60) 65 (25) .634** 
6. Instructors sometimes turn a blind eye to 
people who are not observing the health and 
safety procedures.  
3.46 1.18 .772 5 (2) 28 (11) 53 (21) 128 (50) 32 (12) .579** 
7. Our college supplies enough safety 
equipment. 
3.60 1.03 .764 7 (3) 27 (11) 46 (18) 140 (54) 34 (13) .630** 
8. Our college checks equipment to make 
sure it is free of faults.  
2.73 1.70 .794 7 (3) 22 (9) 53 (21) 95 (37) 23 (9) .561** 
9. Sometimes conditions here hinder my 
ability to work safely.  
3.62 1.01 .779 6 (2) 26 (10) 43 (17) 147 (57) 32 (12) .499** 
10. I cannot always get the equipment I 
need to do the task safely. 
3.59 1.08 .770 3 (1) 33 (13) 36 (14) 145 (56) 34 (13) .582** 
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Appendix O: Attitudes about Fellow Students Subscale Item Analysis 
    Frequency and (Percentage)  
Items Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Omitted 
Alpha 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1. I am encouraged by my fellow students 
to report any safety concerns I may have.  
3.18 .935 .547 5 (2) 45 (17) 99 (38) 96 (37) 9 (4) .603** 
2. Students take no responsibility for each 
other’s safety.  
3.66 .837 .586 2 (1) 22 (9) 51 (20) 160 (62) 21 (8) .485** 
3. I ask my fellow students to stop work 
which I believe is performed in an unsafe 
manner.  
3.62 .843 .548 - 20 (8) 58 (23) 159 (62) 17 (7) .592** 
4. My fellow students look out for my 
safety.  
3.60 .891 .530 1 (1) 14 (5) 67 (26) 152 (59) 18 (7) .638** 
5. When I see a fellow student working at-
risk, I caution him or her.  
3.90 .749 .542 - 6 (2) 29 (11) 189 (73) 30 (12) .607** 
6. In my college, there is significant peer 
pressure to discourage unsafe practices.  
2.91 1.12 .614 13 (5) 59 (23) 92 (36) 72 (28) 11 (4) .501** 
7. Students and instructors accept safety 
violations as long as there are no accidents.  
3.29 1.27 .641 - 32 (12) 59 (23) 123 (48) 23 (9) .505** 
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Appendix P: Reflections on One’s Own Safety Attitudes Subscale Item Analysis 
    Frequency and (Percentage)  
Items Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Omitted 
Alpha 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1. I tend to take more risks in my tasks 
when instructors aren't present.  
3.33 1.06 .775 2 (1) 53 (21) 39 (15) 98 (38) 20 (8) .547** 
2. If I make a mistake that has 
significant safety consequences and 
nobody notices, I do not tell anyone 
about it.  
3.36 1.11 .766 1 (1) 38 (15) 53 (21) 93 (36) 23 (9) .623** 
3. I believe the most important part of 
completing a task is being safe.  
3.79 .967 .770 - 22 (9) 42 (16) 101 (39) 48 (19) .575** 
4. I believe that safety issues are not 
assigned a high priority in my College.  
3.54 1.11 .777 5 (2) 23 (9) 44 (17) 106 (41) 31 (12) .538** 
5. I do not skip any safety step even to 
increase work efficiency.  
3.39 .989 .763 2 (1) 37 (14) 57 (22) 98 (38) 18 (7) .641** 
6. I cannot avoid taking risks in my 
College. 
3.43 1.13 .786 4 (2) 33 (13) 49 (19) 94 (36) 29 (11) .468** 
7. I believe some tasks here are difficult 
to do safely.  
3.51 1.02 .780 1 (1) 40 (16) 42 (16) 101 (39) 29 (11) .496** 
8. I pride myself on my ability to work 
safely.  
3.79 .836 .769 - 14 (5) 50 (19) 113 (44) 37 (14) .589** 
9. I hope to be known as a safe worker.  4.07 .736 .768 - 4 (2) 29 (11) 125 (48) 56 (22) .610** 
10. I only get involved in safety 
activities because I'm required to do so.  
3.04 1.09 .792 16 (6) 56 (22) 57 (22) 71 (28) 14 (5) .409** 
11. When people ignore safety 
procedures here, I feel it is none of my 
business. 
3.55 .862 .760 - 22 (9) 63 (24) 109 (42) 19 (7) .668** 
12. I practice the safety attitudes and 
behaviors I have learned in the College 
of Engineering in other contexts (i.e., 
home, work). 
3.62 .996 .777 5 (2) 18 (7) 48 (19) 111 (43) 30 (12) .522** 
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Appendix Q: Safety Climate Distribution Table 
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Appendix R: Safety Climate Questionnaire 
 
 
Participant Consent Form  
   
You are invited to participate in a research study entitled:       
 Culture and Climate of Safety in Organizations: Conceptualization and Assessment 
(BEH 16-204).   
 
Researcher: Melanie Kaczur, Graduate Student, Applied Social Psychology, University of 
Saskatchewan, mek498@mail.usask.ca  
 
Supervisor: Dr. Valery Chirkov, Applied Social Psychology, v.chirkov@usask.ca  
 
Purpose and Objective of the Research:  
The objectives of this study are to (1) gain a better understanding of the concept of safety climate 
and (2) to develop and test a safety climate questionnaire using participants from the College of 
Engineering.  
The first set of questions you complete are intended to gather information about the current 
injury and accident rates you have experienced in the College of Engineering (including 
laboratories and other facilities), as this information is necessary to the further development of 
the questionnaire. This information about injuries and accidents will be kept strictly confidential. 
The next set of questions will be used to determine your perception and opinions about some of 
the safety practices and issues in the College of Engineering. The present study will help create a 
valid and reliable measure of safety climate that can be used by industry members to predict and 
prevent accidents. The combined results will be presented in academic journals and conference 
presentations. 
Procedures:  
 The first part of the questionnaire will ask questions about the number of injuries and 
accidents you have experienced. The following questions will ask about your safety 
perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors at the College of Engineering.  
 Once you have completed the paper survey please place the questionnaire in the envelope 
provided to you. 
 Upon completion of the questionnaire you will be provided with a Debriefing Form that 
will provide you with the contact information of the researchers if you have further 
questions. Please feel free to ask any questions regarding the procedures and goals of the 
study or your role. 
 
Funded by: Funding for this project has been received from the Tri-Council SSHRC. 
 
Potential Risks:  
 There are no known or anticipated risks to you by participating in this research. 
 You only need to answer questions that you are comfortable with, but try to answer all of 
them as incomplete data will not allow us to use your responses.  
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Confidentiality:  
 Your data are completely confidential and no personally identifying information will be 
linked to your data. All data will be reported in aggregated form only. The data will be 
stored securely in electronic or hard-copy form in a secure laboratory at the University of 
Saskatchewan for a minimum of five years after completion of the study. When the data 
is no longer required, it will be permanently deleted and the questionnaires will be 
destroyed beyond recovery.  
 
Right to Withdraw:  
 Your participation is voluntary and you can answer only those questions with which you 
are comfortable.  You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any time 
without explanation or penalty of any sort. Your right to withdraw data from the study 
will apply until surveys have been collected. After this time, it is not be possible to 
withdraw your data as it does not have any identifying information on it. At that point 
you will also be provided with a debriefing form. 
 Whether you choose to participate or not will have no effect on your employment or class 
standing or how you will be treated. 
 
Follow up:  
 To obtain results from the study, please contact graduate researcher Melanie Kaczur, 
mek498@mail.usask.ca  
 
Questions or Concerns:  
 Contact the researcher(s) using the information at the top of page 1 
 This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board. Any questions regarding your rights as a 
participant may be addressed to that committee through the Research Ethics Office 
ethics.office@usask.ca (306) 966-2975. Out of town participants may call toll free (888) 
966-2975. 
 
Consent: 
 
By completing and submitting this questionnaire, your free and informed consent is implied 
and indicates that you understand the above conditions of participation in this study.  
 
 
A copy of this consent will be left with you, and a copy will be taken by the researcher. 
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Safety Attitudes in the College of Engineering 
The Department of Psychology together with the College of Engineering is conducting a survey 
about safety in the college. In this questionnaire we will ask you questions about your 
perceptions and attitudes regarding safety. There are no right or wrong answers as we are 
interested in your opinions. Please take the time to read the items and use the provided rating 
scales.  
Section 1: Demographics Please answer the following demographics questions. 
1. What is your gender? Please checkmark your answer. 
 Male          
 Female 
 Other 
 
2. What year were you born? Please write in the four digit year you were born (i.e., 
1992). 
                                 G 
3. What year of study are you currently in? Please checkmark your answer. 
 First year        
 Second year       
 Third year         
 Fourth year         
 Fifth year or above 
 
4. Which engineering discipline are you in? Please checkmark your answer. 
 Chemical & Biological Engineering (CBE) 
 Civil Engineering 
 Geological Engineering 
 Environmental Engineering 
 Electrical Engineering 
 Computer Engineering 
 Engineering Physics  
 Mechanical Engineering 
 
5. Do you have any previous industrial work experience (i.e., have you worked in the 
mining industry, construction industry, factory industry, manufacturing industry 
etc.) either as a permanent employee or as a summer student or intern? Please 
checkmark your answer. If yes, please state where you worked and what you did. 
 Yes 
 No 
What kind of work experience?                                                                            H      
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Section 2: Safety Related Episodes in the College 
Thinking back to your experiences at the university, which includes experiences that have 
occurred in the College of Engineering (i.e., does not include summer jobs or internships), 
answer the following questions. Please checkmark your answer.  
Definition: A near miss is a narrowly avoided accident that could have resulted in an injury. 
1. While you have been at the College how many times have you personally experienced: 
 Never 1 to 5 times 6 to 9 times Ten times 
or more 
A near miss? 
 
    
A minor injury that required first 
aid? 
    
A major injury that required 
medical attention? 
    
 
2. While you have been at the College how many times have you witnessed: 
 Never 1 to 5 times 6 to 9 times Ten times 
or more 
A near miss? 
 
    
A minor injury that required first 
aid? 
    
A major injury that required 
medical attention? 
    
A fatality?     
 
Do you have any comments regarding safety related episodes in the College? Please write 
them below. 
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Section 3: Safety Attitude Questions 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
Safety Policies and Procedures 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
When safety rules or procedures are 
changed, the changes are promptly 
communicated to all affected students. 
      
My college values students’ correct 
observation of safety rules and 
procedures.  
      
Students can explain health and safety 
policies in the College. 
      
Not all the health and safety rules or 
procedures are strictly followed here. 
      
Some health and safety rules or 
procedures are difficult to follow. 
      
In my college, disregarding safety 
policies and procedures is rare. 
      
It would help students to work more 
safely if safety procedures were more 
realistic. 
      
All the safety rules and procedures in 
my college really work. 
      
Safety procedures are carefully 
followed. 
      
Some safety rules and procedures do 
not need to be followed to get the task 
done safely. 
      
Some health and safety rules and 
procedures are not really practical. 
      
Safety is considered when changes are 
made to rules and procedures. 
      
Safety is not sacrificed for speed during 
a task. 
      
Safety is not sacrificed for quality 
during a task. 
      
Do you have any comments regarding safety policies and procedures in the College? Please 
write them below. 
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Safety Training  
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
Students have the necessary 
competence to perform tasks in a safe 
manner because of the safety training 
they have received.  
      
Most of the safety training students 
receive is effective.  
      
It would help students to work more 
safely if we received more frequent 
safety training. 
      
It would help students to work more 
safely if we were given better quality 
safety training. 
      
Our safety training program ensures all 
students who do the same task learn to 
do it the same safe way.  
      
When asked to do a new job or task, 
students receive enough training to be 
able to do it safely. 
      
 
Do you have any comments regarding the safety training in the College? Please write them 
below. 
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Safety Communication 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
Students are recognized for working 
safely.  
      
Reporting a safety problem will not 
result in negative repercussions for the 
persons reporting it.  
      
Students are rewarded for taking quick 
action to identify a safety problem.  
      
It would help students to work more 
safely if the instructors recognized and 
praised our safe behaviour.  
      
Students are not blamed for acting 
unsafely. 
      
If students violate safety regulations 
they will be disciplined.  
      
Students are not comfortable reporting 
a safety violation, because they will be 
disciplined.  
      
Students’ suggestions about safety 
would be acted upon if they expressed 
them to the instructors. 
      
There is good communication in the 
College between instructors and 
students about health and safety issues. 
      
Safety information is always brought to 
our attention by our instructor. 
      
Our instructor does not always inform 
us of current safety concerns and 
issues. 
      
Students frequently offer ideas and 
suggestions to improve safety. 
      
Accidents that happen here are always 
reported and discussed. 
      
 
Do you have any comments regarding the safety communication in the College? Please 
write them below. 
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Attitudes of Instructors and Supervisors 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
In my college, the instructor acts 
quickly to correct safety problems.  
      
Corrective action is always taken when 
the college is told about unsafe 
practices.  
      
In my college, instructors pay serious 
attention to the safety of students.  
      
Instructors and supervisors express 
concern if safety procedures are not 
adhered to.  
      
The college clearly considers the safety 
of students of great importance.  
      
Instructors sometimes turn a blind eye 
to people who are not observing the 
health and safety procedures.  
      
Our college supplies enough safety 
equipment. 
      
Our college checks equipment to make 
sure it is free of faults.  
      
Sometimes conditions here hinder my 
ability to work safely.  
      
I cannot always get the equipment I 
need to do the task safely. 
      
 
Do you have any comments regarding the safety attitudes of instructors in your College? 
Please write them below. 
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Students’ Attitudes toward Safety 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
I am encouraged by my fellow students 
to report any safety concerns I may 
have.  
      
Students take no responsibility for each 
other’s safety.  
      
I ask my fellow students to stop work 
which I believe is performed in an 
unsafe manner.  
      
My fellow students look out for my 
safety.  
      
When I see a fellow student working 
at-risk, I caution him or her.  
      
In my college, there is significant peer 
pressure to discourage unsafe practices.  
      
Students and instructors accept safety 
violations as long as there are no 
accidents.  
      
 
Do you have any comments regarding the safety attitudes of fellow students in your 
College? Please write them below. 
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Reflections on one’s own Safety Attitudes and Behaviors 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
I tend to take more risks in my tasks 
when instructors aren't present.  
      
If I make a mistake that has 
significant safety consequences and 
nobody notices, I do not tell anyone 
about it.  
      
I believe the most important part of 
completing a task is being safe.  
      
I believe that safety issues are not 
assigned a high priority in my 
College.  
      
I do not skip any safety step even to 
increase work efficiency.  
      
I cannot avoid taking risks in my 
College. 
      
I believe some tasks here are 
difficult to do safely.  
      
I pride myself on my ability to work 
safely.  
      
I hope to be known as a safe 
worker.  
      
I only get involved in safety 
activities because I'm required to do 
so.  
      
When people ignore safety 
procedures here, I feel it is none of 
my business. 
      
I practice the safety attitudes and 
behaviors I have learned in the 
College of Engineering in other 
contexts (i.e., home, work). 
      
Do you have any comments regarding your own safety attitudes and behaviors? Please 
write them below. 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU! 
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Participant Debriefing Form  
   
Culture and Climate of Safety in Organizations: Conceptualization and Assessment (BEH 16-
204).   
 
Researcher: Melanie Kaczur, Graduate Student, Applied Social Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, 
mek498@mail.usask.ca  
 
Supervisor: Dr. Valery Chirkov, Applied Social Psychology, v.chirkov@usask.ca  
 
Safety culture and safety climate have been used as predictors of injuries and accidents 
for decades (Varonen & Mattila, 2000). However, current researchers are in disagreement over 
the definition and understanding of these terms (Cooper, 2000). This has lead of an abundance of 
safety questionnaires that are not accurately measuring the concept of safety culture and climate, 
leading to ineffective and misleading research. Due to this limitation, existing literature was 
analyzed in order to create a single, unified definition of safety culture and safety climate that 
was used to develop a valid and reliable assessment tool. This study was conducted in order to 
determine the validity and reliability of the developed questionnaire. It is hoped that it will be an 
applicable and effective measure of safety climate for industry members 
Thank you very much for participating in our study. If you have any questions about the 
study or anything else you experienced in the study please feel free to email the researchers 
(mek498@mail.usask.ca or v.chirkov@usask.ca).  
Thank you again for your help in conducting this study! 
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Appendix S: Shortened Version of the Safety Climate ScaleH      
Section 3: Safety Attitude Questions 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
Safety Policies and Procedures 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
Some health and safety rules or 
procedures are difficult to follow. 
      
In my college, disregarding safety 
policies and procedures is rare. 
      
Safety procedures are carefully 
followed. 
      
Some health and safety rules and 
procedures are not really practical. 
      
Safety is not sacrificed for speed during 
a task. 
      
Safety is not sacrificed for quality 
during a task. 
      
 
Safety Training  
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
Students have the necessary 
competence to perform tasks in a safe 
manner because of the safety training 
they have received.  
      
Most of the safety training students 
receive is effective.  
      
It would help students to work more 
safely if we received more frequent 
safety training. 
      
It would help students to work more 
safely if we were given better quality 
safety training. 
      
When asked to do a new job or task, 
students receive enough training to be 
able to do it safely. 
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Safety Communication 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
Students are rewarded for taking quick 
action to identify a safety problem.  
      
Safety information is always brought to 
our attention by our instructor. 
      
 
Attitudes of Instructors and Supervisors 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
In my college, the instructor acts 
quickly to correct safety problems.  
      
Corrective action is always taken when 
the college is told about unsafe 
practices.  
      
Instructors and supervisors express 
concern if safety procedures are not 
adhered to.  
      
Sometimes conditions here hinder my 
ability to work safely.  
      
I cannot always get the equipment I 
need to do the task safely. 
      
 
Students’ Attitudes toward Safety 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
Students take no responsibility for each 
other’s safety.  
      
I ask my fellow students to stop work 
which I believe is performed in an 
unsafe manner.  
      
When I see a fellow student working 
at-risk, I caution him or her.  
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Reflections on one’s own Safety Attitudes and Behaviors 
How strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please check the 
answer that you feel best applies to your experiences at the College of Engineering. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
I do not skip any safety step even to 
increase work efficiency.  
      
I cannot avoid taking risks in my 
College. 
      
I believe some tasks here are 
difficult to do safely.  
      
I pride myself on my ability to work 
safely.  
      
I hope to be known as a safe 
worker.  
      
When people ignore safety 
procedures here, I feel it is none of 
my business. 
      
 
 
